CIVIL

Jackson v. The Board of Election Commissioners of the City of Chicago

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan, Ottawa

Carmelita Earls and her husband obtained homestead exemptions on three properties in Cook County. Preparatory to filing to run for Alderman, Earls checked with the Indebtedness Check Unit of the City of Chicago Department of Revenue and was told that she owed no outstanding debt to the City. Shortly after, the Assessor's office challenged two of the homestead exemptions. Earls then promptly executed waivers of those exemptions. An objection was raised to Earls' candidacy, in which it was contended that Earls was in arrears in payment of taxes or other indebtedness to the City. 

In the compressed time frame available for such challenges, the Election Board denied the objection, the Circuit Court confirmed that decision, but the Appellate Court reversed. The Election Board and Circuit Court found that a debt purportedly owed to Cook County would not bar a candidate from seeking office in the City of Chicago. The Appellate Court disagreed with that conclusion, and directed that any votes for Earls were not to be counted. The election took place. Because of the unstayed order of the Appellate Court, no votes were counted for Earls.

The sole substantive decision of the Supreme Court is that the Appellate Court erred on the fundamental question of election law. Although local taxing districts are the ultimate beneficiaries of the property tax system, the obligation to pay taxes is to the tax collection authorities, in this case the county. Therefore, even if Earls were to be regarded in arrears with respect to the real estate taxes, that would not be deemed a "tax or other indebtedness due to a municipality" sufficient to bar her municipal candidacy.

But there is more to be gleaned from the 20 page majority opinion by Justice Karmeier and the 28 page concurrence and dissent authored by Justice Freeman and joined by Justice Burke. There is discussion of the procedural options relating to Supreme Court review. The court's opinion notes that the candidate did not request the Appellate Court to recall its mandate and stay its judgment in order to seek Supreme Court review in favor of her having filed an emergency motion for stay with the Supreme Court, combined with a request for expedited consideration of her Petition for Leave to Appeal - within the four days between the Appellate opinion and the primary election. The dissent comments upon the likely efficacy of the procedure implicity suggested in the majority opinion. The majority and the dissent conduct a spirited interchange on whether a request for a special election had been forfeited, and whether a special election was an available remedy.

This case adds to the body of case law dealing with the public interest exception to mootness. It also adds texture to the ongoing development of  forfeiture principles, with a note as to the interaction between Supreme Court Rule 366 and those principles.