Quick takes from Thursday, Dec. 28, Illinois Supreme Court opinions

CIVIL

Cookson v. Price

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC For those keeping tabs on the reviewing courts’ interpretation of Section 2-622 post Lebron v. Gottlieb Memorial Hospital, 237 Ill. 2d 217 (2010), note the opinion dismissing the appeal in Cookson v. Price.  Interpreting the 2006 version of Section 2-622, 735 ILCS 5/2-622, which spells out the requirements for expert reports accompanying medical malpractice complaints, the trial court denied a plaintiff’s request to file an amended report more than 90 days after filing the lawsuit.  The plaintiff had sued a physical therapy assistant and his employer; initially, he attached a physician’s report.  Contending that the statute required a physical therapy assistant’s report, the defendants moved to dismiss.  The plaintiff ultimately sought leave to file a new report prepared by a physical therapy assistant -- too late in the trial court’s view; however, the appellate court reversed.  It found that allowing the amendment would not frustrate the goal of weeding out frivolous lawsuits. Practitioners must wait to learn the supreme court’s take on this issue.  In Lebron, on unrelated grounds, the court struck as unconstitutional the Act that contained the 2006 version of Section 2-622.  Because the statute in effect at the time of the appeal now is void, the supreme court decided that it had no reason to hear the Cookson case and sent the case back to the trial court to determine whether the plaintiff’s pleadings meet the May 1998 version of Section 2-622 that Lebron resurrected. Opinion 109321 Case summary

Millennium Park Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan

By Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams Montgomery & John Ltd. This case involved a challenge to a tax assessment.  The plaintiff had a permit to operate a retail store, restaurant and food concessions in a city park.  The tax assessor issued a proposed assessment, which the plaintiff challenged by filing a declaratory judgment action.  The plaintiff contended that it merely held a license – not a lease – of the city property and therefore could not be taxed. A divided Court struggled primarily with the issue of jurisdiction.  The majority concluded that the circuit court had original subject matter jurisdiction to consider the case. Much of the Opinion is devoted to the “unauthorized by law” doctrine.  That is an exception to the common law rule that in the field of taxation and revenue cases, equity will not assume jurisdiction to grant relief where there is a complete and adequate legal remedy.  The majority held that because the plaintiff’s challenge was that the tax assessor was unauthorized to impose a tax, the circuit court had jurisdiction even though the plaintiff had not sought relief through administrative review. The Court also discussed certain, broader principles of statutory construction.  The Court explained that if a statute codifies a common law rule, it does not eliminate any common law exceptions to the rule that might exist in the absence of a clear expression of intent to abrogate the exception. The Court also agreed with the lower courts on the merits that the plaintiff’s agreement with the Park District created an untaxable license as opposed to a taxable lease. Opinion 108923 Case summary

CRIMINAL

In re Luis R.

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender Luis R. was charged in a delinquency petition with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault. The petition was filed in 2007, while the acts were alleged to have been committed between June and August of 2000. At the time the petition was filed, Luis R. was 21 years old. Luis R. filed a motion to dismiss the petition, alleging that the court was “without jurisdiction over [his] person” because he was now 21 years old. The circuit court granted the motion. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. A divided Supreme Court reversed. The Court focused solely on the issue of jurisdiction. The Court found that the circuit court had both subject matter and personal jurisdiction because the State’s petition alleged the existence of a justiciable matter (subject matter jurisdiction) and Luis R.’s attorney had filed a general appearance in this cause on Luis R.’s behalf (personal jurisdiction). The Court did not consider whether further proceedings could be had on the delinquency petition, whether the matter could be transferred to the criminal division, or whether the State could prosecute Luis R. under the criminal law, concluding that such considerations would result in an advisory opinion. Instead, the Court simply remanded for further proceedings. Dissenting justices Freeman and Burke were critical of the majority’s refusal to consider what Justice Burke called the “actual rationale behind the circuit court’s order” – that being the inability of the circuit court to grant the relief requested in the petition. Justice Freeman noted that it was “anybody’s guess” as to what further proceedings could be held on remand because the court has no authority under the Juvenile Court Act to adjudicate a delinquency petition filed against a 21-year-old. Opinion 108403 Case summary

People v. Stoffel

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender Jerry Stoffel filed a document he labeled “petition for relief from judgment” pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1401. Counsel was appointed a month later. The State filed a motion to dismiss. At a status hearing, the court inquired whether the petition was a habeas or a post-conviction petition, and defense counsel responded that it was a PC and that he would be making amendments to it. The State did not object to the characterization of the pleading as a PC petition at that hearing or at a subsequent status hearing. Defense counsel later sought to supplement the pleading, and the State moved to strike arguing that defendant’s petition was a 2-1401 petition and that defense counsel could not amend or supplement a PC petition that was never filed. At a hearing on the State’s motion to dismiss, the court held that the original pleading had not been recharacterized as a PC and granted the State’s motion to dismiss. The appellate court held that the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing to recharacterize defendant’s 2-1401 petition as a PC. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a trial court is not obligated to recharacterize a petition and that a decision not to recharacterize a petition cannot be error and thus is not subject to review on appeal. The Court’s decision in that regard was unanimous. There was a split, though, as to whether the circuit court had, in fact, recharacterized the petition by appointing counsel and advancing the petition to the second stage of proceedings. The majority held that it had. Three justices dissented concluding that the court had not recharacterized the pleading as evidenced by the lack of Shellstrom admonishments. Ultimately, the majority went on to consider and reject the issue presented in defendant’s petition and denied the petition on the merits. As a practical matter then, for this defendant, the result is the same under either the majority’s or dissent’s approach – no relief. Opinion 108500 Case summary