A review of Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court criminal opinion in the case People v. Smith.

People v. Smith

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

In People v. White, 2011 IL 109616, the Supreme Court held that where a factual basis for a plea agreement establishes that the defendant is subject to a mandatory sentencing enhancement (for a firearm, in White), a negotiated sentence without that enhancement is improper, even if the plea agreement included the concession that the State would not seek the enhancement.  In Smith, the Court was confronted with the question of whether White applies retroactively to convictions which were final at the time White was decided.

Smith pled guilty to first degree murder, partially in exchange for the State’s agreement not to seek a firearm enhancement and to recommend a 30-year sentence. The factual basis presented at Smith’s plea hearing established that the murder involved the use of a firearm. Smith was sentenced to 30 years of imprisonment.

Smith did not take a direct appeal, but later filed a post-conviction petition arguing that his sentence and plea were void based upon White. The Supreme Court began by finding that the White did not rely on any constitutional provisions in reaching its result and thus could not be characterized as a constitutional rule for post-conviction purposes.

In response to Smith’s argument that his sentence was void, and thus subject to challenge in a post-conviction proceeding, the Court concluded that White relied, in part, on the principle that a sentence is void when it is not authorized by statute.  However, White also relied on the principle that a circuit court may not disregard a fact which requires imposition of a statutory sentence enhancement if that fact is included in the factual basis accepted by the court. While the voidness principle was in effect at the time of Smith’s plea, and thus would apply to his case, the second principle underlying the decision in White – regarding whether the court could disregard a fact in the factual basis – was not and therefore was a new rule.

The Court went on to consider whether White’s holding should apply retroactively under a Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) analysis, noting that the Teague framework applies to both constitutional and non-constitutional issues. White did not fit within one of the Teague exceptions to non-retroactivity of new rules of criminal procedure: it did not place certain kinds of conduct “beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority;” and it did not require the observance of procedures “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Thus, the Court concluded, White could not provide a basis for relief here.

The Court affirmed the circuit court’s dismissal of Smith’s post-conviction petition and specifically overruled appellate court decisions holding that White applied retroactively. The opinion is notable for at least two reasons.  First, it resolves the question of whether White applies retroactively. Second, it makes clear that Illinois will apply the Teague retroactivity test to non-constitutional rules of criminal procedure as well as those having a basis in constitutional law.