Subject Index Human Rights

On November 15, 1999, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of the defendant’s motion for judgment as a matter of law since the plaintiff, Tina Mizwicki, failed to set forth sufficient evide evidence to show that the defendant was an “employer” for purposes of Title VII.

On July 9, 1999, the Seventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois's determination that defendant/employer had violated the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 USC §2000e(k).

On May 7, 1999, the Illinois Appellate Court for the first district reversed the order and decision of the Illinois Human Rights Commission and held that a dental office was not a "place of public accommodation'' under the Illinois Human Rights Act Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.

If passed, House Bill 474 would add "sexual orientation'' to race, religion, sex, and eight other classifications already enumerated in the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq.

On February 8, 1999, the Seventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the United States District Court and held that a parent corporation can only be integrated with a subsidiary for purposes of determining whether the employer had a requisite number of employees for coverage by three federal anti-discrimination statutes.

On December 3, 1998, the Seventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Ameritech, the defendant.

On November 12, 1998, the first district of the Illinois Appellate Court held that the city's failure to consider accommodations in its hiring decisions regarding the blind plaintiff did not rise to the level of unlawful discrimination under the Human Rights Act because the plaintiff was not considered handicapped within the meaning of the Act.

On September 17, 1998, the Seventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the defendant agency had violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) by retali retaliating against them after a claim was brought with the EEOC for wrongful discharge.