Our panel of leading appellate attorneys reviews the two civil and three criminal opinions handed down Thursday, March 23, by the Illinois Supreme Court. 

People v. Whitehead, 2023 IL 128051

By Jay Wiegman, Assistant Appellate Defender

Aggravated Battery is defined in the Criminal Code in a variety of ways, including by the location of the conduct: “A person commits aggravated battery when, in committing a battery . . . he or she is or the person battered is on or about a public way, public property, a public place of accommodation or amusement, a sports venue, or a domestic violence shelter.” 720 ILCS 5/12 3.05(c) (West 2018).  A conviction of aggravated battery in a place of public accommodation is a Class 3 felony, punishable by up to five years in prison, while simple battery is a Class A misdemeanor, punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of less than one year.

In 2019, Vonzell Whitehead was charged with aggravated battery after he struck Steven Box just outside the doorway of Box’s apartment. A jury found Whitehead guilty of two counts of aggravated battery, and he was sentenced to 42 months in prison. The Illinois Appellate Court, Second District, rejected the defendant’s argument that the stoop in front of Box’s apartment door was a “public place of accommodation” within the purview of Section 12-3.05 of the Code because “members of the public could approach Box’s door and stand on his stoop.” In People v. Whitehead, 2023 IL 128051, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and held that the accessibility of a location to the public, standing alone, is insufficient to transform a location into a public place of accommodation and cannot be used to enhance an offense from simple battery to aggravated battery. 

Justice Neville wrote the opinion for the Illinois Supreme Court, which included Chief Justice Theis and Justices Overstreet and Holder White, as Justices Cunningham, Rochford, and O’Brien took no part in the decision. Noting that Section 12-3.05(c) does not define “public place of accommodation,” the Court first turned to dictionaries to define the term and held that a public place of accommodation is “a place for the use of the general public that is supplied for convenience, to satisfy a need, or to provide pleasure or entertainment,” such as a restaurant or hotel. The stoop of a private dwelling does not fall within this definition. Moreover, the stoop of a private dwelling is not transformed into a public place of accommodation merely because it is accessible to the public. Further, the inclusion of a list of specific locations, such as “a sports venue, or a domestic violence shelter,” meant that the legislature did not intend the term “public place of accommodation” to apply to all locations that are accessible to the public. Finally, because a stoop is generally considered to be within the curtilage of a home, it would be “illogical” for the Court to conclude that a stoop is a “public place of accommodation.” The Court noted that interpreting the aggravated battery statute in such a way that “places of public accommodation” would include the curtilage of a person’s apartment would be inconsistent with the legislature’s intent to enhance the penalty only for those batteries occurring in a public place.

Because Whitehead had already served 40 months of his 42-month sentence and that there was no need to remand the case for re-sentencing, the Court vacated Whitehead’s conviction of aggravated battery, entered a conviction for simple battery, and ordered that the mandate issue instanter, with a seven-day stay provided to allow the State to file a petition for rehearing.

People v. Woods, 2023 IL 127794

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender8

In 2016, Caroline Woods and her former fiancé, Andrew Richardson, were charged with numerous offenses arising out of the physical abuse of Caroline’s son, Z.W. At a jury trial, Caroline was convicted of four counts of aggravated battery of a child.

The charges were brought after a man walking his dog encountered then-seven-year-old Z.W., alone, on a city sidewalk. Z.W. told the man he was going to a playground. The man observed visible scars and bruises on Z.W. and called the police. During the investigation into Z.W.’s condition, he reported to the police, a social worker, medical personnel, and others that both Caroline and Andrew had struck him with various objects, including a baseball bat, a belt, and a wire cord. Additionally, Andrew had held Z.W. against a burner on the stove, and Caroline had burned Z.W. with a hair iron. A physical examination revealed extensive injuries and scars consistent with Z.W.’s claims. At trial, Caroline testified that Z.W.’s injuries were either accidental or were caused by Andrew.

The State argued that Caroline was guilty both as a principal and under a theory of accountability. The jury was given IPI Criminal 5.03, the general accountability instruction, which provides, in part, that a person is legally responsible for the conduct of another when she “knowingly...aids, abets, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid the other person in the planning or commission of an offense.” The State also offered a non-pattern jury instruction addressing parental accountability, which provided that, “[a] parent has a legal duty to aid a small child if the parent knows or should know about a danger to the child” and has the physical ability to protect the child. Defendant objected to the parental accountability instruction, citing People v. Pollock, 202 Ill. 2d 189 (2002), for the proposition that the “should know” language was improper. The trial court found Pollock distinguishable because defendant here admitted she knew of the abuse.

