A review of Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the criminal cases In re Q.P., People v. Fiveash and People v. Goossens.

CRIMINAL

In re Q.P.

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

An officer responded to a call of a vehicle burglary in progress. Upon arriving, he located the minor, Q.P., who matched the description of the burglar. The officer handcuffed the minor and put him in the back of the squad car. The minor gave a false name and date of birth. Upon discovery that the information was false, the minor admitted to the officer that he was attempting to prevent the police from discovering that he had an outstanding warrant.

The minor was charged with, and convicted of, obstructing justice based upon giving false information to the police with the intent to prevent his apprehension. The Supreme Court was called upon to determine the meaning of “apprehension.” The minor argued that he was already apprehended because he was in police custody at the time he provided the false information. The State argued that apprehension is specific to each criminal charge and thus, while the minor had been apprehended for the suspected vehicle burglary, he had not yet been apprehended on the outstanding warrant.

The Supreme Court agreed with the State. Citing a line of cases dating back to 1899, the Court stated that “apprehension” has a settled meaning in Illinois; it means the “seizure, taking, or arrest of a person on a criminal charge.” The Court clarified that “apprehension” relates to a specific criminal charge. Thus, the minor was properly found guilty of obstructing justice here because he had given a false name with the intent to avoid his apprehension on an outstanding warrant, even though he had already been apprehended for the suspected vehicle burglary.

The question decided in Q.P. was very narrow. The Court followed established principles of statutory construction to reach its decision. Q.P. clarifies that a defendant who gives false information to the police after he is seized or arrested on one charge can still be charged with, and convicted of, obstructing justice if it is determined that the defendant gave that false information in an effort to avoid apprehension on a separate charge.

People v. Fiveash

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

The Supreme Court was confronted with the question of whether a 23-year-old defendant could be prosecuted in criminal court for acts allegedly committed when he was 14 or 15 years old.

David Fiveash was charged with sexual offenses against a family member occurring between January 2003 and January 2004. The offenses were brought to the attention of the police in April 2012, and the charges were brought in May 2012. Fiveash sought dismissal of the charges on the basis that section 5-120 of the Juvenile Court Act gave the juvenile “exclusive jurisdiction” over offenses allegedly committed when he was 14, barring his prosecution in criminal court now that he was over 21. The trial court agreed, but the appellate court did not.

The Supreme Court sided with the appellate court. Section 5-120 bars criminal prosecution only against defendants under the age of 21 for offenses allegedly committed while under age 17.  Because defendant was 23 at the time he was charged, Section 5-120 does not apply. Consequently, the juvenile court does not have exclusive jurisdiction. Defendant’s prosecution in criminal court is proper.

Like it did in Q.P., the Court cited to established principles of statutory construction in reaching its conclusion in Fiveash. The Court noted that defendant’s position would have allowed him to escape prosecution for “four felony sexual offenses allegedly committed against a six-year-old family member” and would have contradicted the legislature’s express intent to hold those who commit criminal offenses directly accountable for their actions. The Court also cited to the extended limitations period for initiating criminal proceedings for sexual offenses against children (10 years after the child victim turns 18; 720 ILCS 5/3-6(j)), as indicative of the legislature’s intent to allow prosecution “well beyond the normal time frame.”

People v. Goossens

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Raymond Goosens was convicted of intimidation for threatening not to respond to 911 calls from a local racetrack as long as two former police officers remained employed there. He was convicted and sentenced to two years of probation with one of the conditions being that he “become current in his child support” obligations in an unrelated divorce proceeding. On appeal, he challenged the court’s authority to include that condition.

Section 5-6-3(b)(6) of the Code of Corrections allows a court to require, as a condition of probation, that the defendant “support his dependents.” The Supreme Court’s decision clarifies that this condition need not be related to the underlying criminal offense.

Once again, the Supreme Court looked to principles of statutory construction to decide the narrow issue presented in this case. The most important of those principles is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. While case law instructs that probation conditions not specifically provided for in the Code must be reasonable and related to the nature of the offense or the rehabilitation of the defendant, there is no such requirement in the broadly-stated conditions of probation enumerated in the statute. The unrestricted language used in the Code, that a defendant may be ordered to "support his dependents," suggests that the legislature did not intend such a condition be related to the offense.