Real Estate Law

Under the Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (RLTO), a tenant who sues for violation of RLTO and prevails is entitled to reasonable attorney fees and all court costs related to that action. The fee-shifting provision of the RLTO applies to a postjudgment petition, brought under Section 2-1401, attacking that result. Thus, the tenant is entitled to fees and costs for successfully opposing postjudgment petition in circuit court.(McBRIDE and COBBS, concurring.)

An allegation that a plaintiff is a mortgagee pursuant to Section 15-1208 of Mortgage Foreclosure Law is sufficient to plead capacity to sue. By attaching copies of mortgage and a note endorsed in blank to the complaint, Plaintiff sufficiently pled that it was bringing suit in the capacity of legal holder of the indebtedness.(GORDON and LAMPKIN, concurring.) 

Condominium association won a judgment and order for possession for Defendant's condominium due to her failure to pay $1,863 in assessments for common expenses. Court denied Defendant's 9 motions to vacate judgment. Evidence was presented of existence of a balance owed and a signed lease. Forcible Entry and Detainer Act does not mandate evidentiary hearing, but only sufficient evidence adduced by movant that judgment has been cured and property has not been leased. Defendant's attempt to pay outstanding balance 2 months after her eviction is sufficient evidence that she had not cured default. Court's order denying Defendant's motion to vacate was supported by evidence and is not against manifest weight of evidence, as Defendant had not cured judgment and property had been leased. (MASON and LAVIN, concurring.)

Service of process on Defendant in Cook County foreclosure action was improper, as no order was entered appointing a special process server.  Thus, court lacked personal jurisdiction over Defendant, and judgment was void.  However, jurisdictional defect does not affirmatively appear on face of the record. Service lists and affidavits of service would lead a reasonably prudent purchaser to conclude that service took place in DuPage County, thus permitting service by special process server without appointment by court. Thus, no basis in record to conclude that third-party purchasers, who purchased property later at sheriff's sale, were anything but bona fide purchasers under Section 2-1401(e) of Code of Civil Procedure, and their rights to the property were thus protected.(McLAREN and BURKE, concurring.)

Appellate court is without jurisdiction over appeal, because order from which Appellant appealed was not a final judgment, and Appellant provided no alternative basis which would allow this court to exercise jurisdiction over her appeal. The fact that Appellant , who failed to properly intervene in trial court proceedings, filed a motion, and the court ruled on it, cannot turn order into a final appealable judgment.(HOWSE and ELLIS, concurring.) 

Plaintiffs and Defendants are neighbors in subdivision in Winnetka.  Defendants own bechfront property and thus have unfettered access to beach year-round.  Plaintiffs, whose properties are not beachfront properties, have access to beach via beach easement, but access limited by gate installed by Village that is often locked. Plaintiffs filed suit seeking determination that they had a right to cross over Defendants' property to access beach so they would have unrestricted access.Court properly found that Plaintiffs failed to establish either express easement for ingress and egress over Defendants' property or existence of easement by prescription. Court properly entered judgment in Defendants' favor, after trial on Plaintiffs' claim of easement by necessity, finding that at time of original conveyance, a ready means of ingress and egress to beach existed that did not entail crossing over Defendants' property. Underlying disputes were not commenced for harassment purposes only, and court properly denied Defendants' Rule 137 motion for sanctions. (LAVIN and PUCINSKI, concurring.)