On appeal, Caroline again alleged instructional error, specifically that her jury was given instructions on both accountability, generally, and parental accountability, and that those instructions were in direct conflict with one another because the general accountability instruction required actual knowledge while the parental accountability instruction allowed the jury to find criminal liability so long as it found she should have known about the abuse. The appellate court found no inconsistency because the jury was instructed of the actual knowledge requirement, the State did not emphasize the “should know” language in its closing argument, and the evidence of Caroline’s actual knowledge was overwhelming. 

The Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the parental accountability instruction improperly allowed a negligent mental state and was therefore incorrect. While Caroline argued that this required automatic reversal, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that directly conflicting instructions may be harmless where they do not concern a disputed essential issue in the case and thus there is no risk that the jury relied on the incorrect instruction. Here, Caroline’s knowledge for purposes of accountability was not an essential element because she was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as a principal. Thus, the error in including the “should know” language was harmless.

Notably, the parental accountability instruction at issue here was predicated on language which appears in the committee notes to IPI Criminal 5.03 and which misstates the law of accountability. In its decision here, the Court did not issue an amendment to the note, but the Court did “suggest that until such time as the drafting committee proposes an amendment, any instruction on parental accountability not include the ‘should have known’ language.”

People v. Mayfield, 2023 IL 128092

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

In March 2020, the Supreme Court issued a series of emergency administrative orders in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. At issue in the instant appeal were orders authorizing circuit courts to toll 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a), the speedy trial statute. Gary Mayfield was tried and convicted in accordance with those tolling provisions but after the statutory speedy-trial term had expired. 

Mayfield was arrested on charges of domestic battery on February 16, 2020, and remained in custody awaiting trial, thereby triggering the statutory 120-day speedy trial term. On March 12, counsel asked for the earliest available trial date, and the court set defendant’s trial for April 27, 2020. In the interim, however, the Supreme Court entered orders which authorized the continuance of trials and which stated that such continuances would be excluded from speedy trial computations. At a hearing on May 26, 2020, defense counsel answered ready for trial and objected to any further delay, but Mayfield’s case was continued over objection. On August 11, counsel moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial grounds. That motion was denied. Ultimately, Mayfield was tried and convicted on September 9, 2020.

On appeal, Mayfield argued that the administrative orders tolling the speedy-trial statute were unconstitutional in that they violated the separation of powers clause of the Illinois constitution by infringing on the authority of the legislature to enact laws. The appellate court disagreed, holding that the scheduling of criminal trials is a matter of procedure and thus within the primary purview of the courts, not the legislature. 

The Supreme Court also rejected Mayfield’s challenge, concluding that the administrative orders were an appropriate exercise of its general administrative and supervisory authority over all state courts under Article VI, Section 16 of the Illinois constitution. More specifically, the Court held that while the legislative and judicial branches traditionally have overlapping authority to regulate court procedure, the circuit court here was not bound to follow the speedy trial statute because the Supreme Court had expressly authorized its tolling under its “general administrative and supervisory authority.” Because the conflict between the speedy trial statute and the Court’s administrative orders concerned court procedure, the administrative orders prevail.

Walton v. Roosevelt University, 2023 IL 128338

By Joanne R. Driscoll, Forde & O’Meara LLP

This case presents an excellent framework for analyzing the principle of federal preemption and how Illinois courts are to interpret federal law. The certified question before the Illinois Supreme Court was whether Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) (29 U.S.C. § 185 (2018)) preempted Biometric Information Privacy Act (Privacy Act) (740 ILCS 14/1 et seq. (West 2018)) claims asserted by employees covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). A unanimous opinion authored by Justice Holder White affirmed the appellate court’s conclusion that preemption existed.

Plaintiff Walton filed a class-action complaint against his former employer, Roosevelt University (Roosevelt), alleging violations of Section 15 of the Privacy Act related to use of employee biometric data for timekeeping purposes and the lack of consent. Roosevelt moved to dismiss, arguing that Walton was a member of SEIU, Local 1, a collective bargaining unit, and that his Privacy Act claims were preempted by the LMRA because the manner by which any employee clocks in and out was a subject covered by a broad management-rights clause in the CBA. 

