Quick Take on Illinois Supreme Court Opinion Issued Thursday, November 12, 2026

Leading appellate attorney reviews the Illinois Supreme Court opinion handed down Thursday, November 12.
People v. Johnson, 2026 IL 130932
By Benjamin Lawson, Third District Appellate Court
Lead opinion by Justice Cunningham, joined by Justices Rochford and O’Brien
Chief Justice Neville specially concurred
Justice Overstreet specially concurred
Justice Holder White dissented
Justice Tailor took no part in the decision
Summary
Affirms the appellate court’s judgment vacating the circuit court’s fitness finding and remanding the case for a retrospective fitness hearing to determine whether Johnson was fit when he pleaded guilty. Note: this is a plurality opinion. All participating justices agreed that the appellate court maintained jurisdiction to review the issue of Johnson’s fitness, and that the circuit court erred in finding Johnson had been restored to fitness. Five justices agreed that the appellate court may order a retrospective fitness hearing when there is a reasonable probability that the defendant’s fitness at the time of the original proceeding can be accurately determined from the contemporaneous record. Four voted to overrule a prior Supreme Court case (People v. Ratliff) to the extent it held that an issue inadvertently left out of a Rule 604(d) postplea motion is waived rather than forfeited. Plain-error review is therefore available in an appeal following a guilty plea, effective immediately.
Decision
The defendant, Gregory Johnson, Jr., was charged in October 2017 with first degree murder for stabbing Timothy Ellis to death after he “discovered in his mind” that Ellis had molested the 16-year-old daughter of a friend. During the arraignment that followed, Johnson interrupted the proceedings, saying he wanted to “plead innocent” and “plead insanity” before he was removed from the courtroom.
Two months later, his attorney moved under section 104-11(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for a fitness examination. The motion asserted that a bona fide doubt existed as to the defendant’s fitness to stand trial based on Johnson’s behavior and statements. The court granted the motion on January 5, 2018, and ordered Dr. David Coleman to examine Johnson and prepare a report on his fitness.
The court held a hearing on the motion on March 29, 2018. At the hearing, the court noted that the doctor’s report had not made it into the court file. The parties stipulated to the contents of the report, and the court entered an agreed order finding that Johnson was unfit. Neither the report nor the order appeared in the record. Johnson was sent to Chester Mental Health Center (Center) with the expectation that he could be restored to fitness after receiving treatment.
The Center prepared an initial treatment plan diagnosing the defendant with paranoid schizophrenia and antisocial personality disorder. In August 2018, the Center stated in a progress report that Johnson had “no rational understanding of court proceedings” and remained unfit. The Center continued to generate reports, including an October 22, 2018, treatment plan review that contained conflicting assessments of whether the defendant was fit. It said that Johnson’s primary diagnosis had been changed to adult oppositional defiant disorder because he no longer showed signs of psychosis, and that he should continue his medications to maintain “clinical stability.” In two places it stated that Johnson had been found fit on September 24, 2018. But it also listed fitness as an “active” treatment goal with a target date of December 30, 2018, and its “Fitness Statement” said that the treatment team “currently believes that [Johnson] is Unfit to Stand Trial.”
Nonetheless, on October 30, 2018, the court ordered the defendant to be released from the Center and remanded to the county jail. The order referred to a progress report from the Center, submitted under section 104-18(a)(2) of the Code, stating that Johnson was fit to stand trial. That report was not attached to the order and is not in the record. The Center discharged Johnson on November 1. A one-page “Notice of Change in Status,” filed with the court, stated that he was “recommended as fit to stand trial.”
The court held a restoration-to-fitness hearing on November 14, 2018. The court noted that it had the notice of change in status but that no progress report was in its file. Defense counsel referred to a progress report dated October 25, 2018, and proposed that the parties stipulate that, if “the doctor who wrote the report” testified, he would testify consistently with it. The court asked, “Which is restoring him to fitness [?]” and counsel agreed. The State joined the stipulation, and the court found Johnson restored to fitness. No witnesses testified, neither the State nor the court questioned Johnson, and the report was never placed in the record.
