Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the Civil cases Rush University Medical Center v. Sessions, Choate v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company, Patrick Engineering v. The City of Naperville, Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Company, In re Marriage of Coulter and the Criminal case People v. Fields.

CIVIL

Rush University Medical Center v. Sessions

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan, Ottawa

Choate v. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Company

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC

Finding that a railroad had no duty to a minor who tried to jump onto a moving train, the Illinois Supreme Court has reversed a $ 3.9 million judgment against a railroad. The plaintiff, a 12-year-old boy who had gathered with two other boys and three girls in a parking lot near the train tracks, approached the moving train with the idea of crossing the tracks to reach the home of one of the boys after the train passed. The plaintiff, however, decided to jump onto the moving train to impress his friends. He slipped and his foot was amputated when it fell under a wheel.

The supreme court disagreed with the lower courts' ruling that the question of the railroad's duty presented an issue of fact for the jury to decide. Rather, whether the "child trespasser exception" to the general rule of no liability for trespassers applied was for the court, not the jury. The supreme court overruled two appellate decisions establishing that a jury should decide whether a child of the age in question should appreciate as obvious the danger of the situation.

The supreme court also rejected the notion that the jury verdict could be justified by expert testimony to the effect that the danger could be inexpensively avoided by fencing the area. The court concluded that no exception applied and entered judgment for the railroad notwithstanding the verdict. 

Patrick Engineering v. The City of Naperville

By Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams Montgomery & John Ltd.

This lengthy, factually detailed decision involved primarily one narrow legal issue: whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel may apply against a municipality based upon the alleged apparent authority of its employees. The Supreme Court held that equitable estoppel does not apply against a municipality when a plaintiff has alleged merely that a municipal official possessed apparent authority.  Instead, a plaintiff must allege specific facts to show that a municipal official possessed express authority and that the plaintiff reasonably relied upon statements or conduct by the official.  This requires pleading specific facts (not “mere conclusions”) of (1) an affirmative act by either the municipality itself or an official with express authority to bind the municipality; and (2) reasonable reliance upon that act by the plaintiff that induces the plaintiff to detrimentally change its position.

The Court also addressed certain other important legal principles.

First, the Court reminded litigants that although a section 2-619 motion admits well-pleaded facts, “conclusions of law and conclusory factual allegations not supported by allegations of specific facts are not deemed admitted.”

Also, the Court set forth the elements for a claim of Account Stated.  It defined an “account stated” as “an agreement between parties who have had previous transactions that the account representing those transactions is true and that the balance stated is correct, together with a promise, express or implied, for the payment of such balance.”

Carter v. SSC Odin Operating Company

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC

In a prior appeal in the same case, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1, preempted  the General Assembly's attempt to outlaw arbitration agreements affecting actions under the Nursing Home Care Act, 210 ILCS 45/1-101 et seq. (West 2006). In this case's second trip to Springfield, the supreme court considered two other arguments against arbitration of a wrongful death action by the estate of nursing home patient.

The court first considered the plaintiff's argument that the agreements in question lacked mutuality of obligation because the defendant's promise to arbitrate was illusory. Plaintiff contended, and the appellate court agreed, that a $200,000 floor for the arbitration provision ensured that no claim by the nursing home for nonpayment ever would be subject to arbitration; by contrast, claims for personal injuries brought by or on behalf of the patient would go to arbitration.  Thus, the appellate court found that the agreement to arbitrate was not enforceable.

The supreme court disagreed. Reasoning that the promise to arbitrate was supported by adequate consideration, the first cousin of mutuality of obligation, the court found that the patient's promise to arbitrate was enforceable, even if it was not met with an equivalent promise to arbitrate by the defendant for claims it might have.

Yet, the plaintiff could not be compelled to arbitrate a claim under the Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West 2006). Only the patient had signed one of the two applicable agreements; while the plaintiff special administrator had signed the other agreement, she did so only as the patient's legal representative and not in her individual capacity. She could not be bound by the agreement to arbitrate because she was not a party to the agreement.

In re Marriage of Coulter

By Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams, Montgomery & John Ltd.

This family law case emphasizes the importance the courts will place on agreements reached between divorcing parties.

The parties were divorced parents of three minor children. During the divorce, they entered into an agreed joint parenting agreement (“JPA”). The JPA was expressly incorporated into the judgment of dissolution.  The JPA allowed the mother to remove the children to California after two years upon certain conditions.  When the mother, in compliance with the JPAA, indicated her intent to remove the children, the father objected and sought a preliminary injunction to bar the removal.  The mother thereafter filed a petition for temporary removal.

The circuit court denied the injunction, the appellate court reversed, and the Supreme Court reversed that judgment.  It held that the injunction was improper and the petition for removal unnecessary because the court had already allowed the removal by incorporating the JPA into the judgment.

The Court acknowledged that Section 609(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act typically requires that the court must grant leave to remove a child from Illinois.  However, the judgment order that incorporated the JPA constituted a valid and enforceable court order granting leave to remove.  It was also enforceable as a contract. 

