Traffic Laws & Courts

The newsletter of the ISBA’s Section on Traffic Laws & Courts

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2003 Articles

Appellate court holds Supreme Court Rule 504 is applicable to DUI cases By Larry A. Davis May 2003 Since the Supreme Court's decision in 1976 in Village of Park Forest v. Fagan, 64 Ill. 2d 264, 356 N.E. 2d 59 (1976), it has been this author's experience that many courts have been reluctant or have refused to apply the provisions of Supreme Court Rule 504 (166 Ill. 2d R. 504) to major traffic offenses, such as DUI.
The constitutionality of city ordinances governing administrative adjudication of parking compliance violations: Van Harken v. City of Chicago By Lawrence W. Terrell May 2003 In Van Harken v. City of Chicago 713 N.E. 2d 754, 305 IL. App 3d 972 (IL App. 1 District 1999), the Illinois Appellate Court held that the administrative adjudication scheme established by the City of Chicago does not violate the state constitution.
Driving below the posted speed limit as the basis for stopping a vehicle By J. Brick Van Der Snick May 2003 In an interesting decision (and not uncommon situation confronted by defense counsel) the Second Appellate District has issued a decision in a case where the officer stopped the vehicle for traveling below the posted speed limit. People v. Karen Isaac, 2-01-0660, (filed December 4, 2002).
Recent cases By James J. Ahern May 2003 Three days following the defendant's arrest, he moved the court to preserve all transmissions by the Prospect Heights Police Communications Section for a period of 11/2 hours before his arrest, which occurred at 7:25 p.m. and for 21/2 hours after his arrest.
Second Appellate District holds that the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to statutory summary suspension hearings—A critique By Larry A. Davis May 2003 In Village of Algonquin v. Tilden, 335 Ill. App. 3d 332, 280 N.E. 2d 832; 269 Ill. Dec. 360 (2nd D, 2002), the Second Appellate District held that a defendant can be compelled to testify as an adverse witness in a hearing conducted pursuant to her petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension without implicating the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination.