Our panel of leading appellate attorneys reviews the Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Wednesday, November 30. 

Chicago Sun-Times v. Cook County Health & Hospital Systems, 2022 IL 127519

By Amelia Buragas, JD

In Chicago Sun-Times v. Cook County Health and Hospital Systems, the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether information contained in medical records was exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. A majority of the court, with one justice dissenting, found that it was not exempt so long as identifying information was removed prior to disclosure.

In 2018, reporters from the Chicago Sun-Times were investigating whether the Cook County hospital was complying with state law that required the hospital to notify local law enforcement when “walk-in” gunshot wound patients were treated at the hospital. The newspaper sent a FOIA request to the Cook County Health and Hospital Systems seeking information, including the date of admission of patients seeking treatment for gunshot wounds as well as the corresponding date that law enforcement officials were notified of the admission. The county refused the request, saying that the requested records were exempt from disclosure because they contained personal health information prohibited from disclosure under HIPAA and private information exempt from disclosure under FOIA. The newspaper then initiated a FOIA enforcement action in Cook County circuit court, arguing that the date listed on each record was discoverable even if the other information contained in the record was not. The circuit court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant and the newspaper appealed. The appellate court then reversed the trial court and the supreme court granted the defendant’s petition for leave to appeal.

On appeal to the supreme court, the defendant renewed its arguments that HIPAA prohibited covered entities from using and disclosing their patients’ private health information to comply with a FOIA request and that the responsive records, even with the unique identifiers redacted, constituted “medical records” that were exempted from disclosure under FOIA. The defendant also argued that complying with the FOIA request would be unduly burdensome. Plaintiff countered that the appellate court’s judgment should be affirmed because the FOIA request only sought the year element of the data field from the records. The supreme court agreed with the newspaper and found that the defendant could “de-identify” the records and comply with the request without violating HIPAA’s privacy rule or the FOIA prohibition against disclosing medical records. The court noted that if it adopted the defendant’s broad interpretation that “medical records” are exempt in their entirety—even after removal of identifying information—then it would “potentially shield from disclosure all information concerning patient care undertaken by a public body.” The court did not reach the question of whether the request was unduly burdensome. It explained that because the litigation did not progress beyond the summary judgment stage it would not “delve into the factual question of the burden associated with processing the request.” It noted that the circuit court was free to address the procedural and substantive issues surrounding the unduly burdensome nature of the request if asserted by the defendant on remand. The court affirmed the appellate court's judgment, reversed the circuit court's judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.

Justice Theis dissented, re-framing the issue not as whether the information requested was exempt from disclosure, but whether FOIA “required a public body to review its records to piece together information to create a new document in response to a FOIA request.” Theis also questioned whether the underlying request actually sought public records that were subject to production under FOIA and suggested instead that the request was a request for general information, which is not subject to production under FOIA.

People v. Cross, 2022 IL 127907   

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Latron Cross was convicted of first degree murder. On appeal, Cross argued for the first time that he was not tried within 120 days of his arrest, thereby violating of his statutory right to a speedy trial. In particular, Cross argued that the trial court erred when it attributed 34 days of delay to him, due to his belated disclosure of an alibi defense, where that disclosure did not move the pending trial date. The Illinois Supreme Court held that a trial date need not be postponed for a delay to be attributed to a defendant.

At the time Cross disclosed his alibi defense, the charges against him had been pending for more than a year. During that period, there had been various delays attributed to both the defense and the State, such that there was still time remaining in the statutory speedy trial term. At the time of his disclosure, Cross’s trial was set for September 24, 2018, a date that had been set when Cross announced ready for trial on July 16, 2018. The period from July 16 to September 24 was originally attributed to the State for purposes of calculating the speedy trial term. But, when the alibi disclosure was made on August 21, 2018, the trial judge decided that the 34-day period from August 21 to September 24 instead would be attributed as a delay occasion by Cross. Subsequently, on September 24, the State sought a continuance due to scheduling problems for its experts, and the trial was rescheduled to November 6, 2018. That date fell outside of the original speedy trial term, which would have run on October 27, 2018, had the court not changed the 34-day period from August 21 to September 24 from delay attributed to the State to delay attributed to Cross.

The Supreme Court noted that action by a defendant that causes a trial date to be rescheduled is one example of a delay occasioned by defendant for purposes of calculating the speedy trial term. But, the Court held that postponing a trial date is not required for a defendant’s action to toll the statutory speedy trial term. A trial court’s decision to attribute delay to a defendant is given great deference and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Here, the Court held that Cross’ late disclosure of his alibi defense impacted the State’s ability to present its case, even if it did not necessitate a continuance of the trial date. The trial judge properly recognized the impact of the late disclosure in attributing 34 days of delay to Cross, and thus there was no abuse of discretion.

Justice Neville dissented. He would have found error in the court’s decision to change its attribution of 34 days of delay from the State to Cross. The State’s actions on July 16 had already cause the delay to September 24, and Cross’s alibi disclosure in the middle of that period did nothing to alter or increase the delay.