Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Friday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the civil cases Chicago Teachers Union v. The Board of Education of the City of Chicago and Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District and criminal cases People v. Washington, People v. Guerrero and People v. Baskerville.

CIVIL

Chicago Teachers Union v. The Board of Education of the City of Chicago 

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC

Under its Rule 52, the Seventh Circuit lateraled questions to the Illinois Supreme Court concerning the rights of tenured teachers who have been laid off and seek to fill subsequent teaching vacancies. Under Supreme Court Rule 20, the court accepted the certification. It summarized the Seventh Circuit's inquires as follows: whether the School Code, 105 ILCS 5/34-18(31), 34-84 (West 2010), gives "laid-off tenured teachers either (1) the right to be rehired after an economic layoff, or (2) the right to certain procedures during the rehiring process? If so, what is the scope of that right?"  The majority concluded that the School Code does not give Chicago public school teachers these rights.

In 2010, facing a budget crunch, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago laid off 1,289 teachers. The teachers received some information concerning application for vacant teaching positions, but the laid-off teachers were not given preference for these positions. While the Board recalled 715 tenured teachers that summer due to an increase in federal funding, it did not create an official recall policy. Teachers who were not rehired complained that subsequently opened positions were filled with new hires. Claiming violation of due process, the Union sued in federal court for injunctive relief. After initially prevailing at both levels in federal court, the Seventh Circuit deferred to the state supreme court.

The supreme court observed that whether a due process claim exists depends on whether state law gave the teachers a property interest in their jobs. The relevant provisions of the School Code established a system for "permanent" -- meaning "tenured" -- teaching appointments. But, as to Chicago teachers, the School Code was amended in 1995 to remove layoff and recall procedures. According to the majority, the legislature thus eliminated any right to rehiring that tenured teachers had under the old version of the statute. While the Board still has the power to promulgate recall procedures following a layoff, the Board does not have to exercise that power.

Justice Theis, joined by Chief Justice Kilbride, dissented. Justice Theis would rule that tenured teachers have a property interest in their jobs, by virtue of the statutory guarantee of continued employment subject to removal for cause. She reasoned that, in the context of a layoff, the term "permanent" in the statute must at least mean that teachers with "permanent" appointments should have a real shot at showing they remain qualified to fill those positions.

Gaffney v. Board of Trustee of the Orland Fire Protection District

By Michael T. Reagan, The Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan

In Gaffney v. Board of Trustees of the Orland Fire Protection District, the court's first 4-3 split civil decision of 2012, involving two consolidated cases, the court decided both procedural and substantive questions arising under Sec. 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act, 820 ILCS 320/10. Both cases involved orthopedic injuries incurred during firefighter training exercises. Gaffney was injured in a live-fire exercise while retracing the route of a hose in order to clear it from an obstruction. Lemmenes was injured in a simulation of fire conditions while wearing a blacked-out firefighter's mask. Because their injuries were career-ending and incurred in the line of duty, they received line of duty pensions. In these cases, they also sought the additional benefits provided by Sec. 10(a) of the Act of the payment of future health insurance premiums. The circuit judge in Gaffney concurred with the denial of benefits by the fire protection district,  and the appellate court affirmed, with a dissent. The denial of benefits by the district to Lemmenes was reversed by his (different) trial court, and that appellate panel affirmed.

The decisions denying benefits were initially made by the Board of Trustees of the Fire Protection District. The statute provides for these benefits in four factual settings. The setting implicated here is if the injury occurred as the result of the firefighter's "response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency." The Act offers no direction as to how that decision is to be made, nor does it provide for administrative review. The Supreme Court holds here that the proper vehicle for judicial determination of entitlement to benefits is through an action for declaratory judgment. The action of the fire protection districts is not regarded as an administrative decision. Rather, the board's decision denying benefits "is only an employer's objection to paying Sec. 10 benefits."

The narrow split in the court arises from differing views of the substantive language of the Act and from the application of those competing meanings to the facts of these two cases. The majority concludes that the meaning of "emergency" is an unforeseen circumstance involving imminent danger to a person or property requiring an urgent response. The court noted at the outset that public safety employees are required to respond to emergencies, "whether they are real or not." The majority concluded that Gaffney, injured in the environment of a live fire exercise, was entitled to benefits, but that Lemmenes was not entitled to benefits in his non-fire setting, with no unforeseen circumstances.