The Court stressed that the parents’ decisions as to what is in their children’s best interests is entitled to great deference.  The Court also emphasized the strong public policy of encouraging parties to resolve issues by agreement before resorting to litigation.

Finally, the Court noted that the objecting party was not entirely without recourse.  He could have sought a modification of the judgment under section 610 of the Act.

CRIMINAL

People v. Fields

By Jay Wiegman, Office of the State Appellate Defender

The Illinois Supreme Court has previously identified three situations where a per se conflict of interest exists: (1) where defense counsel has a prior or contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the prosecution; (2) where defense counsel contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness; and (3) where defense counsel was a former prosecutor who had been personally involved in the prosecution of defendant. People v. Taylor, 237 Ill. 2d 356, 374 (2010), reh'g denied (May 24, 2010), cert. denied131 S. Ct. 1466, 179 L. Ed. 2d 310 (U.S. 2011).  In People v. Fields, the Supreme Court revisited this issue to determine whether a conflict of interest exists only where the professional relationship between defense counsel and State's witness is contemporaneous with defense counsel’s representation of the defendant. People v. Fields, 2012 IL 112438.  A unanimous Court held that defense counsel’s past representation of a State's witness did not create a per se conflict of interest. People v. Fields, 2012 IL 112438.

In Fields, defendant was charged, in Henry County,  with predatory criminal sexual assault of his stepdaughter. Prior to trial, the State moved to introduce other-crimes evidence pursuant to 25 ILCS 5/115-7.3 (West 2006)) The State sought to introduce evidence that defendant had sexually abused another child, this time in Rock Island County, in order to show that defendant had a propensity to commit sex crimes. Also before trial began, defendant filed a complaint with the ARDC regarding his attorney, who was allowed to withdraw.  In his stead, Attorney Ed Woller, who had represented defendant in the Rock Island case, was appointed to represent Fields.  Fields, 2012 IL 112438, ¶ 6.  Defendant was convicted of the Henry County charges following a jury trial.   Fields, 2012 IL 112438, ¶ 8.

Defendant appealed, and alleged that his trial attorney operated under a per se conflict because he had previously served (in an unrelated matter) as a guardian ad litem for the complainant in the Rock Island case, representation that had  been disclosed during pretrial proceedings in the Rock Island County case, but not in the Henry County case. Fields, 2012 IL 112438, ¶ 8. The majority of the Appellate Court, Third District, agreed. People v. Fields, 409 Ill. App. 3d 398. The appellate court, citing People v. Taylor, 237 Ill. 2d 356 (2010), and People v. Hernandez, 231 Ill. 2d 134 (2008), noted that the three situations where a per se conflict of interest exist has been found to exist includes those situations where defense counsel has a prior or contemporaneous association with the victim, the prosecution, or an entity assisting the prosecution. Fields, 409 Ill. App. 3d 401. The majority held that the Rock Island complainant was an entity assisting the prosecution, so that defense counsel’s prior association with her constituted a per se conflict of interest. Fields, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 402. Justice Schmidt dissented, and stated that the majority’s finding that the Rock Island complainant was an entity assisting the prosecution rendered superfluous the second of three categories of per se conflict: where defense counsel contemporaneously represents a prosecution witness.  Fields, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 406 (Schmidt, J., dissenting).  The dissent further stated that the majority’s holding ignored the precedent set forth by the Supreme Court in People v. Enoch, 146 Ill. 2d 44 (1991), which stated that defense counsel’s prior representation of a State’s witness does not establish a per se conflict of interest between defense counsel and a defendant. Fields, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 406 (Schmidt, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court granted the State leave to appeal.

Upon review, Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, first found that "Illinois supreme court case law has clearly and consistently held that, in cases where defense counsel has represented a State’s witness, a per se conflict of interest will not be held to exist unless the professional relationship between the attorney and the witness is contemporaneous with defense counsel’s representation of the defendant." Fields, 2012 IL 112438, ¶ 20.  Accordingly, the Court found that the appellate court majority erred in holding that a per se conflict of interest existed.

The Court also found that it erred when it found that a per se conflict of interest existed because the Rock Island complainant was an “entity assisting the prosecution.”   Fields, 2012 IL 112438, ¶ 26, 29.  The Supreme Court agreed with the dissent, and concluded that because defense counsel’s prior representation of a prosecution witness does not constitute a per se conflict of interest, while his prior association with an entity assisting the prosecution do es constitute a per se conflict, a prosecution witness necessarily cannot also be an “entity assisting the prosecution.” Fields, 2012 IL 112438, ¶ 26, 29.   Moreover, in the context of per se conflicts of interest, caselaw has always recognized a difference between a person and an "entity".  Fields, 2012 IL 112438, ¶ 30.

While determining that an attorney is not operating under a conflict of interest can be a difficult task, especially in smaller counties, where it is less uncommon for witnesses and parties to know one another, and where public defender's offices are often decentralized and manned by attorneys who also maintain private practices, the Supreme Court's decision should lease much of the discomfort Public Defenders felt following the Appellate Court's reversal of Fields' convictions. Had the Supreme Court affirmed the Third District, these attorneys would have had to scramble to build a conflicts list going back several years.