Quick takes from today's Illinois Supreme Court opinions
Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review today's Supreme Court opinions from Civil cases Speed District 802 v. Warning, Ries v. The City of Chicago, Johnston v. Weil, Kaufman v. Schroeder, M.D., LaSalle Bank National Association v. Cypress Creek 1, and Criminal cases People v. Baez and People v. Comage.
CIVIL
Speed District 802 v. Warning
By Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams Montgomery & John Ltd. The reviewing courts have struggled with this case, resulting in a divided Illinois Supreme Court reversing the (divided) appellate court judgment and setting aside a decision of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (“the Board”). At issue was whether the SPEED District 802 (“the District”) violated two sections of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (“the Act”) when it failed to renew the teaching contract of Warning, who was a nontenured probationary teacher. Warning had insisted on bringing a teacher’s union representative with her to “remediation meetings” that were designed to improve her performance. The detailed facts reflected that there was much conflict between Warning and the school principal regarding the representative’s attendance at these meetings. Following several meetings, Warning was advised that her teaching contract would terminate at the end of that school year. Warning and the SPEED Education Association then filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board, contending that Warning had been dismissed in retaliation for having union representation at the meetings. The Act prohibits educational employers from taking adverse action against an employee as a result of protected union activity or discriminating against an employee based on union activity. But, the majority found that Warning did not have a right, under the collective-bargaining agreement, to have union representation at these meetings. Accordingly, she did not prove that she was engaged in “union activity” and, therefore, there could be no finding that the District discriminated against her for engaging in protected activity. The Board’s decision (finding that the District committed an unfair labor practice by not renewing Warning’s contract) was therefore “clearly erroneous.” Lengthy dissenting opinions challenged the decision to overturn the Board’s determination that the District committed an unfair labor practice. The three dissenters disagreed, however, as to the scope of the proper remedy.Johnston v. Weil
By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC Answering “no” to the following certified question, the Illinois Supreme Court has ruled that a court-ordered psychiatric evaluation can be shared in a custody proceeding without running afoul of the Confidentiality Act: Whether evaluations, communications, reports and information obtained pursuant to section *** 604(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage [Act] [citation] are confidential under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act [citation] where the 604(b) professional personnel to advise the court is a psychiatrist or other mental health professional. Plaintiff Heather Johnston had twice been divorced and had a child during each marriage. Pursuant to the first husband’s request to modify a joint parenting agreement, the circuit court appointed a psychiatrist, Dr. Phyllis Amabile, to conduct an evaluation. Dr. Amabile advised Johnston that the information obtained would be disclosed to the court, all parties and their attorneys and reported her findings to the court. When the second husband sought custody of his and Johnston’s daughter and tried to subpoena Dr. Amabile, Johnston asserted that the report was privileged. Johnston and her parents then sued her ex-husbands, their attorneys, and her children’s representatives for violating the Confidentiality Act. The circuit court denied motions to dismiss but agreed to certify the question above. The court considered the parties’ competing interpretations of section 604(b) of the Marriage Act, which allows a court to seek professional advice and obtain the written report of a professional, without exception for psychiatrists. Although disclosure is confined to the proceedings in which the judge orders the report, guided by the overriding principle of determining the best interests of the child, the supreme court held that a court may consider such evidence. The Confidentiality Act was not implicated because no therapeutic relationship existed; as all were aware, Dr. Amabile was consulted to evaluate the parties for the court, not to treat Johnston. The supreme court majority read section 10(a)(1) of the Confidentiality Act, relied on by dissenting Justice Kilbride to limit disclosure, only to prevent a party in a dissolution proceeding from discovering the mental health records of her opponent.Kaufmann v. Schroeder
