Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Thursday, November 14, 2024
Leading appellate attorneys review the two Illinois Supreme Court criminal opinions handed down Thursday, November 14.
People v. Brown, 2024 IL 129585
By Kerry Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender
In 2017, Alvin Brown was charged with driving while license revoked, which was a Class 2 felony based on the facts that his license revocation was for DUI and that he had 14 prior driving-while-revoked violations. In 2019, Brown pled guilty to the charge, with no agreement as to the sentence. Because he had at least two prior Class 2 or greater convictions, he was eligible for Class X sentencing and ultimately was sentenced to nine years in prison.
Brown subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his plea, alleging he felt forced to plead due to counsel’s advice that he would receive a 20-year sentence if he did not, and also a motion to reconsider sentence, which contained no specific grounds. At a hearing on those motions, counsel told the court that Brown actually did not want to withdraw his plea, which Brown confirmed. Counsel went on to argue that Brown’s sentence was excessive and that he should have been sentenced as a Class 2 offender. That motion was denied.
After an appeal which resulted in remand for compliance with Supreme Court Rule 604(d), defendant filed a new motion to withdraw plea and reconsider sentence arguing that he did not understand the consequences or effect of his plea. At the 2022 hearing on that motion, counsel noted that after Brown pled and was sentenced, the law changed, effective July 1, 2021, to require that in order for Class X sentencing to apply, a defendant must have been convicted of a“Class 1 or Class 2 forcible felony” and that the prior qualifying convictions also must have been forcible felonies. Brown would not have been eligible for Class X sentencing under the amended statute. Counsel did not argue for application of the amended statute, only that Brown’s sentence should be reconsidered. The court denied the motion to reconsider, finding defendant’s sentence appropriate.
In the appellate court, Brown sought remand for resentencing, arguing that he was entitled to elect sentencing under the amended version of the Class X sentencing statute [730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b)] because it took effect before the circuit court ruled on his post-plea motion. Brown also argued that the record refuted counsel’s Rule 604(d) certificate, and requested remand for further post-plea proceedings. The appellate court affirmed.
Today, the Supreme Court also affirmed. The amended version of section 5-4.5-95(b) specifically stated its implementation date in the text of the statute as July 1, 2021. This was a clear expression of the legislature’s intent that the statute apply prospectively only.
Brown argued, however, that he had the right to elect sentencing under the amended statute because it became effective while his case was still pending in the circuit court where the proceedings on remand on his post-plea motion were not concluded until May 2022. Specifically, Brown relied on Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes [5 ILCS 70/4], which provides that “if any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any provisions of a new law, such provision may, by the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect.” The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the imposition of sentence, and not the ruling on the post-plea motion, was the date that the judgment was final and thus was the controlling date under Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes. Accordingly, Brown could not elect the benefit of the amended statute which took effect after he was sentenced. In so holding, the Court overruled People v. Spears, 2022 IL App (2d) 210583, which had reached a contrary result.
The Court also rejected Brown’s complaint that the record showed that counsel had not complied with Supreme Court Rule 604(d), despite counsel’s certification that he had. Brown had two opportunities to present his post-plea claims, and the court had two opportunities to reconsider his sentence. Brown affirmed on the record that he had adequate time to consult with counsel, and counsel presented argument sufficient to allow the circuit court to consider Brown’s claims and sufficient to permit appellate review of those claims. An additional remand would be “an empty and wasteful formality;” there was nothing to indicate the court’s ruling would be different if there were a third request to reconsider.
People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 129356
By Jay Wiegman, Office of the State Appellate Defender
At Earl Ratliff’s arraignment for robbery in April 2019, the LaSalle County circuit court admonished him of the charge, the sentencing range and his right to counsel. Defendant indicated he wanted an attorney and a public defender was appointed. At a hearing nearly three months later, appointed counsel indicated that Defendant wanted to represent himself. After advising Defendant of the difficulties inherent in self-representation, the trial judge granted Defendant’s request to proceed pro se without admonishing him regarding the charge, the sentencing range, and his right to counsel, as required by Supreme Court Rule 401(a), which states as follows:
“Any waiver of counsel shall be in open court. The court shall not permit a waiver of counsel by a person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing him of and determining that he understands the following: (1) the nature of the charge; (2) the minimum and maximum sentence prescribed by law, including, when applicable, the penalty to which the defendant may be subjected because of prior convictions or consecutive sentences; and (3) that he has a right to counsel and, if he is indigent, to have counsel appointed for him by the court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984).
On the day of his trial, Defendant told the court that he wished to enter an open guilty plea, which the circuit court accepted after admonishing him as to the charge, the sentencing range – including mandatory supervised release – and collateral consequences, in accord with Rule 402(a). Defendant was ultimately sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment. Defendant’s subsequent motion to reconsider the sentence was denied. A notice of appeal was filed, and the form indicated that the nature of the order appealed from was the motion to reconsider sentence, issued on May 7, 2021. Six months later, the defendant, who noted that the circuit clerk had erroneously included a paragraph that is to be filled out when the appeal is from other than a conviction, filed an unopposed motion for leave to file an amended notice of appeal and attached an amended notice of appeal. Defendant noted that he was appealing his conviction and all related rulings.
