A leading appellate attorney reviews the Illinois Supreme Court opinion handed down Thursday, October 20. 

People v. Stewart,, 2022 IL 126116

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

In 2016, Denzal Stewart was charged with the Class 2 offense of possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Stewart was 20 years old at the time of the offense, and he turned 21 while the charge was pending. 

After Stewart was found guilty at a jury trial, the court found he was subject to mandatory Class X sentencing pursuant to 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-95(b). That statute provides, in part:

(b) When a defendant, over the age of 21 years, is convicted of a Class 1 or Class 2 felony, after having twice been convicted in any state or federal court of an offense that contains the same elements as an offense now (the date the Class 1 or Class 2 felony was committed) classified in Illinois as a Class 2 or greater felony and those charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different series of acts, that defendant shall be sentenced as a Class X offender.

Stewart’s two prior felony convictions were a 2013 Class 1 residential burglary and a 2014 Class 2 possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Thus, for Stewart’s current Class 2 conviction, the court imposed the statutory minimum Class X term of 6 years of imprisonment.

On appeal, Stewart argued that he was not eligible for Class X sentencing. Stewart was 17 years old when he was convicted of his first felony offense in 2013. Because he was 17, he was prosecuted as an adult for that offense rather than being subject to juvenile delinquency proceedings. But, the Juvenile Court Act was amended the following year to raise the age for juvenile court jurisdiction from 16 to 17. Accordingly, Stewart argued, on the date of the current offense, in 2016, his residential burglary would have resulted in a juvenile adjudication not a felony conviction, and thus it was not a qualifying felony offense under Section 5-4.5-95(b).

The appellate court agreed, noting that the relevant question was whether the prior offense would have been a Class 2 or greater felony if committed on the date of the present offense. Today, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed.

In resolving Stewart’s appeal, the Court looked to the plain language of Section 5-4.5-95(b) and found that it was silent, and therefore ambiguous, on the question of whether the legislature intended a prior felony conviction to be a qualifying offense for Class X sentencing if it would have resulted in a juvenile adjudication had it been committed on the date of the present offense. But, the Court held that subsequent legislation clarified the legislature’s intent; specifically, the legislature did not intend for convictions of juveniles in adult court to be considered qualifying offenses for Class X sentencing.

In particular, the Court noted that in 2021, the statute was amended to provide that an offender qualifies for Class X sentencing on a third Class 2 or greater conviction only where the first qualifying offense was committed after the individual had reached the age of 21. While a statutory amendment generally creates a presumption that it was intended to change existing law, circumstances may indicate that an amendment was meant as a clarification rather than a substantive change in certain instances. Here, there was a conflict in the appellate court as to the statute’s meaning prior to the amendment, and thus it was construed as a clarification rather than a change. Accordingly, the Court held that Stewart was improperly sentenced as a Class X offender.

Justice Overstreet dissented, concluding that the plain language of the statute at the time of Stewart’s offense rendered his 2013 Class 1 residential burglary a qualifying predicate offense because it had the same elements as an offense “now classified” as a Class 1 or Class 2 felony. Specifically, the dissent noted that residential burglary was still a Class 1 felony on the date of Stewart’s 2016 offense, and Stewart’s age was not an element of the offense at any time and therefore did not operate to change the classification of the offense regardless of changes to the Juvenile Court Act. Justice Overstreet disagreed that the statute was ambiguous at the time of Stewart’s 2016 offense and also disagreed that the 2021 amendment was intended to clarify the meaning of the original statute. Instead, he would have held that it was meant to change existing law. Justice Michael Burke joined the dissent, and Justice Holder White took no part in the consideration or decision of the case, which was fully briefed and argued before her appointment to the Court.