By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC Splitting again over the deceptively-complex question of what claims “arise out of patient care,” as set forth in both 735 ILCS 5/13-212(a) and section 8-101(b) of the Tort Immunity Act, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that a patient’s action against a community hospital is time-barred. The plaintiff, Kristen Kaufmann, was hospitalized for treatment of a urinary tract infection by her obstetrician-gynecologist, Dr. Roger Schroeder. Alleging that Schroeder unnecessarily sedated her and that she awoke to find him licking her breasts, Kaufmann sued Schroeder and Jersey Community Hospital, Schroeder’s employer and the location of the alleged assault. The hospital obtained a dismissal based on the one-year statute of limitations in 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a), which applies to claims against local public entities other than actions arising out of patient care, which are governed by the two-year limitations period in section 8-101(b). Writing for the court, Justice Burke, joined by Justice Theis, relied on the earlier decisions interpreting the operative statutory language. Those decisions, Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill. 2d 502 (2007), and Orlak v. Loyola University Health System, 228 Ill. 2d 1 (2007), establish the “arising out of patient care” standard: the injury must originate in, stem from or result from the patient’s medical care or treatment. The court observed that the only harm alleged resulted from the sexual assault, and not any medical treatment and concluded that Schroeder’s unnecessary sedation was simply a means to accomplish his sexual assault, which was not medical care. Justice Freeman, with Justices Thomas and Karmeier, specially concurred to elaborate on the legal standard set forth in Brucker and to emphasize that the plaintiff’s injury arose from alleged criminal acts that did not meet the “arising out of” standard. Justices Garman and Kilbride disagreed. Analyzing in detail the prior decisions interpreting section 13-212(a) and the meaning of “arising out of,” Justice Garman concluded that the broadly-worded statute applied to the facts alleged, where a physician who was treating the plaintiff inflicted the injury. In Justice Garman’s view, Schroeder’s ability to commit the alleged assault directly resulted from his actual and pretextual treatment; therefore, Kaufmann’s injuries “arose out of patient care.”LaSalle Bank National Association v. Cypress Creek 1
By Michael T. Reagan, The Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan In LaSalle Bank National Association v. Cypress Creek 1, LP the issue is "how to distribute foreclosure sale proceeds between a mortgagee and Mechanic's Lien claimants when the mortgage pre-dated the liens, the foreclosure sale proceeds are insufficient to satisfy all claims, and the mortgagee has paid for several improvements to the property through construction loan disbursements under Sec. 16 of the Mechanic's LIen Act." The court held that Mechanic's Lien claimants are given priority, in determining the proportions of the insufficient proceeds to be paid, only with respect to the value of the property attributable to those improvements for which they furnish material or services. Justice Freeman's detailed dissent, joined by Justice Burke, advocates the use of a different calculation which "more correctly reflects the intent of the legislature in enacting the Act, which was to extend statutory protection for unpaid work done, not for money lent."Ries v. City of Chicago
By Michael T. Reagan, The Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan In Ries v. City of Chicago, the defendant police officer placed a suspect who had been in a traffic accident into the rear seat of his police vehicle, with the engine left running. The doors were not locked, and there was no screen between the seats. While the defendant officer was outside of the vehicle, the suspect drove off. Two other police vehicles then gave chase. During the chase, a collision occurred between the suspect's vehicle and the plaintiffs' vehicle. The circuit court found that most of the immunities asserted by defendants did not apply, but ultimately granted a directed verdict to the original officer based upon Sec. 4-107 of the Tort Immunity Act, which provides immunity from liability for injuries caused by the failure to make an arrest or by releasing a person in custody. A substantial verdict was returned. The appellate court reversed, granting JNOV to the City on the basis of immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's entry of JNOV. The court held that Sec. 4-106(b), which provides for absolute immunity for "any injury inflicted by an escaped or escaping prisoner," applied. The court stated that there was no doubt that the suspect was an escaping prisoner, which is defined in the statute as " a person held in custody." Plaintiffs were unsuccessful in trying to focus the case on the specific actions of each of the police officers. The court held that allowing that effort would render Sec. 4-106(b) a malady because any case would have to be premised on the underlying conduct of the police officers. This case also marks the death of a central part of Doe v. Calumet City, 161 Ill.2d 374 (1994). In holding that Sec. 4-106(b) prevails over Sec. 2-202, which provides for liability for