Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the civil case Township of Jubilee v. State of Illinois and criminal case People v. Young.

CIVIL

Township of Jubilee v. State of Illinois,

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC

After losing a circuit court feud with the Township of Jubilee over the ownership of a public square, the state could not persuade the Illinois Supreme Court to allow a do-over in the Court of Claims.  The township had filed an action for declaratory judgment and to quiet title to a parcel, which had not been conveyed to the state, but which the state claimed to acquire by adverse possession: the state placed a sign designating the area as a state park, and state employees mowed the grass in the square for more than 20 years.  The state asserted the State Lawsuit Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 5/0.01, et seq. (West 2002), and the Court of Claims Act, 705 ILCS 505/1, et seq. (West 2002), as jurisdictional barriers to litigating in the circuit court, rather than the Court of Claims.  The circuit court denied the state’s motion to dismiss on these grounds and ultimately ruled for the township on the merits, and the appellate court affirmed.  

In the supreme court, the state only contested the circuit court’s jurisdiction and not the decision on the merits.  The supreme court would have agreed with the state’s jurisdictional position if the state had not filed a “counter-complaint” in the circuit court.  By filing its own separate action to quiet title, the state eliminated the application of the Immunity Act, which only prevents the state from being sued in the circuit court; the Act does not affect the state’s right to seek redress there.  Similarly, the Court of Claims hears complaints brought against the state; it has no authority to hear claims the state elects to bring.

The supreme court emphasized that the state had “affirmatively invoke[d] the circuit court’s jurisdiction in aid of its claim.”  The analysis, the supreme court explained, was not based on waiver or forfeiture.

CRIMINAL

People v. Young

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

The Court was asked to determine whether the provision of the Controlled
Substances Act making delivery of a controlled substance within 1,000 feet
of a "school" a Class 1 felony includes a "preschool."  For now, it does
not.

In construing the meaning of the statutory language here, the Court looked
to two appellate court cases decided approximately 20 years ago, Goldstein,
204 Ill. App. 3d 1041 (1990), and Owens, 240 Ill. App. 3d 168 (1992).  The
Court seemed to adopt the reasoning from Goldstein, where it was noted that
Public Act 84-1075, which enacted the 1,000-feet-of-a-school provision,
simultaneously amended three other statutes to add "school" provisions.  In
those statutes, "school" was defined as "any public or private elementary
or secondary school, community college, college or university."  In
Goldstein, the court concluded that the legislature must have intended the
same meaning to apply in the Controlled Substances Act.  The Owenscourt
reached the same conclusion.

The Supreme Court noted that the legislature had ample time to amend the
Act to more-broadly define "school" had it wanted to do so.  Where the
legislature chooses not to amend a statute after judicial construction, it
is presumed that the legislature has acquiesced in the court's
construction.  Further, because the term "school" has obtained a "settled
meaning" in the case law, the Court found it would be inappropriate for the
Court to change it now.  The Court expressly noted, though, that the
legislature remains free to do so.