Real Estate Law

Court entered judgment of foreclosure and order confirming subsequent judicial sale. Court properly ordered stricken all 6 amended affirmative defenses of Defendant Varan, as they contain unsupported allegations of law and fact. Court properly denied Varan's motion to strike Plaintiff's Rule 113 affidavit and granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. Affidavit was in substantial compliance with requirements of Rule 113. Varan failed to submit counteraffidavit contradicting allegations in affidavit. Defendant Fiandaca's notice of appeal only sought review of order denying him leave to vacate technical defaults and to file a counterclaim and order denying him leave to file response to Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. These orders were not final, appealable orders under Rule 301. Thus,  Fiandaca's appeal is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (HOFFMAN and DELORT, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed petition to quiet title against Defendants. Court properly granted summary judgment for Plaintiff. Defendants failed to strictly comply with Section 12-101 of Code of Civil Procedure, as their 9/16/04 memorandum of judgment inaccurately stated that a default judgment was entered in their favor on 8/6/03, when actually the default judgment in favor of both Defendants became final on 3/29/04. The 9/16/04 memorandum of judgment was defective as it could not put prospective purchasers on notice that, at that time, the default judgment was nonfinal and entered only in favor of one Defendant. Defendants' 2/28/06 memorandum of judgment incorrectly identifies the amount of the default judgment,a nd thus Defendant failed to strictly comply with Section 12-101. (CARTER and HOLDRIDGE, concurring.)

The Illinois Commerce Commission granted plaintiff eminent-domain authority to acquire easements over certain real estate for a planned construction of an oil pipeline.  Landowners filed a traverse motion challenging plaintiff's right to build the pipeline but their motion was denied by the trial court and awarded just compensation.  The Appellate Court reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court had failed to conduct a proper traverse hearing and should allow the landowners to challenge the rebuttable presumptions of public use and public necessity and the Commission's determination as to good faith.  However, the trial court should conduct the discovery process consistent with the limited nature of a traverse motion.  Defendants appealed a denial of a discovery request seeking information on the the involvement of a third party with the pipeline project.  The Appellate Court upheld the denial of the discovery request because a third-party's involvement was not relevant for determining whether the pipeline is primarily for the benefit, use, or enjoyment of the public.  The request was irrelevant to the limited purpose of a traverse hearing and was unduly burdensome.  (HOLDER WHITE and TURNER, concurring.)

A cause of action for inverse condemnation is not cognizable when a quasi-governmental entity acquires a prescriptive flood easement over private property due to the inaction of previous landowners over a long period of time, as the easement arose before the owner acquired an interest in the property. The prescriptive easement is a granting, and is neither an actual taking nor a regulatory taking, and compensation is not required.(OVERSTREET and MOORE, concurring.)

Plaintiffs (sellers) sued Defendants (buyers) for breach of contract arising from a real estate transaction; court awarded them $5608 plus costs, and denied their petition for attorney fees.  Sale contract, which contained short sale addendum, was for $410,000; buyers refused to close due to dispute with their lender. Plaintiffs then sold property, in short sale, to another buyer for $375,000. Collateral-source rule is not implicated, because bank absorbed the loss, and loan forgiveness was not a payment to Plaintiffs but a necessary condition for Plaintiffs to sell the property, and Plaintiffs agreed, as a condition of short sale, to walk away from transaction with zero. Contract for short sale does not relieve a plaintiff from having to prove an actual loss. (HUTCHINSON and HUDSON, concurring.)