Justice Garman's concurring and dissenting opinion respectfully, but in great detail, raises numerous questions concerning both the statutory meaning derived by the majority, and also the application of that meaning to the facts of these two cases. That opinion objected to the grafting of the entire definition of "emergency" from a specific dictionary onto the statute without, in the view of that opinion, further consideration of the full context of the statute as giving additional understanding of the intent of the legislature. That opinion would find the additional benefits to be proper when the firefighter is injured "while responding... to a circumstance that he reasonably believes poses imminent danger to another person or
property and that requires an urgent response."

CRIMINAL

People v. Washington

By Jay Weigman, Office of the State Appellate Defender

In 2004, a delivery truck, was robbed by two men.  During the heist, the truck crashed.  One of the robbers evaded arrest; the defendant did not. One of the deliveryman identified James Washington as the robber who held a gun to the deliveryman's head.  The gun was never found, nor was the safe that was taken from the truck.

The State charged that defendant committed each offense “while armed with a dangerous weapon, to wit: a firearm.”  This language corresponded with the 1992 Illinois Compiled Statutes because an Amendment in 2000 -- which created what are known as the 15-20-25-to-life sentencing provisions, defined a firearm and provided sentencing enhancements based on whether a firearm is possessed, discharged, or used to cause bodily harm -- had been judicially invalidated by the Illinois Supreme Court as unconstitutional.

Following a jury trial, Washington was convicted of aggravated kidnapping, for which he received a 25-year sentence, and also of armed robbery and aggravated vehicular hijacking. For the latter two offenses, he received 15 years each, with all three sentences to run concurrently.

On direct appeal, the First District Appellate Court, relying exclusively on People v. Ross, 229 Ill. 2d 255 (2008), found that the evidence was insufficient to uphold defendant’s convictions because the State never presented the gun or photographs of it, there was no evidence regarding the gun’s weight or composition, and there was no evidence that the gun was used in a dangerous manner, such as a club or bludgeon. The Appellate Court remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions that judgment and sentences be entered on the lesser-included offenses of kidnapping, vehicular hijacking, and robbery. The State appealed. Defendant, in his cross-appeal, complained that he was prejudiced by a variance between pleading and proof.

In People v. Washington, 2012 IL 107993, Justice Burke, writing for the majority, first distinguished Ross because that case had involved a BB gun, which the Court held could not be proved to be a dangerous weapon without being entered into evidence. Because there was no evidence as to its composition or weight, there could be no inference that the BB gun could have been used as a bludgeon. Conversely, in Washington, because the victim testified that defendant possessed a gun and that the victim's observation was unobstructed, there was no real dispute at trial that defendant possessed some type of gun when he committed the crimes. 

As to the defendant’s complaint of a fatal variance, the supreme court noted that Washington was charged under the predecessor statutes and then convicted under them, after the jury was instructed on them. As a result, there was no variance, fatal or otherwise. The convictions entered in the circuit court were upheld, and the appellate court was reversed.

Chief Justice Kilbride, joined by Justice Theis, dissented. The dissent considered the Court to be constrained by the elements of the offenses in the statutes applicable between 2000 and the instant offense, under which defendant could be found guilty if armed either with a dangerous weapon, “other than a firearm,” or while armed with a firearm. Because the State charged defendant using the dangerous weapon prong of the statute, it was required to prove defendant guilty of using a dangerous weapon that was not a firearm. There was, however, no proof that defendant committed the offenses while armed with a dangerous weapon other than a firearm.

People v. Guerrero

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

In 1991, Rolando Guerrero pled guilty to first degree murder in exchange for a 50-year term of imprisonment. He was not admonished about the requirement that he also serve a three-year term of mandatory supervised release (MSR).

In 2006, Guerrero sought leave to file a successive post-conviction petition (a previous petition was dismissed in 1994), relying on People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177 (2005). Guerrero claimed that he had learned about the MSR-admonishment error from Ronald Whitfield himself. Guerrero admitted, though, that he had known he would have to serve a term of “parole” and that he learned about parole when he transferred from the juvenile to the adult division of the DOC in 1994. The trial court held a hearing on the motion for leave to file successive petition and ultimately denied leave to file.

