Court’s Improper Denial of Pro Se Right Results in New Trial for Defendant

People v. Rodriguez-Aranda, 2022 IL App (2d) 200715, opinion filed June 29, 2022

The second district appellate court reversed the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County and remanded the case for a new trial due to the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s request to represent himself pro se and the improper shackling of defendant during the court proceedings of the bench trial. ¶ 1. The appellate court agreed with defendant that the court erred in denying his request to represent himself and in leaving him mostly shackled for the duration of the trial. ¶ 1.

Background

On November 20, 2015, defendant purportedly stabbed his wife in a jealous rage, and upon realizing what he had done, turned the knife on himself with suicidal intent. ¶ 7. After being discovered at the brink of death the following morning, defendant was taken to the Order of St. Francis Medical Center for treatment. ¶ 7 Defendant then spent a week in hospital before he was placed under arrest, read his Miranda rights, and interviewed on November 30, 2015. ¶ 8.

On September 13, 2016, defendant’s counsel filed a motion to suppress defendant’s statements made in the November 30, 2015, interview, arguing that defendant did not have the capacity to waive his Miranda rights, because he had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, prescribed psychotropic medication, and was in a compromised physical state due to his suicide attempt. ¶ 12. The State hired Dr. Lichtenwald to examine the defendant and prepare a report on defendant’s capacity to waive his Miranda rights. ¶ 12. While the motion to suppress would eventually be withdrawn by defendant’s counsel, Dr. Lichtenwald’s report still entered the record before that time. ¶ 12.

Dr. Lichtenwald’s report concluded that defendant was competent to waive his Miranda rights. ¶ 15.  While a hospital psychiatrist had initially diagnosed defendant as schizophrenic and prescribed defendant psychotropic medication during his initial stay in the hospital, ¶ 13, in the following months, defendant denied having any mental illness, denied experiencing suicidal ideation beyond the first two days of his hospitalization, and showed no signs of mental illness even after having been off all psychotropic medications for over a year. ¶ 14.

Following the withdrawal of the motion to suppress, when asked by the trial court if he intended to accept a plea deal arranged by his trial attorney on May 3, 2018, defendant made a request of the court. Defendant declared that he did not wish to plead guilty and after stating his preference that he be assigned new counsel that spoke Spanish, requested that he be allowed to represent himself. ¶ 17. The court told defendant that while he did not have to plead guilty, it would not assign new counsel, and at length, admonished defendant as to the ill-advisedness of representing oneself generally, with particular emphasis put on the fact that the defendant neither read nor spoke English. ¶ 19. The court then inquired into whether defendant had ever received a mental health diagnosis and was informed by the present attorneys that defendant had at one point been diagnosed with schizophrenia. ¶ 19. When asked if there was any evidence in reports that was inconsistent with that diagnosis, neither attorney could recall any such evidence offhand and this was accepted by the court. ¶ 20. The court then entered an order denying defendant’s request to proceed pro se on three bases: his schizophrenia diagnosis, his inability to understand English, and his disruptive behavior in court. ¶ 21. Defendant would again express his dissatisfaction with his assigned counsel and request that he be allowed to proceed pro se. ¶ 23.

When the case proceeded to bench trial the defense counsel requested the defendant have his hands unshackled for the trial. ¶ 25. Only defendant’s right hand was unshackled so that he could take notes. ¶ 25. In a post-trial motion defendant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective, the court erred in denying his request to represent himself, and the court erred in leaving his left hand shackled at trial. ¶ 26. The trial court denied his motion, and regarding defendant’s shackling, the court stated that the right not to be handcuffed or shackled in a jury trial does not extend to bench trials. ¶ 27.

On appeal, the state maintained that “defendant did not clearly, unequivocally, and unambiguously request to proceed pro se and that his main request was for a new attorney. . . or a new interpreter[.]” ¶ 35.

