Quick takes from Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions
Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday’s Supreme Court opinions from Civil cases General Motors v. Pappas, Auburn v. IDOR and Bell v. Hutsell and Criminal cases People v. Absher and People v. Marshall.
CIVIL
General Motors v. Pappas
By Michael T. Reagan, The Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan In General Motors v. Pappas, a unique interest rate dispute resulted in an opinion which provides significant lessons on appellate jurisdiction and judgment interest. In August, 2005, the Property Tax Code was amended, effective January 1, 2006, to change the interest rate paid on property tax refunds following a successful tax protest. A dispute arose in these numerous consolidated cases as to how that amendment was to be applied. In the Supreme Court, the issues were distilled down to questions concerning the availability of judgment interest under section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure, rather than interest under the Property Code. The "core issue" was whether the taxpayers are entitled to judgment interest on fixed judgments of outstanding interest which were then appealed by the Collector. The Court held that if the statutory interest on the tax refund is not paid in full, judgment interest under section 2-1303 is allowed on the set amount of outstanding interest that is owed as a result of the judgment. That is not compound interest. Rather, it is no different than any other fixed money judgment subject to the accrual of judgment interest. Along the way to that holding, the court dealt with intricate questions of jurisdiction and forfeiture. A circuit court retains jurisdiction after a notice of appeal is filed to determine matters collateral to the judgment. Here, the award of judgment interest after the appeal had been initiated was found to be collateral to the judgment, and thus proper. In certain of these cases, where the notice of appeal was filed before the award of judgment interest, the failure to file an amended notice of appeal, or an additional notice, resulted in a lack of appellate jurisdiction over that question. The award of interest was a different matter than the appeal on the merits. That jurisdictional defect was not cured by inclusion of the issue in the docketing statement and the brief. As to other taxpayers, the interest issue had not been raised in the trial court. While that would normally result in forfeiture, thecourt considered the issue regardless because of a conflict with another appellate opinion and the consequent desire to provide a unified body of case law. As to yet another taxpayer, the court found that the interest issue had not been forfeited even though the issue had not been raised in the circuit court because the taxpayer had sought the continued accrual of statutory interest under the Property Tax Code. The tax issue in this case is unlikely to recur, but the opinion will continue to provide guidance on these jurisdictional issues.Auburn v. IDOR
By Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams Montgomery & John Ltd. At issue here was whether the Property Tax Extension Limitation Law (PTELL) applied to all portions of the Auburn Community Unit School District No. 10 after territory in a county that had not considered a PTELL referendum was annexed into the Auburn district. The Court held that the entire District remained subject to the PTELL. The Court reasoned that the Regional Board had not created a new school district when it dissolved the Divernon District and annexed the majority of the territory to the Auburn District. Accordingly, although the boundaries of the district had changed, the Auburn District remained the same district under the applicable School Code as it was when PTELL became applicable. Because PTELL was already applicable to the Auburn District at the time of annexation, it could only be removed pursuant to the statutory removal referendum process. The Court further found that the Auburn District had not met either of the statutory removal requirements. Accordingly, PTELL continued to apply to the entire district. The Court held that its interpretation of the statute was consistent with the legislative purpose of PTELL, which was to provide greater citizen control over property taxes that citizens are required to pay.Bell v. Hutsell
By Alyssa M. Reiter, Williams Montgomery & John Ltd. The difference between malfeasance and nonfeasance proved critical in this case. Bell sued on behalf of her son, who died in a single-car accident after allegedly consuming alcoholic beverages at defendants’ residence. Plaintiff alleged in the first three counts of her complaint that the defendants voluntarily undertook a duty to prohibit underage drinking and possession of alcoholic beverages on their premises and to inspect, monitor, and supervise underage partygoers to those ends. The circuit court dismissed the multi-count complaint with prejudice. The appellate court affirmed dismissal of the other counts but reversed dismissal of counts I through III, which were premised on a theory of voluntary undertaking. On review, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court as to those counts. The Court acknowledged that previous decisions had recognized that, despite the general rule precluding common law social host liability based upon provision of alcohol, a defendant can be liable for an alcohol-related injury based upon a theory of voluntary undertaking. The Court then examined whether the allegations of the complaint in this case satisfied the requirements of a voluntary undertaking theory. The Court concluded that they did not. Relying on sections 323 and 324A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the Court emphasized that, in this case, the defendants took no affirmative acts to effect the aim of their expressed intention (prohibiting underage drinking) and no one relied upon defendants’ intentions or were put at an increased risk of harm as a result. The Court held that this was a case of “true nonfeasance.” It distinguished this from previous cases where the defendants’ affirmative conduct, amounting to an assertion of control over an impaired person, increased that person’s risk of harm or created a risk of harm to others. The Court concluded that this case “point[ed] up the continuing significance of a distinction between malfeasance and nonfeasance.”CRIMINAL
People v. Absher
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender In March 2004, Samuel Absher pled guilty to retail theft in exchange for being placed on probation for two years, with the first year to be served as part of St. Clair County's "Intensive Probation Supervision" program. Absher voluntarily agreed to the conditions of the Intensive Probation program, including that he submit to searches of his person and property as requested by the probation officer. Two months later, Absher appeared to be under the influence of drugs at a probation appointment. Later that night, the probation officer and local police officers went to Absher's home to conduct a search pursuant to the aforementioned probation condition. Absher attempted to deny entrance to his home, but the officers forced entry and discovered cocaine, marijuana, and several lighters and pipes. Absher was charged with possession of a controlled substance, and his motion to suppress was denied in the trial court. The appellate court reversed, citing the holding in People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill. 2d 231 (2003) that a search of a probationer's residence must be suppoted by reasonable suspicion. The appellate court found that People v. Wilson, 228 Ill. 2d 35 (2008) (allowing suspicionless search of a parolee) did not alter the outcome. The Supreme Court concluded that the instant case was governed by contract principles and that, because Absher had entered a fully negotiated plea in exchange for probation, he could not unilaterally modify the conditions of that probation by challenging the search to which he had prosepctively consented as part of the plea agreement. The Court likened Absher's efforts to challenge the search to those of a defendant who enters a fully negotiated plea and then seeks to reduce his sentence through a motion to reconsider without withdrawing the plea. The Court found Lampitok factually distinguishable based on the specific language of the probation conditions at issue and on the fact that the defendant in Lampitok was not the probationer but rather was a roommate. Of note is the fact that the Court specifically stated that its decision was limited to the "specific facts in this appeal." Unresolved by Absher is whether a suspicionless search condition like the one at issue here will be enforceable where probation is imposed by the court rather than pursuant to a plea agreement.People v. Marshall
By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender 730 ILCS 5/5-4-3 requires any individual convicted of a felony or various other offenses to submit a blood, saliva, or tissue sample for DNA indexing and to pay a corresponding $200 DNA analysis fee. At issue was whether that statute requires duplicative DNA sample submissions and payment of multiple fees from an offender who has already submitted DNA samples and paid the fee pursuant to a prior conviction. Over the past few years, the appellate court districts have been split over the multiple sample/multiple fee question. The Supreme Court resolved that split here. The statute requires only a single instance of DNA-sample taking, analysis and indexing and payment of a single $200 fee from each qualified individual. An order requiring an additional sample/fee is void and not subject to forfeiture.Filed under: