Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Thursday, October 19, 2023
Our panel of leading appellate attorneys reviews the one civil and three criminal opinions handed down Thursday, October 19, 2023, by the Illinois Supreme Court.
Givens v. City of Chicago, 2023 IL 127837
By Amelia Buragas, Illinois State University
Eleven years ago, three men, John Givens, Leland Dudley, and David Strong, broke into an electronics store in Chicago. A witness heard the burglary and called the police. The three men attempted to escape by backing their van out of a closed garage door at a high-rate speed but in the process, hit a police officer with their vehicle. The other officers on the scene then fired their weapons at the van and its occupants. All three of the men were struck by bullets; Strong died at the scene and Dudley and Givens were both seriously injured. Dudley and Givens were charged and convicted of felony murder, aggravated battery to a peace officer, and possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Their criminal convictions and sentences were upheld on appeal.
While the criminal cases were pending, Dudley and Givens as well as the Estate of David Strong, filed a civil complaint against the City of Chicago alleging that the police officers committed battery against the plaintiffs. The complaint further alleged that the officers used excessive force during the arrest and that they had no justification for the use of deadly force. The trial court entered summary judgment against Dudley and Givens, finding pursuant to the doctrine of collateral estoppel that their criminal trials precluded the civil action. The Estate’s case proceeded to trial and the jury entered a verdict in favor of the estate. The City filed a post-trial motion seeking a judgment notwithstanding the verdict by arguing that the jury’s answer to a special interrogatory was inconsistent with the general verdict and, as a result, invalidated it. The trial court agreed and entered JNOV in favor of the City.
All three plaintiffs appealed, Givens and Dudley challenged the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment against them, and the Estate challenged the circuit court’s entry of JNOV. The appellate court reversed on all issues, remanding for a trial on the claims alleged by Givens and Dudley and reinstating the verdict for the Estate. The Illinois Supreme Court allowed the City’s petition for leave to appeal. The issues before the Illinois Supreme Court were the same as in the appellate court: whether Given’s and Dudley’s civil claims were barred by collateral estoppel and whether the City was entitled to JNOV because the jury’s answers to the special interrogatories were inconsistent with the general verdict.
On the first issue, the Court began by explaining that in order to prevail on a claim for collateral estoppel the plaintiff must establish that (1) an issue decided in a prior adjudication was identical with the one presented in the current litigation, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits of the prior adjudication, and (3) the party against whom estoppel was asserted was a party or in privity with a party in the prior adjudication. The Court noted that the parties did not dispute that the second and third elements had been established; thus, the only question was whether the issues decided in the criminal case were identical to the issues raised in the civil lawsuit. The Illinois Supreme Court held that they were not. The Court explained that the jury in the criminal case did not conclusively determine whether the police officers used excessive force and that, indeed, the criminal jury was instructed on the felony murder count that the cause of Strong’s death was immaterial. The Court was also not persuaded by the City’s argument that the jury in the criminal case had found that the plaintiffs intentionally caused their own injuries, explaining that “the criminal prosecution did not conclusively determine whether, under civil standards” Givens and Dudley brought about their own injuries or whether their injuries were proximately caused by the officers. As a result, the Court concluded that Givens and Dudley were not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from litigating their claims against the City for excessive force.
On the issue of the special interrogatories, the Court explained that for the Estate to overcome the City’s immunity under the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act, it had to establish that the officers acted with willful and wanton conduct. The special interrogatory at issue was intended to test this contention and asked whether the police officers showed an “utter indifference or conscious disregard for the safety of others.” The jury answered “no.” The Illinois Supreme Court explained that this answer was inconsistent with a finding that the officers’ actions were willful and wanton and that the answer to the special interrogatory “irreconcilably” conflicted with the general verdict. Further, the Court noted that the Estate’s argument that the language of the special interrogatory was confusing because it could have been alluding to a possible passersby or innocent bystander was “implausible” and that it would not “convolute the reading of this special interrogatory to conclude that the jury was confused in answering it.” Thus, the Court held that the circuit court properly determined that the jury’s answer on the special interrogatory controlled, and that it did not err when it entered judgment in the City’s favor.
Justice Cunningham, joined by Justices Neville and Holder White, concurred in part and dissented in part, explaining that while they agreed with the majority’s conclusion that collateral estoppel did not bar the civil litigation claims, they disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the jury’s answer to the special interrogatory was inconsistent with the general verdict. The dissent described the special interrogatory as “poorly worded” and “ill-conceived,” and noted that it had “no connection to the verdict form.” As a result, the majority opinion took the “unprecedented” action of nullifying a jury’s verdict “when the legal significance of the special interrogatory was not communicated to the jury.”