wilful and wanton misconduct "in the execution or enforcement of any law," the court invoked the principle that the more specific applicable immunity controls. The court went on, however, to discuss in depth the question of whether Doe, which had been interpreted on occasion to provide a general wilful and wanton exception to other sections of the Tort Immunity Act, remained good law. The court noted that Doe was first put under scrutiny in In re Chicago Flood Litigation in 1997. The court documented numerous cases in which the continued viability of the applicable part of Doe had been questioned. The court then overruled those cases which had treated Doe as good law following Chicago Flood, stating, "It is time for this court to acknowledge the obvious." Justice Theis specially concurred, giving useful guidance. "We leave in Doe's wake unresolved issues about the scope of the immunity provided by Sec. 2-202 ... ." She expressed the view that the deserved death of Doe "returns us to a more appropriate reading of (Sec. 2-202) ... ." She writes that Section 2-202 still applies in appropriate cases where municipal employees are engaged "in the execution or enforcement of any law," thereby permitting potential liability upon proof of wilful and wanton conduct.CRIMINAL
People v. Comage
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender Police officers responding to a reported theft located defendant, who matched the description of the offender, in a nearby parking lot. Defendant fled. Officers chased him for 20-30 yards before defendant stopped. Mid-chase, defendant was observed taking items from his pocket and tossing them over a wooden privacy fence. This occurred in a well-lit area while officers were close behind. An officer recovered the objects -- a crack pipe and push rod -- within 20 seconds. The issue before the Court was whether physical evidence is "concealed" for purposes of the obstructing justice statute where officers knew where the evidence was and had no difficulty in recovering it, but the evidence had been out of the officers' sight for a short time. In a split decision (a recent rarity in criminal case decisions from this Court), the majority concluded that "conceal," as used in the obstructing justice statute, requires actual interference with the administration of justice; "i.e., materially impedes the police officers' investigation." In a special concurrence, Justice Freeman noted that this construction was consistent with prior appellate court decisions and found it significant that there had been no amendment to the obstructing justice statute following those prior decisions, resulting in "legislative acquiescence." The dissent concluded that the majority's interpretation read into the statute a requirement that was not present -- that defendant "materially impedes" an investigation or prosecution. The dissent found it enough that defendant's conduct made it "less likely" that the contraband would be discovered. The dissent also disagreed that the majority's interpretation was bolstered by "legislative acquiescence" because none of the prior decisions specifically included a "materially impedes" requirement. The dissent expressly urged the legislature to act in response to the instant decision to "remedy the majority's incorrection interpretation of the statute so that the statute can again be construed to prohibit the sort of affirmative act of concealment that occurred in the present case, where defendant fled from police officers down a dark alley and placed evidence out of their sight." For now, then, to constitute concealment for the purpose of obstructing justice, the defendant must "materially impede" the investigation or prosecution. That could change, though, if the legislature opts to accept the dissent's specific invitation to amend the statute.People v. Baez
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender In this death penalty appeal, the issues presented were largely case-specific. One issue warrants discussion, though, as it could have broader implications. In early proceedings in this case, Baez had retained counsel to represent him. At a court appearance, private counsel indicated that he had plans to be out of the country for some time and asked the court to appoint his partner to handle matters in the case until such time as the matter was ready for trial. Private counsel did not inform the court of when he planned to return, despite the court's repeated requests for that information. The court concluded that counsel was not ready, willing and able to represent defendant and appointed the public defender’s office instead. Defendant argued that his constitutional right to counsel of choice was violated. The Court rejected that claim, noting that it is within the court's discretion to remove counsel when the demands of the court's calendar necessitate removal. Here, the court's inquiries demonstrated that Granich was not ready to provide representation and the removal was upheld. Thus, defendant's right to counsel of his choice may properly be limited where it appears that counsel is not presently available and ready to proceed with representation.Filed under: