Quick Takes on Illinois Supreme Court Opinions Issued Thursday, December 19, 2024

Leading appellate attorneys review the Illinois Supreme Court opinions handed down Thursday, December 19.

People v. Williams, 2024 IL 127304

By Jay Wiegman, Office of the State Appellate Defender

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1, et seq.) provides a means for individuals serving criminal sentences to assert that their convictions resulted from a substantial denial of their constitutional rights. In this three-stage process, a petitioner first files a petition setting forth at least the gist of a claim of a violation of constitutional rights.  In People v. Williams, 2024 IL 127304, the Illinois Supreme Court considered whether Williams met this low threshold when he claimed that he was deprived of the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel where trial counsel did not argue that the mandatory sentence of natural life imprisonment violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as applied to the defendant, who was 22 years old at the time of the offense. With Justice Cunningham specially concurring, and Justice Holder White taking no part in the decision, the Court concluded that the defendant failed to meet the low threshold of pleading a limited amount of factual detail particular to the defendant that would have supported his claim.

In his post-conviction petition, the defendant alleged that his natural life sentence violated Illinois’ proportionate penalties clause, which sets forth that “all penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. 1, ¶ 11. Defendant challenged his natural life sentence as shocking the moral sense of the community, and asserted that, though he was 22 years old at the time of the offense, he was entitled to the protections established for juveniles who commit murder provided in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), because scientific studies have shown that the brains of young adults are still developing in areas related to maturity and moral culpability. Acknowledging that the Court has not foreclosed the possibility of applying proportionate penalties challenges to life sentence imposed on offenders aged 18 or even 19 years old, Justice Rochford, writing for the majority, stated that it is not enough for an emerging adult to simply cite evolving science concerning juvenile maturity and brain development and his age at the time of the offense. Rather, an emerging adult must also place relevant brain research in the context of his own personal circumstances, which Williams failed to do. And while this evidence was not presented in mitigation at sentencing, the Court found that the defendant was not precluded from presenting it in his petition. As a result, the defendant’s petition failed to meet the low threshold of pleading a limited amount of factual detail to support his claim.

In a special concurrence, Justice Cunningham expressed that the majority analysis was misplaced. Justice Cunningham noted that the legislature could constitutionally enact a sentencing scheme for “young adults” who murder multiple people. But, because it had not, the Court must presume that mandating a life sentence for such offenses when the offender is over the age of 18 is constitutional.

People v. Clark, 2024 IL 127838

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Angelo Clark was charged with multiple counts of attempt murder and aggravated battery arising out of a gang-related shooting. He was arrested three days after the incident, pursuant to a Chicago Police Department investigative alert which was based upon the statement of another man, Hardaway, who told police that he heard Clark admit his involvement in the shooting and admit to disposing of the guns that had been used. Clark filed a motion to suppress in the circuit court, arguing that the police lacked probable cause or a valid arrest warrant and thus his arrest was improper. That motion was denied. Clark ultimately was convicted of two counts of aggravated battery and sentenced to a total of 32 years of imprisonment.

The primary issue in the Illinois Supreme Court was the validity of the investigative alert system used by CPD, wherein the police use a database to record and share information that there is probable cause to arrest specific individuals but do not obtain judicial arrest warrants for those individuals.¹ Challenges to the investigative alert system have made their way to the Court twice previously, in People v. Bass, 2021 IL 125434, and People v. Dossie, 2023 IL 127412, but neither of those cases reached the issue on its merits.

The Court first agreed with Clark that, absent exigent circumstances or consent, an arrest in the home requires that the police obtain an arrest warrant issued by a neutral magistrate upon a finding of probable cause, relying on Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). An investigative alert is an inadequate substitute for a warrant in that circumstance. But, while Clark initially argued in the circuit court that the State failed to establish that the police had consent to enter the home to arrest him, he did not include that ground in his post-trial motion, in the appellate court, or in his petition for leave to appeal. Thus, the Supreme Court found it forfeited.