The appellate court initially reversed the denial of leave to file and went on to grant defendant a three-year sentence reduction.  The Supreme Court remanded the matter to the appellate court, directing it to reconsider its judgment in light of People v. Morris, 236 Ill. 2d 345 (2010).  On remand, the appellate court acknowledged that Whitfield did not apply retroactively to Guerrero’s case in light of Morris.  The court went on to grant defendant a three-year reduction in sentence, however, finding that defendant’s plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made in light of the lack of MSR admonishments.

The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Guerrero could not establish cause for not raising the claim in his initial post-conviction petition because (1) he admitted that he understood the concept of parole sometime in 1994 (prior to the filing of his initial petition), (2) his claim concerning the lack of MSR admonishments was not new or novel (similar, though unsuccessful, challenges date back more than 30 years), and (3) Whitfield did not apply to Guerrero’s case.  The Court also clarified that the relief granted by the appellate court was improper.  A defendant who alleges that his plea is involuntary may seek to withdraw his plea. A sentence reduction to approximate the “benefit of the bargain” is not appropriate to remedy an involuntary plea.

Practitioners should take note of the Court’s clarification of the appropriate standard of review of a decision on a motion for leave to file a successive petition.  Where there has been a hearing on the motion, with testimony presented, such a decision should only be reversed if it was manifestly erroneous.  The Court distinguished this situation from that in People v. LaPointe, 365 Ill. App. 3d 914 (2d Dist. 2006), where the decision on the motion for leave to file was that it was “legally insufficient.”  There, de novo review was appropriate.

People v. Baskerville

By Jay Weigman, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Article 31 of the Criminal Code addresses various offenses related to interference with public officers. Section 31-1(a) specifically relates to resisting or obstructing a peace officer and provides: “A person who knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer . . . of any authorized act within his official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor.” 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2006). In People v. Baskerville, the Defendant was convicted of unlawful obstruction of a peace officer for allegedly lying to a peace officer who insisted that defendant bring his wife out of their home so that the officer could ticket her for a traffic violation. On appeal, a majority of the appellate court, relying on the Illinois Supreme Court decision in People v. Raby, 40 Ill. 2d 392 (1968), concluded that obstruction requires a physical act and that providing false information to a peace officer is not a physical act. Therefore, the Third District Appellate Court court held that the State’s evidence was insufficient to prove the offense as charged against defendant and reversed defendant’s conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court granted the State leave to appeal. On appeal, Defendant also sought cross-relief, and challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction.

Justice Theis, writing for the majority of the Illinois Supreme Court, first considered whether a physical act is a an element of obstruction and determined that it is not.  The Court noted that Raby, which involved a demonstration, was driven by First Amendment concerns and did not involve the question of whether providing false information could constitute obstruction; therefore, the Court stated that Raby does not control the analysis of this case. The Court noted that most cases involving interference with a peace officer involve a physical act, but also noted examples where a defendant could interfere with an officer without physical movement (such as a crowd refusing to disperse, or an individual calling police and giving them false information). Therefore, the Court determined that providing false information may constitute obstruction under section 31-1(a) when the misinformation interposes an obstacle that impedes or hinders the officer and is relevant to the performance of his authorized duties. Thus, obstruction is defined not by the act or statement of the defendant but by its impact, as "the false statement only has legal significance if it was made in relation to an authorized act within the officer’s official capacity and if the false information actually impeded an act the officer was authorized to perform." Because defendant’s false statement that his wife was not home did not hinder the officer in executing the traffic stop, the Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court's reversal of defendant's conviction.

Chief Justice Kilbride dissented. The Chief Justice would have deferred to the finding of the trial judge in defendant's bench trial, that the defendant's lies hindered or impaired the officer's performance of the traffic stop.

This Opinion does not set forth a bright line to demarcate those acts or statements that constitute interference, but by refocusing on whether the act or speech actually interferes with an officer in the performance of his official duties, this Opinion may help identify those situations where an individual interferes with an officer while still preserving that person's free speech and assembly rights.