People v. Pacheco, 2023 IL 127535
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
James Pacheco was convicted of aggravated assault and other offenses arising out of an incident where he fled from officers, eventually stopping when a train blocked his path. When officers exited their vehicle to arrest Pacheco, he drove toward one of them. That officer then fired several shots into Pacheco’s vehicle, striking him.
At issue in the Illinois Supreme Court was whether Pacheco had been denied his right to confrontation at trial where the court prohibited defense counsel from cross-examining the officer who shot Pacheco as to whether the officer feared he could lose his job if the shooting was found unjustified and whether the trial court erred in granting the State’s motion in limine to bar defense counsel from asking that officer and his partner why they did not write police reports regarding the incident.
The appellate court had agreed with Pacheco that his confrontation right was violated because whether the officer feared losing his job went to his potential bias and motive to testify falsely and was thus a proper subject for cross-examination. The appellate court also agreed that the officers’ failure to write reports was relevant to their credibility where it raised an inference that the officers sought to insulate themselves from scrutiny.
The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. First, the Court held that there was no confrontation clause violation. A court has the discretion to impose reasonable limitations on cross-examination based on concerns about things like harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, witness safety, repetitiveness, and irrelevance. Whether a limitation was reasonable must be assessed in light of the record as a whole. Here, the Court concluded that, had counsel been permitted to ask the officer about his fear of job loss, he would “certainly” have said “no” given that the deadly force review panel had concluded that his conduct was justified. And, such a question would have opened the door for the State to introduce the review panel’s finding, which would have been highly prejudicial to Pacheco. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the limitation imposed was not only proper, but was necessary to prevent such prejudice. Additionally, the Court noted that defense counsel was otherwise afforded full and fair cross-examination of the officer.
The Court also held that it was not improper to prohibit questioning about the officers’ failure to write their own reports about the incident. The officers testified that department policy actually prohibited them from writing reports because a weapon had been discharged during the pursuit and arrest. Any questioning about the wisdom of that policy would have been irrelevant because the department’s practices were not at issue in Pacheco’s criminal case. And, perhaps most importantly, both officers had provided video recorded statements about the incident, which were available to defense for use at trial. Accordingly, Pacheco was not deprived of potential impeachment material by the officers’ failure to write reports.
Justice Rochford authored a special concurrence, joined by Justices Holder White and O’Brien. The special concurrence would have found a confrontation clause violation, noting that the trial court’s ruling was not based on any concern about opening the door to the “justified” finding. The special concurrence noted that it was not even clear such questioning would have opened the door had counsel simply asked about the officer’s state of mind after the shooting. Additionally, any concern about opening the door went only to prejudice and was not relevant to determining whether there was a confrontation clause violation in the first place. But, the special concurrence concluded that the confrontation clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the strong evidence against Pacheco, the fact that the officer’s testimony was corroborated, and the fact that Pacheco was not otherwise limited in his cross-examination of the officer.
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court’s grant of a new trial on these two issues and remanded the matter to the appellate court for consideration of Pacheco’s remaining claims.
People v. Lane, 2023 IL 128269
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
Reginald Lane was convicted of murder and intentional homicide of an unborn child arising out of his shooting and killing his pregnant girlfriend. At issue was whether 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) applied to mandate a sentence of life in prison or not.
Section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) provides that:
...the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of natural life imprisonment...if the defendant,...at the time of the commission of the murder, had attained the age of 17 or more and...is found guilty of murder of more than one victim.
The circuit court imposed a life sentence based on this provision. Lane appealed, arguing that because he was only convicted of one murder, this section does not apply.
The appellate court agreed with the circuit court and upheld Lane’s life sentence. The appellate court pointed to the penalty provision of 720 ILCS 5/9-1.2(d), which provides that “the sentence for intentional homicide of an unborn child shall be the same as for first degree murder...,” as indicative of the legislature’s intent to treat it as “another form of first degree murder.”
In the Illinois Supreme Court, the State conceded that intentional homicide of an unborn child is not murder, essentially abandoning the appellate court’s holding. But, the State argued that defendant’s life sentence should be affirmed because Section 9-1.2(d) effectively amends Section 5-8-1(a)(1)(c)(ii) and requires a life sentence where a defendant is convicted of both murder and intentional homicide of an unborn child. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed.
The Court cited to the body of caselaw holding that sentencing provisions do not change the classification of an offense. Similarly, the sentencing provision of the intentional homicide of an unborn child statute could not convert that offense into a type of murder for purposes of the multiple-murder sentencing statute. Because Lane was found guilty of only one murder, his life sentence was vacated and the matter was remanded for resentencing.