In March 2019, Johnson pleaded guilty to one count of first degree murder under a fully negotiated agreement for 45 years’ imprisonment. In exchange, the State dismissed the remaining counts and the charges in two unrelated cases. During the admonishments, Johnson said he had taken no mental health medication since November 1, 2018, but answered that he was thinking clearly and able to make important decisions about his case. The court admonished him that any issue not raised in a motion to withdraw his plea would not be considered on appeal.
Johnson filed a pro se motion to withdraw his plea, which the court denied as untimely. The appellate court (Fourth District) reversed and remanded for a ruling on the merits. On remand, appointed counsel filed an amended motion alleging that Johnson had been denied his medications from November 1, 2018, until the plea, that the court erred in accepting the plea after learning this, and that plea counsel was ineffective for proceeding without determining whether Johnson was competent to plead. The motion attached the Center’s reports (including the October 22 treatment plan review), part of the plea transcript, and Johnson’s affidavit stating that, without his medication, he “was not thinking clearly” at the time of his plea. The motion mentioned the November 14 restoration hearing only once, in its background section, and it did not allege that the restoration finding was erroneous. At the August 2022 hearing on the motion, defense counsel discussed the conflicting fitness statements, and the court questioned whether it should have assessed “what was going on in late 2018” before accepting the plea. The court denied the motion, and Johnson again appealed.
On appeal, Johnson argued for the first time that the trial court erred in finding him restored to fitness based on a stipulation to a report the court never received. He also argued that the court failed to address his requests to represent himself in the postplea proceedings. The State responded that neither issue was preserved. The appellate court (Fifth District) reviewed the fitness claim for plain error. It found that the trial court had relied on the parties’ stipulation without ensuring that Johnson could understand the proceedings and assist in his defense, and it vacated the restoration order. Rather than vacate the plea, it remanded for a retrospective fitness hearing. If Johnson’s fitness could be fairly and accurately determined, the appellate court would retain jurisdiction under Rule 615(b)(2) to address his self-representation claim. If not, he would be entitled to a new trial. The appellate court denied Johnson’s petition for rehearing, which argued that the plea should simply have been vacated. Johnson appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court’s lead opinion first addressed the State’s argument that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to review the restoration order because Johnson’s notice of appeal identified only the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea. Under the merger rule, a timely notice of appeal from a final judgment brings up for review the earlier nonfinal orders that were steps in the “procedural progression” leading to it. An order finding a defendant restored to fitness is not immediately appealable, and a defendant cannot be prosecuted while unfit, so the restoration order merges into the final judgment. The lead opinion added that the doctrine under which a guilty plea waives challenges to earlier defects is not jurisdictional. It governs what a defendant may argue, not what the reviewing court may review.
The State argued that People v. Ratliff, 2024 IL 111666 eliminated the merger rule. In Ratliff, the defendant abandoned his motion to withdraw his plea and pursued only a motion to reconsider his sentence, and his notice of appeal named only that order. Applying the merger rule there would have allowed him to challenge his plea without filing the motion to withdraw it that Rule 604(d) requires before an appeal. The lead opinion held that Ratliff is limited to those facts and did not eliminate the merger rule. Because Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal from the denial of his motion to withdraw his plea, the appellate court had jurisdiction over the restoration order.
The lead opinion next held that Johnson had not preserved his challenge to the restoration order. His amended motion to withdraw his plea raised two claims, both directed at the March 2019 plea hearing. Although the motion described inconsistencies in his treatment providers’ assessments and his lack of medication, those facts supported his claims about the plea hearing, not the restoration hearing. Johnson attached the plea transcript but not the restoration transcript, and his affidavit addressed only his state of mind at the time of the plea. Finding the claim preserved would require the court to construct Johnson’s argument for him.