The Court began its analysis by noting a lack of field preemption over labor legislation, thus requiring it to examine congressional intent as to the LMRA. Turning to rules of statutory construction of federal statutes, the Court explained that it looks to federal court decisions interpreting federal statutes. While only bound to follow United States Supreme Court decisions, it will give considerable weight to circuit and district court interpretations that are uniform. Citing State Bank of Cherry v. CGB Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 113836, the Court noted that it may choose not to follow Seventh Circuit or uniform lower federal court precedent if it finds that precedent to be wrongly decided and without logic or reason.

Two Seventh Circuit decisions, Miller v. Southwest Airlines Co., 926 F.3d 898, 903 (7th Cir. 2019), and Fernandez v. Kerry, Inc., 14 F.4th 644 (7th Cir. 2021), were cited by Roosevelt as having held that Privacy Act claims for timekeeping procedures are preempted by federal labor law. Analyzing those cases, the Illinois Supreme Court explained that Miller, construing the Railway Labor Act, held that how workers clock in and out and how biometric data is retained or destroyed is not only a proper subject of negotiation between unions and employers, but a mandatory subject of bargaining. Fernandez followed substantially the preemption analysis in Miller but in the context of the LMRA, the same statute at issue here. It held that when an employer invokes a broad management-rights clause from a CBA in response to a Privacy Act claim, the claim is preempted because it is up to an arbitrator to determine “whether the employer properly obtained the union’s consent” (14 F.4th at 646).

Determining that the CBA at issue here had a broad management-rights clause, and deferring to uniform federal caselaw that was both logical and reasonable, the Illinois Supreme Court held that preemption applied and, thus, any dispute involving a Privacy Act claim must be resolved according to federal law and the collective bargaining agreement between the parties. 

Midwest Commercial Funding, LLC v. Kelly, 2023 IL 128260

By Karen Kies DeGrand, Donohue Brown Mathewson & Smyth LLC 

In this dispute over lien priority, two judgment creditors of Robert Kelly sought to satisfy judgments against him. Creditor Heather Williams obtained a $4 million personal injury judgment against Kelly; the other creditor, Midwest Commercial Funding, LLC, has a $3,484,420.70 judgment against Kelly for breach of a commercial real estate lease. Williams and Midwest sought to satisfy their judgments out of Kelly’s royalties held by Sony Music Holdings, Inc., which was not a party to either creditor’s lawsuit. Prevailing on three issues–standing, forfeiture, and proper service–Williams established lien priority.
 
Williams obtained her judgment against Kelly in March 2020; four months later, Midwest prevailed against Kelly. Williams initiated her effort to collect from Sony with a citation to discover assets sent via registered mail to Sony on August 17, 2020. According to the USPS, Williams’ citation was delivered on August 24. Midwest sent its citation on August 19, 2020, by email and regular mail. David Castagna of Sony’s legal staff acknowledged receipt of Midwest’s email citation on August 24 and answered it three days later, by a return email including the information that Sony had received Williams’ citation on August 25.
 
Midwest intervened in Williams’ citation action, where the trial court ruled in Midwest’s favor. Noting that Sony did not object to service of either citation, the trial court concluded that Midwest’s email of its citation on August 19 beat Williams’ mail delivery of her citation on August 24. The court deemed waived Williams’ new arguments on reconsideration that Midwest’s email service was defective and evidence regarding an alleged conspiracy between Midwest and Kelly to hide his money. The appellate court reversed based on its conclusion that Midwest did not properly serve its citation by email.
 
Upholding the appellate court’s judgment, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Midwest’s argument that Williams lacked standing to object to email service on Sony. The Court found that Williams challenged service on Sony in the course of asserting her own right–not any right belonging to Sony–to obtain payment of Kelly’s royalties; Williams had a “real interest” in the outcome of the citation proceedings involving Sony, and thus had standing to challenge Midwest’s method of service. The Court also rejected Midwest’s forfeiture argument. Invoking a reviewing court’s prerogative to consider a fully briefed issue of law regardless of forfeiture, the Court excused Williams’ late challenge of Midwest’s service as necessary to reach a just result.
 
Finally, the Court’s application of statutes and rules governing supplemental proceedings and citations to discover assets established Williams as the priority lienholder. The Court held the plain language of the procedures framed by Illinois Supreme Court Rules 105 and 277 and 735 ILCS 5/2-1402 (West 2020) did not permit service by email, but did permit service by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested. As a non-party, Sony could not be served by email pursuant to Rule 11. The Illinois Supreme Court also held that Sony’s willing acceptance of Midwest’s email service did not impact Williams’ rights.