Real Estate Law

Homeowners in same subdivision filed suit alleging that majority of lot behind house cannot be used to build structures due to utility easement, claiming fraud and misrepresentation. Question of fact exists as to negligent misrepresentations against brokers, and as to fraud. Promissory estoppel is unavailable as parties have acknowledged existence of contracts to purchase real estate. (DONOVAN and GOLDENHERSH, concurring.)

Defendant filed eviction action, and Plaintiff filed claim to quiet title which court dismissed with prejudice, and allowed eviction case to proceed. Court did not make determination of title in eviction proceeding, but found only that Defendant was entitled to possession of property and did not find that Defendant had superior claim of title. Thus, because issue of title was not decided in eviction proceeding, appeal of quiet title action is not barred by collateral estoppel. Cook County probate court did not lack power to determine title as to Du Page County real estate. Plaintiff's claim to title was not barred by res judicata, as it was through a separate trust deed executed by her mother, and thus she did not have absolute duty to file action to quiet title within probate proceeding. (HUTCHINSON and BURKE, concurring.)

Circuit court had jurisdiction to enter summary judgment in favor of Township and against State in action to quiet title, in dispute over parties' property rights as to two parcels of property described as a "public square" in Plat of 1860. Although Township's request to quiet title as to claim of ownership by State should not have been initiated in circuit court, State filed its own complaint to quiet title, thereby affirmatively invoking circuit court's jurisdiction in aid of its claim. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, THOMAS, GARMAN, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/9/11.) Court granted Trust's Section 2-1401 petition to vacate tax deed, but denied Trust's request for money damages. Court properly found, under law of the case doctrine, that corporation was not a bona fide purchaser for value, as the issue had already been decided. Court properly denied request for money damages, as Trust failed to establish what damages it incurred per terms of recapture agreement. (BOWMAN and ZENOFF, concurring.)

Forest preserve district filed condemnation action to acquire 204 acres (a public golf course and adjoining land). Jury valued property at $10.725 million as of 1999 complaint-filing date, but landowners contended that value had more than doubled. District had negotiated in good faith, but parties were unable to agree on purchase price; thus, District's filing of condemnation action was allowed. Court properly vacated jury verdict as to value, subject to possible reinstatement after hearing on just compensation using current value of property. In Illinois, a taking occurs on date that government deposits amount of compensation that has been ascertained and awarded, and acquires title and right to possession. (KILBRIDE, FREEMAN, GARMAN, KARMEIER, BURKE, and THEIS, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 11/22/11.) Court dismissed homeowners' affirmative defense, counterclaim and third-party-complaint, per Section 2-619, in mortgage foreclosure action, holding that their right to rescind mortgage expired under Truth in Lending Act (TILA) when they failed to exercise it within three years of receiving mortgage. Letters from homeowners and their counsel, and motion for leave to file counterclaim, did not affirmatively and clearly state their unqualified and present intent to rescind loan, and thus were not sufficient to rescind loan within three-year statute of repose in Section 1635(f) of TILA. As Section 13-207 allows claims for setoffs or counterclaims to be filed if barred by statute of limitation, homeowners are not prohibited from pursuing TILA Section 1640 damages claim under Illinois law. (LAVIN and STERBA, concurring.)