The State argued that plain-error review is unavailable after a guilty plea. Rule 604(d) provides that any issue not raised in the postplea motion “shall be deemed waived,” and Ratliff held that this language means waiver rather than forfeiture. Forfeiture is the failure to timely assert a right; waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. The lead opinion explained that Illinois courts long used “waiver” to mean forfeiture and that, before Ratliff, the court had repeatedly reviewed unpreserved claims for plain error in guilty-plea appeals. Ratliff did not address those decisions. Reasoning that treating an inadvertent omission as an intentional waiver would inevitably leave in place some pleas shown to be involuntary, the lead opinion overruled Ratliff on that point. Plain-error review is therefore available in an appeal following a guilty plea. The ruling is effective immediately and applies to all cases pending in the appellate court and the Supreme Court.
The lead opinion added a limit: plain-error review cannot be used to raise claims that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives under the waiver-by-guilty-plea doctrine. That doctrine did not bar Johnson’s claim because a challenge to his fitness goes to whether the plea itself was knowing and voluntary, and a defendant who may be unfit cannot knowingly waive the right to have his fitness determined.
Turning to whether plain error occurred, the lead opinion rejected the State’s argument that the stipulation was proper under People v. Lewis, 103 Ill. 2d 111 (1984). Lewis allows a court to accept a stipulation to an expert’s expected opinion testimony, but not a stipulation to the legal conclusion that the defendant is fit. Here, the evidence did not meet the statutory standard. Once a defendant is found unfit, he is presumed to remain unfit, and the State must prove fitness by a preponderance of the evidence. The stipulation did not name the doctor or state his qualifications. It did not say whether or how he examined Johnson, how Johnson was restored after a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, whether his fitness depended on medication, or whether he could understand the proceedings and assist in his defense. It was “so vague as to have essentially no probative value.” The October 22 treatment plan review could not support the finding because nothing showed the court had it, and the one-line notice of change in status added nothing.
The lead opinion also rejected the State’s invited-error argument. Because defense counsel proposed the stipulation, Johnson could not challenge the court’s consideration of it, but he could still argue that the evidence as a whole was insufficient. By finding Johnson restored to fitness on this record, the trial court allowed the prosecution to proceed while he was presumptively unfit. That was second-prong plain error, which covers errors that render a proceeding fundamentally unfair.
Finally, the lead opinion rejected Johnson’s argument that his plea should be vacated outright. Retrospective fitness hearings present “inherent difficulties,” but there is no per se rule against them. Whether one is appropriate is decided on a case-by-case basis and turns on whether enough contemporaneous evidence exists to permit a fair and accurate determination. Johnson argued that the appellate court had relied reflexively on language in People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 339 (2000), describing such hearings as “now the norm.” The lead opinion explained that Mitchell did not require a retrospective hearing in every case and that the appellate court applied the correct standard. It added that the passage of time is a factor but is not dispositive.
The lead opinion then clarified that the appellate court may order a retrospective fitness hearing if it finds a reasonable probability that the defendant’s fitness at the time of the original proceeding can be accurately determined from the contemporaneous record. That record, rather than entirely new testimony, should guide the trial court’s determination, because new testimony may raise due process concerns. The lead opinion reaffirmed the case-by-case approach and the rule that retrospective hearings should be reserved for “exceptional cases.”
Applying that standard, the lead opinion noted that section 104-18 of the Code required the Center to send the court a written progress report when it believed Johnson had attained fitness, including its clinical findings and information about any medication. The transport order and the parties’ references at the restoration hearing made it probable that such a report existed, and if so it would be significant contemporaneous evidence of Johnson’s fitness. Johnson’s plea will be upheld only if the trial court finds, based on that report, sufficient contemporaneous evidence that he was restored to fitness before the plea. If the report no longer exists, cannot be found, or is inconclusive, the trial court must vacate the plea, and Johnson will be entitled to a new trial. If the trial court can fairly and accurately determine that Johnson was fit, the appellate court retains jurisdiction to consider his self-representation claim. On that basis, the court affirmed the appellate court’s judgment, vacated the circuit court’s judgment, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Special Concurrences
Chief Justice Neville specially concurred. He agreed that the appellate court had jurisdiction, agreed with overruling Ratliff, and agreed with the remand for a retrospective fitness hearing. He wrote separately on two points.
