Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the civil cases People ex rel. Madigan v. Burge and Kanerva v. Weems.

People ex rel. Madigan v. Burge

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan, Ottawa

People ex rel. Madigan v. Burge, which involves great  public interest because of the alleged actions of defendant while supervisor of the Violent Crimes Unit detectives of an area for the Chicago Police Department, ends, as it began in the circuit court, with the conclusion that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider this case. The reasoning and judgment of the circuit court were affirmed; the appellate court was reversed.

In 1997 Jon Burge applied for and received pension benefits from the policemen’s benefit fund. In 2003, a federal civil rights lawsuit was filed by a plaintiff who alleged that he was tortured and abused by officers under Burge’s command. In answers to written interrogatories in that suit, Burge denied under oath having knowledge of, or participating in, the torture or abuse of persons in custody of the Chicago Police Dept. In 2010, Burge was convicted of felonies for making false answers to interrogatories.

Thereafter, the Retirement Board of the pension fund held a hearing to determine whether Burge’s pension benefits should be terminated because of those convictions. The Pension Code provides that no benefits shall be paid to any person “who is convicted of any felony relating to or arising out of or in connection with his service as a policeman.” Burge contended that the felony convictions related solely to the false testimony in the civil suit, and that therefore termination of his benefits was not called for.

The eight member board evenly divided on the motion to terminate. Accordingly, “the motion was not passed” and Burge was allowed to continue to receive his pension. No administrative review was sought.

One week after that administrative decision, the Attorney General filed this complaint, brought pursuant to Sec. 1-115 of the Pension Code. That provision authorized the Attorney General to bring an action to “enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this Code.” The complaint sought an order ordering the Board to cease payments to Burge.

The Pension Code states that “the Board shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all matters relating to or affecting the fund… .”  The Pension Code also provides that administrative decisions of the Board are subject to judicial review solely as provided by the Administrative Review Law. The circuit court, reasoning from those provisions, concluded that the instant complaint would present to the court the same issue that the Board had already decided but would do so outside the confines of the Administrative Review Law.  The court dismissed the Attorney General’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

With Justice Burke writing for the majority, the supreme court affirmed the dismissal by the circuit court.  The court dealt with the conflict between Sec. 1-115 which provides that “any” violation of a Pension Code may be challenged in circuit court and Sec. 5-189 which provides that the ordinary adjudications affecting the fund are in the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Pension Board. The court relied upon the canon of construction that the more specific provision (Sec. 5-189) controls over the more general provision (Sec. 1-115). The court had to invoke an additional principle of construction to meet the Attorney General’s contention that Sec. 1-115, being the more recently enacted provision, should be given precedence. The rule that the specific governs the general holds true “regardless of the priority of enactment.”

The court also held that the Administrative Review Law was the sole means of seeking review of this type of benefits decision.

Chief Justice Garman dissented, with Justice Kilbride joining.  “The majority resolves this case with the statutory canon that the specific controls the general, but it disregards some absurd results that follow.”  Justice Freeman also dissented.  “I  … would find that circuit courts have concurrent jurisdiction … .”

Kanerva v. Weems

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan, Ottawa

Kanerva v. Weems reverses the circuit court’s dismissal of these challenges to the validity of an amendment to State Employees Group Insurance Act.  That amendment eliminated statutory standards for the State’s contributions to health insurance premiums for members of three state retirement systems and instead requires the Director of Central Management Services to determine on an annual basis the amount of health insurance premiums that will be charged to the state and to retired public employees.

The defendants moved to dismiss on various grounds, including the assertion that Article XIII, Sec. 5 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970, the pension protection clause, protects only traditional pension benefits and does not reach obligations to contribute to health care benefits. The supreme court granted a motion for direct review pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 302(b) which transferred the appeals from the order of dismissal directly to the supreme court.  Justice Freeman, writing for the majority, stated that the central, common issue in the multiple cases before the court was whether the circuit court erred in dismissing the claims that the amendment violated the pension protection clause. A complete summary of the numerous contentions advanced by both sides cannot be accomplished here. The court concluded that health insurance subsidies are constitutionally protected by the pension protection clause, rejecting the contrary contention that only the retirement annuity itself would fall within that protection. “Whether a benefit qualifies for protection … turns simply on whether it is derived from membership in one of the State’s Public Pension Systems. … How the benefit is actually computed plays no role in the inquiry.”

The court’s disposition of the case gave rise to one of the grounds for dissent by Justice Burke. The court held that the plaintiffs are entitled to proceed on their pension protection clause claims, and stated that there was no need to address plaintiffs’ remaining claims now because the plaintiffs obtained all of the relief they sought. “Any comment on their other claims would be advisory and in conflict with traditional principles of judicial restraint.”

Justice Burke’s dissent is in two parts. She disagrees with the conclusion that the pension protection clause protects more than pensions. She also disagreed with the majority’s declining to decide the other issues in the case. “To avoid delay and additional expense for the parties, the dismissal of these claims, which have been fully briefed and argued, should be addressed by this court.”