Analysis

Defendant’s Right to Self-Representation

Regarding the State’s claim that defendant did not unequivocally and unambiguously request to proceed pro se, the appellate court found that three requests and the trial court’s lengthy admonishments clearly established that the court understood the defendant’s request and that this understanding was sufficient. Citing, Rainey, 2019 IL App (1st) 160187, ¶ 43. ¶ 37.
The court also found that the trial court had “intricately” linked the defendant’s inability to read and speak English to his legal ability to represent himself. ¶ 40. The court held this denial of the defendant’s right to proceed pro se was improper, as such denials can neither be based merely on a lack of legal knowledge and ability, nor on the courts belief that it would be unwise for a defendant to proceed in such a manner. ¶ 41.

Concerning the trial court’s finding that defendant had forfeited his right to self-representation, the court found no basis to support such a finding. ¶ 45. The court held that given that the right to represent oneself is fundamental, trial courts must endure some degree of unorthodox or even irritating behavior from pro se defendants. ¶ 45. While the court stated that had his behavior required his removal from the court room, had he threatened or insulted the court, or had he refused to participate in proceedings, such behaviors might justify baring defendant from representing himself.  ¶ 45.  However, defendant’s behavior did not cross the bounds within which trial courts must tolerate the rough demeanor of pro se defendants. ¶ 45. The court expanded on this, finding that the mere fact that the trial court had admonished defendant for the occasional interruption or for speaking too quickly, it did not signal that his behavior rose to the level of egregiousness necessary to bar pro se representation, and that behavior merely less respectful than typical does not reflect that the defendant was abusive or insulting toward the court. ¶ 45.

Furthermore, the court found “the trial court abused its discretion when it denied defendant’s request to represent himself, based simply on a prior diagnosis of schizophrenia without reviewing all the medical records. . . and without otherwise more fully considering defendant’s present ability to conduct trial proceeding by himself.” Citing Rainey, 2019 IL App (1st )160187, ¶ 76. ¶ 60. The court held that a bright-line ruling precluding the defendant from proceeding pro se on grounds of his schizophrenia diagnosis and the trial judge’s reliance on the fleeting recollections of detailed documents by the present attorneys did not satisfy the need for an individualized inquiry due when contemplating this type of right’s restriction. Citing generally, Indiana v. Edwards, 55 U.S. 164 (2008). ¶ 51. The court noted that the mere presence of a severe mental illness is insufficient to support the denial of defendant’s right to proceed pro se and must instead demonstrate defendant is delusional or irrational at the time of trial. Citing People v. Washington, 2016IL App (1st) 131198. ¶ 54.

The court agreed with defendant that his purported diagnosis, with no findings on how said diagnosis affected his ability to represent himself, did not support the trial court’s finding that he was incompetent to conduct trial proceedings on his own. ¶ 55. The court found in this case that the trial court was insufficiently familiar with defendant’s mental health, ¶ 57, to the point that it appeared that no one present had thoroughly examined the report upon which they purportedly based their findings. ¶ 58. Upon review of Dr. Lichtenwald’s report, the court found support for the notion that defendant’s prior diagnosis did not render him unable to represent himself. ¶ 58. The court further observed that the trial court’s consideration of defendant’s attempted suicide over two years prior to the proceedings, without any subsequent suicidal ideation or attempts, had little bearing on defendant’s current competency to represent himself at trial. ¶ 59.
Based on the multitude of structural defects in defiance of harmless error analysis in the trial court’s findings above, the court reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded for new trial. ¶ 60.

Leaving Defendant Partially Shackled at Trial was Improper

The court then briefly touched on the issue of defendant remaining shackled at trial. On this issue the court found that the trial court’s assertion that the defendant’s right to be unshackled extended only to jury trial proceedings was incorrect. Citing, People v. Allen, 222 Ill. 2d 340, 346 (2006). ¶ 63. The court held that the trial court should have either fully granted the request to be unshackled or held a hearing to determine the shackles’ necessity in accordance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 430. ¶ 64.

Nicholas Hengels-Chinn is a third year law student at DePaul University College of Law. The author is also an intern at the Illinois Guardianship & Advocacy Commission. He may be contacted at NHENGELS@depaul.edu.