Quick takes on Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court civil opinions
Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the civil cases Forest Preserve District v. First National Bank, In re Haley D., Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills and Reliable Fire Equipment Co. v. Arredondo.
Forest Preserve District of DuPage County v. First National Bank
By Michael T. Reagan, The Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan
Forest Preserve District of DuPage County v. First National Bank of Franklin Park will give rise to substantial discussion in the eminent domain community. Justice Thomas’ opinion, once again for a unanimous court, holds that the application of the Fifth Amendment to the date of valuation as announced in Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1 (1984), requires a determination as to whether there has been a substantial increase in the value of the property from the time of the filing of the complaint to the date of actual "taking." Integral to both Kirby and this opinion is the concept of "abandonment." "Because the federal government retains its right not to acquire land even after a trial setting the amount of just compensation, the ‘date of taking’ is the date on which the government actually pays the owner and takes title to the land." In this opinion, the court defined the time of "taking" in Illinois for the purpose of applying Kirby to be the date on which the government both deposits the amount of compensation that has been awarded and acquires title and the right to possess the property. The flow of the arguments in this case is very interesting, as is how the court integrated the requirements of Kirby with long-established understandings of Illinois eminent domain law.
The court held that the Kirby rule permitting recovery for increased valuation is not limited to circumstances in which the government engaged in wrongful delay. Further, the mounting of a vigorous defense by the defendant does not serve as reason to negate the application of Kirby.
Because this opinion touches on many fundamentals of the condemnation process, it is recommended reading.
In re Haley D.
By Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams Montgomery & John Ltd.
This lengthy, factually detailed opinion, considered whether the circuit court erred in denying a father’s motion to set aside a finding that he had defaulted on a petition by the State to terminate his parental rights to his daughter and in entering a default judgment terminating his parental rights. The appellate court had concluded that the proceedings did not comport with due process. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court judgment, which reversed the default judgment and remanded, but for different reasons.
Because the case could be decided on nonconstitutional grounds, the Court confined its analysis to those grounds. The Court reached several important conclusions.It concluded that the order ruling that the father had defaulted on the petition to terminate was not a final judgment or order. Therefore, the father’s motion to set aside the default should have been considered under the more relaxed standard of 735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) rather than the more demanding standard of 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a). Under the prevailing standard, the father’s motion should have been granted. The Court also concluded that section 2-15(3) of the Juvenile Court Act required the State to comply with the provisions for service in Supreme Court Rule 11 when it filed its petition to terminate (and it had not). The Court also took the opportunity to remind that “[a] parent’s right to raise his or her biological child is a fundamental liberty interest…and Illinois law favors natural parents having custody of their children.”
Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp.
By Michael T. Reagan, The Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan
In Crossroads Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Sterling Truck Corp., Justice Garman’s opinion for a unanimous court carefully applied fundamental principles of separation of powers, subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court, and the legislature’s power to divest subject matter jurisdiction within the context of the Motor Vehicle Franchise Act, 815 ILCS 710/1 et seq. A foundational premise of the analysis of this case was the holding in Fields-Jeep-Eagle Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 163 Ill.2d 462 (1994), that the Act violated the doctrine of separation of powers when it delegated to the circuit court a determination of whether "good cause" on the part of a manufacturer in granting a new franchise, because the determination of good cause was to include a determination of the "public interest." The power to determine the public interest is vested exclusively in the legislature and cannot be delegated to the judiciary. As a result, the legislature amended the Act to create the Motor Vehicle Review Board to hear dealer protests.
The main issue in the case was the determination of the proper procedure for the determination of damages once it was found that good faith did not exist. Damages claims have to be brought in the circuit court. The question was whether primary jurisdiction would be applied to permit the claim for damages to be filed initially in the circuit court. The court ruled that application of primary jurisdiction did not pass constitutional muster here because the circuit court does not have subject matter jurisdiction of the claim that there was an absence of good faith. Rather, the proper procedure is for the MVRB to entertain the claim in the first instance. Thereafter, a claim for damages could be filed in the circuit court.
The Supreme Court adhered to the recognized principle that issues not presented in a petition for leave to appeal must be deemed to be forfeited, regardless of whether the issue were to be later raised in a brief. The appellant argued that the 20-page limit on a PLA does not permit proper development of numerous issues. The court replied that a fully developed argument is not required in a PLA, but that "a party must raise an argument with sufficient grounds to show there is an issue."
Nowak v. City of Country Club Hills
By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC
By Illinois statute, when does a disabled police officer’s employer have to begin picking up the tab for the health insurance of the officer and his family? Construing the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (“PSEBA”), 820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2006), the Illinois Supreme Court reversed an appellate decision and affirmed the circuit court in ruling that the obligation attaches only when the officer is declared permanently disabled -- not on the date he suffers the injury.
Plaintiff Don Nowak, a full-time police officer for the City of County Club Hills, participated in the health insurance plan his local police union had bargained for; under the plan, Nowak paid 20% of the insurance premium. After Nowak sustained serious injuries in the line of duty, by statute, he received his full salary for one year. After this benefit expired, and more than two years after the accident, Nowak applied for a disability pension. All along, Nowak had continued to pay his 20% share of the family’s health insurance premium. The police pension board awarded Nowak a line-of-duty disability pension, and the city immediately began paying 100% of Nowak’s health insurance premium, but refused Nowak’s request for reimbursement of the premiums Nowak had been paying since sustaining the career-ending injury.
The statute pertains to an officer who “suffers a catastrophic injury,” but Section 10(a) of PSEBA is silent as to the event that triggers the employer’s obligation to pay. Thus the court found the statute to be ambiguous. In reaching its conclusion, the supreme court considered the legislative history, which indicates an intent to “continue” an officer’s employer-sponsored health insurance coverage after he has been forced to take a line-of-duty disability, and considered the public policy goal of providing the mandated benefit at the lowest possible cost.
Reliable Fire Equipment Co. v. Arredondo
By Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams Montgomery & John Ltd.
In this case, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to clarify the standard for determining the enforceability of noncompetition restrictive covenants. The Court reviewed over 100 years of Illinois law concerning such restrictive covenants. It concluded that Illinois has historically recognized, and continues to recognize, the legitimate business interest of the promise as a requirement of an enforceable restrictive covenant. That requirement is part of the following three-prong test of reasonableness for restrictive covenants ancillary to valid employment relationships. The restrictive covenants is reasonable if it (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of a legitimate business interest of the employer-promisee; (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee-promisor, and (3) is not injurious to the public. The Court further clarified that there is no particular “test” or universe of factors in determining what constitutes a legitimate business interest. Instead, the various factors considered in prior case law “are only nonconclusive aids in determining the promisee’s legitimate business interest, which in turn is but one component in the three-prong rule of reason, grounded in the totality of the circumstances.”