CIVIL

Krywin v. The Chicago Transit Authority

By Jean M. Prendergast, Schuyler, Roche & Crisham, P.C Today, in a 5-2 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court in Krywin v. The Chicago Transit Authority, held that a common carrier’s duty to provide passengers with a safe place to alight must yield to the natural accumulation rule. Under that rule, a landowner has no duty to remove natural accumulations of ice, snow or water. The plaintiff-passenger had fallen as she exited a train onto a slippery CTA platform. The court affirmed the appellate court and reversed the passenger’s nearly $400,000 verdict. The court also held that the CTA had no duty to identify a safer place to exit the train.  The court reasoned that the passenger failed to meet her burden to prove the feasibility of requiring the CTA to discharge all passengers safely during inclement conditions. The court took judicial notice of the magnitude of the CTA’s operations and observed that “it would be impractical to place a burden on the CTA to evaluate its train platforms” every time a train enters a station. Justice Freeman, joined by Justice Kilbride, dissented, pointing out that the majority’s holding disregarded the Local Government and Governmental Employees’ Tort Immunity Act (“Act”), which codified the natural accumulation rule, but also specifically excluded the CTA from the Act’s protection.  In addition, the dissent maintained that the majority decision is inconsistent with the court’s prior adoption of the principles stated in Section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which recognized that landowners are in a superior position to protect their invitees. The dissent pointed to the supreme courts of Alaska and Michigan, which have recognized that climate conditions do not render all weather risks reasonable for a business invitee. The dissent charged that the majority opinion diluted a business owner’s duty and undermined basic principles of public responsibility. Case Summary Opinion 108888

CRIMINAL

People v. Williams

By David Bergschneider, Office of the State Appellate Defender At defendant’s sexual assault trial, a State Police scientist testified that she compared defendant’s DNA profile with a profile developed from evidence at the crime scene, and concluded that the samples matched. The crime scene profile was developed not by the ISP lab, but by Cellmark, a private company. 1. The Supreme Court found that the State was not required to show that the Cellmark equipment operated properly, as a foundation to show that the Cellmark profile was reliable. Under Wilson v. Clark, 84 Ill. 2d 186 (1981), an expert may base an opinion on facts that are typically relied upon by experts in the field, even where those facts are not placed in evidence. In addition, such facts may be introduced to explain the expert’s opinion. The relevant evidence here was the expert’s opinion, not the Cellmark report. Because the report was used merely to explain the expert’s opinion, no foundation concerning Cellmark’s equipment was required. 2. Under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), admission of “testimonial” hearsay violates the Confrontation Clause unless the declarant is unavailable and the defense had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Crawford applies only if the evidence in question is hearsay. The court found that the Cellmark report was not hearsay, because it was used to explain the basis of an expert opinion rather than the truth of the matter asserted. Therefore, Crawford did not apply. Case Summary Opinion 107550

People v. Phipps

The Supreme Court also released this previously un-announced opinion. Case Summary Opinion 107016