Real Estate Law

Court entered order approving sale in mortgage foreclosure action. Plaintiff's description of improvements of real estate, in public notice of sale, provided prospective buyer with enough information so as to allow them to perform their due diligence. Even if description were viewed as defective, it was not a material error. Defendant failed to show that property sold for significantly less than its value, and thus failed to show good cause under section 15-1508(d) of Mortgage Foreclosure Law so as to have sale held invalid or set aside.  (GORDON and BURKE, concurring.)

In mortgage foreclosure action, court approved sale in favor of Plaintiff bank. As deed to property subsequently vested to a 3rd party, under section 15-1509(c) of Foreclosure Law, court properly confirmed sale of property although court should have conducted evidentiary hearing on question of whether parties entered into a loan modification agreement. Remanded for court to conduct a hearing to determine correct amount of surplus. (GORDON and BURKE, concurring.)

Court entered default judgment in mortgage foreclosure action.Court properly denied Defendant’s motion to quash service. Summons substantially adopts the appearance and content of the summons form in Illinois Supreme Court rules. Summons clearly identifies Defendant as a defendant in a pending foreclosure action, identifying her by her first and last name. Trial court’s jurisdiction vested when summons was served on Defendant. (JORGENSEN and HUDSON, concurring.)

Respondent Fannie Mae filed mortgage foreclosure action; court entered default judgment and Fannie Mae purchased the property at judicial sale. Six years later, Petitioners filed section 2-1401 petition alleging judgment of foreclosure was void, as they were not named in caption to summons, and thus court had no personal jurisdiction over them. Petitioners are estopped from asserting judgment was invalid by their lack of diligence and resulting prejudice to subsequent purchasers.(BIRKETT and BRENNAN, concurring.)

Plaintiff bank filed foreclosure complaint; court entered default judgment and property was sold at judicial sale. Six years later, Defendants filed petition for relief from void judgment, arguing that they were not properly served and thus court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. Court properly granted Bank's motion to dismiss on basis of laches.Defendants' unreasonable delay in filing complaint allowed them to increase the damages they could claim and resulted in property's transfer to bona fide purchasers, resulting in prejudice to Bank.  (McLAREN adn BRIDGES, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 8/14/20.) Plaintiff filed mortgage foreclosure complaint and served Defendant, through a special process server. Court granted Plaintiff's motion for default judgment, and court confirmed report of sheriff's sale. Seven years later, Defendant filed petition to quash service of process and vacate all orders and judgments. The affidavit of the special process server shows that substitute service of summons and complaint was made on Defendant at an address in Chicago, but does not indicate whether service was in Cook or Du Page County. Thus, the record does not affirmatively show that service took place in Cook County. Affidavit of service would lead a reasonably prudent purchaser to conclude that service was proper. Because jurisdictional defect does not affirmatively appear on face of record, Section 2-1401(e) protects bona fide purchaser's rights in the property, as well as interests of MERS and successor in interest to Plaintiff.Court properly dismissed Defendant's petition. (HUTCHINSON and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

In mortgage foreclosure action, court entered order approving sale of property in favor of bank. Defendant had entered into a loan modification agreement with Plaintiff. Court should have conducted evidentiary hearing as to status of Defendant's loan modification prior to confirming the sale, as there is a question as to whether parties entered into a loan modification agreement. As deed conveying title to the property was executed after confirmation of sale and recorded by Recorder of Deeds, title to property has vested by deed to a 3rd party, and thus Defendant's claim is barred. There is sufficient evidence to warrant a hearing as to the proper amount of the surplus, and remanded for purpose of conducting a hearing on that issue. (GORDON and BURKE, concurring.)

Court properly entered orders granting summary judgment, statutory damages, and attorney fees against purchaser of a foreclosed Chicago apartment, on the existing tenant's claim that new owner failed to comply with ordinance requiring it to offer relocation assistance or to continue the tenancy within 63 days of acquiring the property. Ordinance required that new owner should have made offer by the 63rd day of taking ownership, but it did not make offer until its 187th day of ownership. Tenant did not make an express waiver of her right to damages and fees. Tenant's fee request was supported by affidavits as to tasks performed by her attorney.(ELLIS and HOWSE, concurring.)

In 2006, MERS, acting as nominee for original mortgage lender, filed release and satisfaction of 2006 mortgage agreement, and later recorded a certificate of error as to release and satisfaction. In 2010, MERS assigned lender's interest, and assignee then filed foreclosure complaint. Eight years later, court resolved cross-motions for summary judgment. Court properly denied Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings and motion for summary judgment due to the existence of material disputed facts. Court erred in granting summary judgment for lender due to existence of disputed material facts. Court's subsequent orders are thus vacated. Remanded with directions for trial court to reach the merits of Defendant's motion for leave to file a 2nd amended answer and affirmative defenses. (CARTER, concurring; HOLDRIDGE, concurring in part and dissenting in part.)