First, he would hold that Rule 604(d)’s waiver provisions do not apply to a defendant found unfit to stand trial unless the circuit court, after a hearing that complies with article 104 of the Code, finds him restored to fitness. A defendant who may be incompetent cannot knowingly waive his rights, and the court has an institutional interest in guilty pleas that are, and appear, fair. Because the circuit court never made a properly supported restoration finding, he would not apply Rule 604(d) to Johnson at all.
Second, he would hold that Johnson’s amended motion adequately raised the restoration issue. To meet their duty not to accept pleas from defendants who lack competence, courts may sometimes need to construct a defendant’s argument from his factual allegations. He would apply the standard used for first-stage postconviction petitions, which asks whether the facts alleged state the gist of a constitutional claim. On that view, the court did not need to resort to plain-error review. He also cautioned that faded memories may prevent the State from reconstructing Johnson’s mental state with enough certainty, and he agreed that, if the State cannot prove retrospective fitness, the conviction must be vacated and the case set for a new trial.
Justice Overstreet also specially concurred. He agreed that the appellate court had jurisdiction, that the trial court erred in finding Johnson restored to fitness, and that a retrospective fitness hearing was appropriate. He also agreed that claims barred by the waiver-by-guilty-plea doctrine are excluded from plain-error review and that the doctrine did not bar Johnson’s claim. He disagreed, however, that Johnson failed to preserve his challenge. The amended motion alleged that Johnson was unfit after he stopped receiving medication on November 1, 2018, which was still true when the court found him restored 13 days later, and it attached the conflicting fitness reports. At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel discussed those reports, and the trial court itself questioned whether it should have examined Johnson’s condition in late 2018 before accepting the plea. Because the trial court had the opportunity to review the essential claim, the claim was preserved. He would therefore not have decided whether Rule 604(d) creates waiver or forfeiture, much less overruled a decision “filed barely two years ago.”
Justice Overstreet also objected to the lead opinion’s criticism of Ratliff, which, in his view, followed the plain language of Rule 604(d) (any issue not raised “shall be deemed waived”). He noted that, in People v. Marshall, 2026 IL 132129, the Court had recently treated the post-Ratliff law on identical language in Rule 604(h)(2) as settled. Rather than overrule Ratliff, he would have the Court send its rules committee a proposal to amend Rule 604(d) to replace “shall be deemed waived” with “shall be deemed forfeited,” subject to public hearing and comment.
Dissent
Justice Holder White dissented. She agreed that the appellate court had jurisdiction because Johnson’s notice of appeal named the very judgment he challenged, but she saw no reason to limit Ratliff, which involved two separate judgments, to its facts. She would hold that Johnson’s claim falls outside Rule 604(d)’s procedural bar altogether. When a procedural error at a fitness proceeding denies the defendant a fair hearing, the prejudice invalidates any later guilty plea. In addition, courts have not required compliance with Rule 604(d) when there is a bona fide doubt about the defendant’s fitness, because the defendant cannot be presumed to have understood the Rule 605 admonishments. Johnson received those admonishments at the same plea hearing at which he claims he was presumptively unfit. Because the claim was not procedurally barred, the lead opinion should not have addressed preservation, waiver versus forfeiture, or plain error, and the propriety of Ratliff was not before the Court.
Reviewing the claim directly, Justice Holder White would hold that the circuit court abused its discretion in accepting the stipulation because “there was literally nothing to accept.” The Court had not received or read the report. With only the conclusory notice of change in status and no observation of Johnson, the restoration finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. She agreed with the lead opinion’s invited-error analysis.
Justice Holder White also would not order a retrospective hearing. In her view, Mitchell and the cases it discussed involved former section 104-21(a) of the Code, which entitled defendants taking psychotropic medication to a fitness hearing, and they do not apply in other contexts. She knew of no decision of the Court approving a retrospective fitness hearing outside that setting, and she relied instead on decisions that ordered new trials. She agreed that the case-by-case approach applies and that retrospective hearings will rarely be appropriate. Here, even if the report were found, the record contains no observations of Johnson at the restoration hearing, and almost eight years have passed. Because Johnson is still presumed unfit, she would vacate his plea and sentence and remand for new restoration and plea proceedings.