Real Estate Law

Dispute between a landlord and tenant regarding the tenant’s inability to pay rent due to restaurant closures during the Covid-19 pandemic. Landlord filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer, breach of contract, and breach of guarantee. The trial court found in favor of the landlord, awarding the landlord monetary damages and immediate possession of the premises. On appeal, tenants first challenged the appellate court’s subject matter jurisdiction alleging defects in service of the five-day notice. The appellate court summarily rejected this argument on the basis that any purported supporting case law was out of date. Defendant further argued that the damages were not supported by the evidence. The appellate court found that tenant’s waived the issue by failing to argue mitigation of damages at the trial court and, even if not waived, the argument lacked merit. Finally, the appellate court found no error in the manner that the trial court conducted the trial. (LAVIN and COBBS, concurring)

Defendant architects designed and self-certified plans for construction of a 3-unit residential condominium in Chicago, and the builder obtained a permit through City's Self-Certification Permit Program (SCPP). FIve years after construction was completed, a windstorm exposed the design defect that the building lacked a lateral structural support system to withstand wind loads as required by city building code. Plaintiff (condominium association) is not a member of the class for whose benefit the ordinance was enacted. Neither the city ordinance nor the SCPP program itself implies a cause of action against Defendant architects. As circuit court's sole basis for granting judgment for Plaintiff was its finding that an implied cause of action existed, judgment for Plaintiff is reversed.  (McBRIDE and BURKE, concurring.)

After bench trial to determine final just compensation in an eminent domain proceeding, Defendant, as trustee, appealed several rulings as to operative date for valuing the property. As Defendant never sought to make use of the statutory provision that would have permitted court to declare a valuation date different than date of filing, and as there was no evidence of any change in value of the property in the 3 months between date of filing and date of taking, no error in court using date of filing of complaint as date of valuation. Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's request to continue jury trial to allow Defendant's expert witness on valuation, who was out of state, to return to Illinois to testify. It was Defendant's attorneys' own failure to resolve any confusion about whether trial was set to commence on the trial date which led to their expert not being available for trial or for evidence deposition, and this trial date had been set for seven months. (HOWSE and LAVIN, concurring.)

Plaintiffs filed class action complaint against property management agent retained by condominium association (HOA), alleging that when they sold their condominium unit in 2016, Defendant charged excessive and unreasonable fees to provide them with documents and other information Plaintiffs were required to provide to prospective buyers. Section 22.1 of the Condominium Property Act provides an implied cause of action in favor of a condominium unit seller against a property manager, as agent of HOA or HOA Board, based on allegations that property manager charged excessive fees for production of information required to be disclosed to a prospective buyer under the statute.  (LAVIN and COBBS, concurring.)

Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's 4th foreclosure complaint for violating the single refiling rule of section 13-217 of Code of Civil Procedure. Because Plaintiff's accelerations occurred by the filing of foreclosure actions, Plaintiff's voluntary dismissals of those actions constituted affirmative acts of revocation of those accelerations. Thus, upon revocation the parties returned to their pre-acceleration rights and obligations. Defendants were obligated to make monthly installments, and thus their new payment default gave rise to a separate action. This alleged new default was not part of the core of operative facts of the prior alleged default. As this action and the prior actions were predicated on different operative facts, the single refiling rule did not bar Plaintiff's 2017 foreclosure complaint. (ZENOFF, concurring; HUTCHINSON, dissenting.)

Plaintiff filed foreclosure complaint. Issue of material fact exists as to meaning of 2014 letter send to Plaintiff bank by Defendant's former counsel: whether it was a cease-and-desist letter that exempted Plaintiff bank from the face-to-face meeting requirement which is required, by federal regulations as mortgage was insured by HUD, to occur prior to initiating foreclosure. Court erred in granting summary judgment for Plaintiff bank. (DELORT and CONNORS, concurring.)