Real Estate Law

Plaintiff filed complaint against her Condominium Association and its acting President who prohibited her from operating her condominium unit as a short-term rental on Airbnb, on the basis that the Condominium Declarations barred short-term rentals. Plaintiff granted her guests a mere license to use her unit, not a lease. The restrictive covenant in section 7 of the Declarations, which must be strictly construed, does not bar short-term licensing of the units. City of Chicago imposes regulations on short-term rentals similar to those imposed upon a hotel, and imposes taxes on and requires that financial records must be kept for short-term rentals. This is evidence that Plaintiff's short-term rentals constitutes a "business" for purposes of section 11(b) of the Declarations. The more general prohibition in section 11(b) controls to prohibit Plaintiff's short-term Airbnb rental of her unit. (McBRIDE and ELLIS, concurring.)

Plaintiff made a loan to Defendant LLC that was secured by a mortgage against real property owned by Defendant.Plaintiff filed a foreclosure action against several defendants, and court entered a judgment of foreclosure and sale. Plaintiff later bought the mortgaged property at Sheriff's sale. Court properly confirmed the sale. Defendants argued that terms of sale were unconscionable because the $3.5 million sale price was far less than the $5.5 to $6.5 million range which Defendants suggest is the actual value.  The mere inadequacy of price is an insufficient reason to disturb a judicial sale without some other irregularity. Court did not err by confirming sale without an evidentiary hearing. (HYMAN and COGHLAN, concurring.)

Plaintiffs and the individual Defendants own separate parcels of property along the Mazon River. Plaintiffs filed declaratory action seeking order recognizing their right, as riparian owners, to kayak along the entire river. The Mazon River is not navigable in fact, as it is not, in its natural state, an avenue for commerce by customary modes of water transportation. Thus, a public easement does not exist to allow public navigation on the river. Defendants thus own to the center of the bed of the stream abutting their properties, including the water. Thus, each defendant may lawfully bar all trespassers from the segment of the Mazon River that abuts his parcel of property. Both Plaintiffs and Defendants have private property rights as riparian owners that are superior to the interests of the general public. The riparian owner of each parcel situated along the Mazon River may lawfully bar access, within their easily ascertainable property lines, to any person, including their riparian neighbor.  (HOLDRIDGE and LYTTON, concurring.)

In mortgage foreclosure action, court properly approved judicial sale and denied Defendant's motion to reconsider. Defendant alleged that the notice of sale he received was defective, as it was sent by an agent of the Judicial Sales Corporation rather than an attorney for Plaintiff, as Rule 113(f) requires.  Defendant cannot show good cause for invalidating the sale, because he received notice of the sale and does not allege any resulting prejudice. (McLAREN and HUTCHINSON, concurring.)

Appellants filed a motion to void a tax deed for mineral rights from land in Hamilton County because it was not issued and recorded within 1 year after expiration of the statutory redemption period following the tax sale. The critical "act of approval" was issuance of trial court's 2015 section 22-40(a) order. The subsequent mandamus order ensured that the original 2015 order was carried out as authorized. Thus, the 2016 tax deed was not void. As the 2017 tax deed only corrected the named recipient of the original deed to conform to the 2015 section 22-40(a) tax deed order, the 2017 deed was a continuation of the prior erroneously drafted deed. The 2016 deed was issued and recorded within the deadline of section 22-85 of Property Tax Code. (A. BURKE, GARMAN, THEIS, and NEVILLE, concurring; M. BURKE, specially concurring.) 

Section 15-1504.1 of Code of Civil Procedure created a $50 filing fee for residential mortgage foreclosure cases.Sections 7.30 and 7.31 of the Illinois Housing Development Act Act created programs funded by the fee created in section 1504.1. These statutes violate the free access clause because the $50 fee unreasonably interferes with foreclosure litigants' access to the courts. There is no rational basis for imposing this filing fee on mortgage foreclosure litigants, while excluding other classes of taxpayers from the burden. The $50 filing charge is not a "fee" but a litigation tax, and it has no direct relation to expenses of a petitioner's litigation and no relation to the services rendered, but is assessed solely to raise revenue for the Foreclosure Prevention Fund and the Abandoned Residential Property Fund. (A. BURKE, GARMAN, M. BURKE, and OVERSTREET, concurring; THIS, dissenting.)