The Court then went on to address Clark’s argument that his warrantless arrest pursuant to an investigative alert was unconstitutional regardless of whether it occurred in the home. While acknowledging that this claim also was forfeited because Clark only raised it for the first time on appeal following the 2019 appellate court decision in People v. Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640, aff’d in part and vacated in part, 2021 IL 125434, the Court cited the well-established principle that forfeiture is a limitation on the parties, not the court, and a court may overlook forfeiture where necessary to reach a just result or maintain a sound body of precedent. Here, that meant reaching the merits of Clark’s challenge to the investigative alert system.

As to Clark’s assertion that the investigative alert procedure created an improper proxy warrant system within CPD, however, the Court found that the failure to raise that particular argument in the circuit court deprived the reviewing courts of a proper record upon which to consider the issue. While Clark cited CPD directives and testimony from another case in support of his argument that the investigative alert system was an improper substitute for a judicial warrant, the Supreme Court declined to consider those sources because they were not part of the record here.

The Court did reach the merits on the other argument advanced by Clark, the same argument which had formed the basis for the appellate court’s decision in Bass, 2019 IL App (1st) 160640, specifically that the investigative alert system violated article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution. The appellate court in Bass based its decision on the conclusion that the Illinois Constitution provides greater protection than the fourth amendment because it requires that a warrant be based on probable cause supported by “affidavit” rather than by “oath or affirmation,” thus going “a step beyond” the fourth amendment.

The Supreme Court rejected the Bass analysis. First, the Court noted that in People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282 (2006), it had cited the similarity between the language of the fourth amendment and the Illinois Constitution’s warrant clause as reason not to depart from lockstep. Historically, the Court has construed the phrases “supported by affidavit” and “oath or affirmation” alike, and there was no reason to depart from those holdings here. Further, that language refers only to the mechanism for obtaining a warrant, not whether a warrant is required in a given circumstance. Under the fourth amendment, it is well established that the constitution does not require an arrest warrant where there exists probable cause, even if there was time to obtain an arrest warrant. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). Likewise, Illinois’s longstanding tradition is to allow warrantless arrests based on probable cause. And, probable cause may be established by the collective knowledge of the police. Here, the record established that the police collectively had information sufficient to support a finding of probable cause for Clark’s arrest. Accordingly, his conviction was affirmed.

Justice Neville authored a lengthy dissent, concluding that “investigative alerts are a systemic, racial policy or practice of Chicago police and that warrantless arrests are used predominantly to effectuate the arrests of Black and Latinx suspects” and that the majority’s decision “legalizes a systemic, racial policy or practice that authorizes the Chicago police to make warrantless arrests based on race.” An included appendix identifies 183 criminal cases from Cook County decided in the appellate court between 2007 and 2024, where the defendants included 154 Black men and women, 19 Latinx men, and 1 White woman, as well as 9 cases where the defendant’s race could not be determined from the records available.

Additionally, Justice Neville dissented because Clark was arrested in his home without a warrant and without exigent circumstances. He would have found the issue reviewable under the constitutional exception to the forfeiture rule whereby a constitutional issue raised at trial and that defendant could later raise in a post-conviction petition is not subject to forfeiture on direct appeal. And, he would have found no exigent circumstances and no voluntary consent to enter the home to effectuate Clark’s arrest.

Justice Neville also would have held that Clark’s warrantless arrest violated the Illinois Constitution where there were no exigent circumstances or other exception to the warrant requirement. Justice Neville would have held that the investigative alert system improperly permits extrajudicial determinations of probable cause, and that the better policy would be to require judicially approved warrant for arrests.          

1.  Clark also raised a sentencing issue, specifically that the circuit court erred in sentencing him without considering the juvenile sentencing factors contained in 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a). While the Court agreed with defendant that the statute applied to him even though he committed his offense prior to its effective date, it went on to conclude that the record revealed the circuit court’s consideration of the statutory factors, even though the judge did not specifically reference the statute.

Editor's Note:  The remaining opinion summaries will be added as they are received.