This case concerns the state’s failure to bring evidence of the sole allegation in its petition, the judge nevertheless committing L.K. to a state facility, collateral legal consequences of mental health orders, and the right to confidentiality in court documents.

In L.K., the appellate court reversed a commitment order where the respondent represented himself pro se and elicited the state’s expert’s opinion that he did not meet the criteria for commitment that was alleged in the petition. ¶¶ 12, 30. The state’s petition alleged that L.K. had a mental illness and that because of his illness he was unable to provide for his basic physical needs so as to guard himself from serious harm without the assistance from family or others, unless treated on an inpatient basis. ¶ 1. At trial, however, the state’s expert testified only that L.K. should be involuntarily committed because he was reasonably expected to engage in conduct placing himself or another in physical harm or a reasonable expectation of physical harm unless the respondent was treated on an inpatient basis, though the petition did not state this as a basis for commitment. ¶ 9.

Despite the petition’s assertion that L.K. could not care for his basic physical needs, the state’s expert, Dr. Valdes, thought L.K. could care for his basic needs, as L.K. elicited during his pro se cross-examination. ¶¶ 12, 30. L.K. asked Dr. Valdes whether he was lacking as far as providing for his own basic needs. ¶ 12. Dr. Valdes testified “‘I’m not sure that that’s necessarily one of the things that we are trying to imply here. It’s more of a threat to others.’” ¶ 12, emphasis in original. L.K. then asked, “‘Oh, okay. So you don’t think that I have a problem providing my basic needs?” Dr. Valdes answered, “I think you can probably manage on your own, yes.’” ¶ 12, emphasis in original. The trial court found L.K. subject to commitment on both bases – harm (not alleged in the petition) and needs (alleged in the petition but contrary to Dr. Valdes’s opinion). ¶ 14.

On appeal, the state conceded that the trial court erred in committing L.K. to a mental health facility on theories not alleged in the petition, but argued that there was enough evidence in the record to support commitment based on L.K.’s purported inability to care for his needs. ¶ 28. The appellate court disagreed, finding that a commitment order must be supported by an expert medical opinion based on clear and convincing facts. ¶ 29. As there was no expert opinion that L.K. could not care for his basic physical needs, and only the contrary expert opinion that he could care for his needs, the appellate court reversed the order. ¶ 30.

As there are two previous opinions about whether the state’s proof matched its pleadings, (In re Moore, 292 Ill. App. 3d 1069 (1st Dist. 1997); In re Joseph S., 339 Ill. App. 3d 599 (1st Dist. 2003)), this case is perhaps more noteworthy for the way it addresses the collateral consequences exception to the mootness doctrine, and because it takes care to protect L.K.’s privacy after the state appended a document containing L.K.’s full name in the appendix to its appellate brief.

The appellate court applied the collateral-consequences exception to L.K.’s appeal, as L.K. argued that a commitment order would adversely affect him in seeking employment and “pointed to specific concerns related to licensure in professions, which the record supports finding the respondent has pursued.” ¶¶ 21-26. The state had argued against application of the collateral-consequences exception, contending that the same restrictions on L.K.’s ability to pursue professional careers stemming from a commitment order would also result from a subsequent order for involuntary medication that L.K. did not appeal. ¶ 22. The state attached to its brief this unredacted court order for medication that included L.K.’s full name. ¶¶ 22, 24.

L.K. moved to strike the medication order from the state’s brief. ¶ 22. The appellate court granted his motion and additionally placed the state’s brief under seal, relying on Supreme Court Rules 341 and 364 that require briefs to identify a recipient of mental health services in appeals under the Mental Health Code by their first name and last initial or, by initials only when the recipient has an unusual first name or spelling. ¶¶ 22-24. The court also reiterated that the record on appeal cannot be supplemented by attaching documents to the appendix of a brief. ¶ 24.

Regarding the effect of a subsequent medication order on the question of the collateral consequences of a commitment order, L.K. argued that a medication order does not carry the same implications as a commitment order: A commitment order stems in part from the state’s police authority to protect society from dangerous persons while a medication order stems solely from the state’s parens patriae power to care for its residents. ¶ 25. L.K. also argued that a reversal of a commitment order invalidates a medication order. ¶ 25. In the John N. case, the respondent appealed both a commitment order and a medication order. ¶ 25 citing John N., 364 Ill. App. 3d 996 (2006). After reversing the commitment order, the John N. appellate court reversed the medication order as well, reasoning that the medication order was dependent on the respondent receiving treatment on an inpatient basis at a mental health facility. ¶ 25. Thus, because the court “’reversed the order concerning the respondent’s involuntary admission, he will no longer be receiving *** treatment at the mental health facility and therefore no longer qualifies as a ‘recipient of services’ for involuntary administration of medication.’” ¶ 25, citing John N., 364 Ill. App. at 997; In re Carol B., 2017 IL App (4th) 160604, ¶ 67. The L.K. appellate court similarly found, “Despite the lack of a current appeal, respondent could seek to invalidate the order for medication based on an order invalidating the order for involuntary admission.” ¶ 26. And, “to the extent respondent’s ‘consequences’ arise from the order from medication, as the state argues, respondent is ‘threatened with an actual injury’ traceable to the order for admission that is ‘likely to be redressed by a favorable decision’ in this case.” ¶ 26, quoting Alfred H.H., 233 Ill. 2d at 361. Based on the above reasoning and on the consequences from the commitment order on licensure in professions L.K. has pursued, the court applied the collateral consequences to review (and reverse) L.K.’s commitment order. ¶ 26.

This case also underscores that one should not underestimate the abilities of a person because of their diagnosis of mental illness. Despite Dr. Valdes’s description and opinion of L.K., L.K. did well representing himself. Dr. Valdes had described L.K. as showing “a lot” of negative symptoms of schizophrenia such as social withdrawal, catatonic behavior, and selective mutism. ¶ 8. Dr. Valdes testified that L.K. spent most of the day in bed in a fetal position covered from head to toe with a blanket and that he covered his face while eating meals. ¶ 8. L.K. had never talked to or responded to Dr. Valdes’s questions. ¶ 8. In contrast to Dr. Valdes’s depiction of L.K., the court had permitted L.K. to represent himself, and he skillfully did so. L.K. not only elicited Dr. Valdes’s opinion that he could indeed care for himself, leading to the reversal of the commitment order, but asked questions forcing Dr. Valdes to admit L.K. was not “not showing necessarily acute abnormal behavior.” ¶ 11, 12.

On cross-examination, L.K. asked Dr. Valdes “if he would say that [L.K.] was ‘normal right now or would you say I’m symptomatic.’” ¶ 11. Dr. Valdes replied that at that point L.K. was symptomatic because he was not able to acknowledge his behavior before and during his hospitalization and “‘that you are not able to address that as having been abnormal.’” ¶ 11. L.K. asked if ‘his “behavior was ‘abnormal right now?’” ¶ 11 “Dr. Valdes answered, ‘As we are speaking right now, you’re saying? No, at this point [you] are not showing necessarily acute abnormal behavior.’” ¶ 11. During L.K.’s cross-examination, Dr. Valdes also conceded that L.K. was not conducting himself in a way that was acutely disorganized. ¶ 11.

In sum, the appellate court reversed the commitment order the trial court had entered despite the state’s failure to prove the sole basis alleged in the petition. ¶ 30.

Ann Krasuski is a staff attorney with the Illinois Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, West Suburban (Hines) Office.