On December 20, 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, and vacated the sentence imposed by the Circuit Court of Cook County on the defendant.
On December 22, 2005, the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, modified a decision of the Circuit Court of DuPage County, which convicted the defendant of two counts of domestic battery.
Due to Illinois' strong public policy to protect its citizens from the economic effects of motor fuel theft, the Illinois General Assembly has added Article 16J to the Criminal Code of 1961, 720 ILCS 5/Art. 16J, et seq, in order to protect the people "in their health, safety and welfare from the effects of this crime."
On December 15, 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirming the defendant's ten-year prison term for involuntary manslaughter of a family or household member.
On December 1, 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court reinstated the defendant's appeal for post-conviction relief and remanded his case to the Illinois Appellate Court, First District.
Effective June 1, 2006, the Criminal Code of 1961, 720 ILCS 5/16-22 et seq, is amended by adding section 16-22, which makes "tampering with a security, fire, or life safety system" a Class 4 felony.
The Illinois generally Assembly amended section 12-10 of the Criminal Code of 1961, 720 ILCS 5/12-10 et seq, by lowering the minimum age in subsection (a) required for a person to get a tattoo in Illinois from age 21 to age 18.
On october 20, 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, reversing the defendant's burglary conviction.
In order to consider the emotional implications of sexual abuse victims testifying at multiple trials, section 114-8(b) of the Criminal Code of 1963, 725 ILCA 5/114-8, is amended.
On August 18, 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, denying the defendant's motion for remand.
On June 30, 2005, the Illinois Appellate Court, First District, affirmed the defendant's murder conviction, which he received following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County.
When a court interprets a statute in favor of a criminal defendant, must that interpretation be applied to events that happened before that case
was decided? Yes, this author opines.
On June 3, 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, and the Circuit Court of Ogle County, sentencing the defendant to two years of probation on several counts of possession of child pornography.
On May 6, 2005, the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded a decision of the Lake County Circuit Court convicting the defendant of various charges relating to his arrest for speeding and possession of illegal substances.
On March 31, 2005, the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, reversed the judgment, via a jury verdict, of the Circuit Court of Du Page County, convicting the defendant of misdemeanor theft of services.
Effective on January 1, 2005, in addition to any other sentencing alternatives for a second or subsequent conviction for domestic battery, an individual will be automatically sentenced to a minimum of 72 consecutive hours in prison.
On March 8, 2005, the Illinois Appellate Court, Fourth District, affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court of Champaign County, convicting the defendants on counts of aggravated battery, resisting a police officer, and obstructing a police officer.
On February 3, 2005, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decisions of both the appellate and circuit courts, which granted the defendant's motion to suppress the results of his blood and urine tests.
On February 15, 2005, the Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, reversed and remanded the Circuit Court of Kane County's decision rejecting the defendant's Supreme Court Rule 604(d) motion.
Effective immediately, any person who knowingly operates an audiovisual recording function on a device where a motion picture is being exhibited, without permission from the owner or lessee of the exhibition facility and of the licensor of the motion picture being exhibited, is guilty of criminal use of a motion picture exhibition facility.