Before the Appellate Court, Third District, Defendant argued that his conviction should be reversed because the circuit court failed to comply with the admonishment requirements of Rule 401(a). The majority of the Appellate Court found that Defendant forfeited review of this issue because he did not object to the court’s admonishments and did not raise the issue in his post-plea motion, but further found that the 401(a) issue could be considered because it amounted to reversible second-prong plain error. After reviewing the record, the majority concluded that the defendant had been properly advised of the potential consequences of his plea less than three months before he entered his plea. As a result, the majority could not say that defendant’s waiver was unknowing or involuntary. Justice McDade dissented, and observed that defendant likely did not remember something that had been told to him three months before he elected to represent himself.
The Illinois Supreme Court allowed Defendant’s petition for leave to appeal. Chief Justice Theis, in an opinion joined by Justices Holder White and Rochford, first addressed whether the Court had jurisdiction to consider the appeal, and concluded that the Appellate Court lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order entering judgment on the defendant’s guilty plea because the defendant’s amended notice of appeal was filed after the additional 30-day period set forth in Supreme Court Rule 303(b)(5). As a result, the Illinois Supreme Court vacated the Appellate Court’s judgment, allowing that decision to stand.
Because the appeal presented “weighty issues concerning the finality of judgments pursuant to guilty pleas, the applicability of supreme court rules, the right to counsel, and the second prong of our plain error doctrine,” the Court addressed those issues to provide guidance to the bench and bar in future cases. Rejecting Defendant’s argument that the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to admonish him pursuant to Rule 401(a) at the time the court accepted his waiver of counsel, the Court found that Defendant faced three insurmountable impediments: he waived any Rule 401(a) claim by pleading guilty and by failing to raise it in a post-plea motion as required by Rule 604(d), and, even had his claim not been waived, but only forfeited, his forfeiture would not be excusable as second-prong plain error because a Rule 401(a) violation is not akin to structural error. In finding that the Appellate Court majority had brushed past Defendant’s failure to raise the trial court’s lack of admonitions because of the import it placed on the right to counsel, the majority found that many of the cases relied upon by the Appellate Court terming the right to counsel “fundamental” involved convictions following trials rather than guilty pleas. Further, the Court found those cases failed to engage in any “meaningful analysis of whether a clear Rule 401(a) violation that was not raised in a postplea or posttrial motion constitutes second-prong plain error.” The Court instead found that People v. Moon, 2022 IL 125959, controls here, and determined that a 401(a) violation is akin to a trial error and is there subject to a harmless-error analysis, rather than a structural error, which may be reviewed as second-prong plain error.
Justice O’Brien specially concurred, and agreed with the majority that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s challenge to his guilty plea and, therefore, the judgment of the appellate court must be vacated. Justice O’Brien, however, disagreed with the majority’s determination to exercise this court’s supervisory authority to review the correctness of the appellate court’s order and the merits of Defendant’s challenge to his plea.
Justice Cunningham agreed with and joined Justice O’Brien’s special concurrence. Justice Cunningham believed that that Court should not have invoked its supervisory authority to review the merits of Defendant’s challenge to his guilty plea and, further, believed that the majority improperly undertook its review. Justice Cunningham expressed that a defendant “may always argue on appeal that his pro se guilty plea was entered without a valid waiver of counsel because such an argument is a challenge to the validity of the plea itself.” Justice Cunningham noted that the majority ruling effectively means that plain-error review only applies to forfeited claims, not those that have bee affirmatively waived.
Justice Overstreet concurred in part and dissented in part. Justice Overstreet agreed with Justice Neville’s dissent, and expressed that the original notice of appeal was timely filed and conferred jurisdiction on the Appellate Court to consider the issues raised in the appeal. In all other respects, Justice Overstreet agreed with the majority’s opinion and joined fully in the majority’s analysis on waiver.
Justice Neville dissented. Though Justice Neville agreed that a reviewing court has an independent duty to consider sua sponte issues of jurisdiction, Justice Neville would find that the NOA filed on the day the trial court denied the motion to reconsider conferred jurisdiction on the Appellate Court to review not just that order but all orders in the procedural progression leading to the denial of that motion, because it is generally accepted that a notice of appeal is to be liberally construed. Moreover, a notice of appeal “confers jurisdiction to consider an unnamed ruling if the intent to address the unnamed ruling is apparent and there will be no prejudice to the adverse party. As a result, Justice Neville stated that there was no need for a supervisory order, because the Appellate Court had jurisdiction.
Further, the dissenting justice would hold that the circuit court’s imposition of judgment on Defendant’s uncounseled, blind guilty plea constituted reversible error, because the record includes evidence that Defendant did not knowingly and voluntarily enter a blind guilty plea, the plea may have been void and the circuit court’s imposition of judgment on the uncounseled plea – without an evidentiary hearing concerning Ratliff’s evidence he did not understand the plea – violated his right to due process. Additionally, Justice Neville would find that structural error occurred, as acceptance of an invalid waiver in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights necessarily leaves him entirely without the assistance of counsel at trial. To address these concerns, the dissenting justice also proposed that all admonishments be required to be in writing and provided to future defendants, who would be afforded sufficient time to review them, as well as the assistance of counsel. The dissenting justice also suggested the creation of a statewide public defender program.