Justice Overstreet authored a dissent, joined by Justice Holder White. The dissent would have found that treating intentional homicide of an unborn child the “same” as murder for sentencing purposes, pursuant to the plain language of Section 9-1.2(d), should have led to Lane’s sentence being affirmed because any sentence other than life here actually treats intentional homicide of an unborn child as different from murder rather than the same.
People v. Lighthart, 2023 IL 128398
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
Jessica Lighthart was charged with multiple counts of first degree murder and ultimately pled guilty to one count of murder in exchange for a 35-year sentencing cap and the dismissal of other charges. At the conclusion of a full sentencing hearing, Lighthart was sentenced to 35 years of imprisonment.
Through counsel, Lighthart filed a timely motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied. She subsequently filed a pro se motion to withdraw her guilty plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court “allowed” Lighthart to file the motion even though more than 30 days had passed since sentencing and appointed new counsel to represent her on it. After several continuances, that motion was heard and denied. Lighthart appealed, but her appeal was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds because she had not filed a proper, timely post-plea motion in compliance with Supreme Court Rule 604(d).1
Approximately 10 months later, Lighthart filed a post-conviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for, among other things, failing to file a timely motion to withdraw guilty plea. That petition was dismissed at the second stage on the ground that it was untimely under 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c). At the time her petition was filed, that section provided:
When a defendant has a sentence other than death, no proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months after the conclusion of proceedings in the United States Supreme Court, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay is not due to his or her culpable negligence. If a petition for certiorari is not filed, no proceedings under this Article shall be commenced more than 6 months from the date for filing a certiorari petition, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence. If a defendant does not file a direct appeal, the postconviction petition shall be filed no later than 3 years from the date of conviction, unless the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to his or her culpable negligence.
The circuit court concluded that the 6-month limitation period applied to Lighthart’s case because she had “filed” a direct appeal, even though that filing resulted in a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction rather than a decision on the merits. Thus, Lighthart’s petition was untimely because it was not filed within six months of the date for filing a certiorari petition or, in a case like this one where no petition for leave to appeal was filed and thus no due date for a certiorari petition could be calculated, within six months from the date a PLA would have been due. See People v. Johnson, 2017 IL 120310 (“inserting” PLA language into the statute due to legislative oversight). The appellate court agreed.
The Illinois Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether the filing of an ineffective notice of appeal, which results in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction for failing to comply with Supreme Court Rule 604(d), triggers the 6-month limitation period or whether the petitioner has three years from the date of conviction to file such a petition. The Court agreed with the lower courts and concluded that it was the 6-month period which should apply. The Illinois Supreme Court first noted that the statutory language regarding the 3-year limitation period is ambiguous because the phrase, “If a defendant does not file a direct appeal,” could be construed to mean either (1) where no notice of appeal is filed or (2) where a notice of appeal is filed but is ineffective. Looking back at changes to the Post-Conviction Hearing Act over the years, the Court found that the legislative history showed an overall trend of shortening the limitations period and thus concluded that legislative intent was that the 3-year period applied only where no notice of appeal was ever filed. The Court pointed out that this interpretation also has the benefit of providing a bright-line rule rather than petitioners and courts having to differentiate between ineffective and effective notices of appeal.
Here, because Lighthart had “filed” a notice of appeal, albeit an ineffective one resulting in dismissal, the 6-month limitation period applied. Accordingly, her petition was untimely. But, the Illinois Supreme Court found that her untimeliness was excused due to a lack of culpable negligence because the version of Section 122-1(c) in effect at the time the petition was filed referenced only the time for filing a certiorari petition and made no reference to the later “inserted” requirement that a petition be filed within six months of the time for filing a PLA where none was filed. Additionally, at the time Lighthart’s petition was filed, the only reported opinion on the question was People v. Ross, 352 Ill. App. 3d 617 (3d Dist. 2004), which favored her position. Thus, under the unique circumstances of this case, Lighthart was not culpably negligent for the late filing, and the Court remanded the matter for further proceedings on her petition.
While not the basis for the Court’s decision, it is also worth noting that the Court was critical of the “inexcusable and unconscionable” delay of more than 11 years during second-stage proceedings in the circuit court. Most of that delay was attributable to continuances sought by defense counsel. In its decision, the Court instructed that proceedings on remand be conducted “without further delay.”
1 It is well established that before a defendant can appeal from a partially-negotiated guilty plea involving any form of sentencing concession, defendant must first file a motion to withdraw guilty plea within 30 days of sentencing. A trial court is without authority to extend that time once 30 days have passed. And, while Lighthart had filed a timely motion to reconsider sentence, such a motion is insufficient to preserve a defendant’s right to appeal where the defendant’s guilty plea involved sentencing concessions.