Real Estate Law

Judgment creditor of deceased testator filed petition for letters of administration to collect against decedent's estate. Creditor filed petition for declaration of interest in real estate, claiming interest in property conveyed to decedent and his spouse as tenants by the entirety was improperly titled, under the Joint Tenancy Act, because it was not their homestead. The unsuccessful creation of a tenancy by the entirety in a deed to a married couple becomes a joint tenancy, not a tenancy in common. Court's denial of judgment creditor's request for a declaratory judgment was not an abuse of discretion. (MIKVA and HARRIS, concurring.)

Court properly granted summary judgment for Plaintiff mortgage foreclosure action. Res judicata does not apply to bar Bank's foreclosure action, because the facts, conditions, and issues involved in the first 2 cases were different from those in this case. The current action does not arise from the same set of operative facts as the first 2 actions. Defendant prevailed in the 1st action and the 2nd action was dismissed with prejudice. When Defendant subsequently defaulted in 2 months, this new default constituted the basis for a new cause of action. (JORGENSEN and BRENNAN, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed mortgage foreclosure action, and Defendants were served. Court entered default judgment of foreclosure and property was sold through a sheriff's sale, and court confirmed the report of sale. More than 8 years after foreclosure action was filed, Defendants filed petition for relief from void judgment, arguing that because  Defendants were not properly named on face of the summons, court lacked personal jurisdiction. Defendant DeGomez's name appeared in the caption on summons, and the absence of her name following "To Defendant" did not defeat personal jurisdiction over her. Summons failed to name Defendant Trujillo on its face and thus was no summons at all. However, laches bars her claim for possession, use and occupancy, and her claim for restitution is not cognizable in a section 2-1401 action. (BRIDGES and JORGENSEN, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/30/20.) Bank had previously obtained judgment of foreclosure and order confirming judicial sale of Plaintiffs' home. Plaintiffs then filed claims under Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) and Consumer Fraud Act, alleging that bank and loan servicer engaged in misconduct arising out of foreclosure proceeding. Court properly dismissed complaint as claims were barred by section 15-1509(c) of Mortgage Foreclosure Law.  That section precludes all claims of parties to the foreclosure related to the mortgage or the subject property, except for claims as to the interest in the proceeds in a judicial sale. The proper time to raise the issues in Plaintiffs' complaint was between the judgment of foreclosure and the confirmation of the sale, as contemplated in section 15-1508. As Plaintiffs did not pursue these claims as contemplated, they are claim-barred pursuant to section 15-1509(c). (McLAREN and JORGENSEN, concurring.) 

Petitioner LLC purchased delinquent 2014 taxes on a commercial condominium unit. After LLC obtained and recorded a tax deed for the property, Respondent LLC intervened and moved to vacate the order. Court erred in granting motion and vacating order. Petitioner's notice of sale satisfied requirements and purpose of Section 22-5 of Property Tax Code by listing only the year for which the taxes were sold. (PIERCE, concurring; WALKER, dissenting.)

(Court opinion corrected 12/22/20.) Defendant owned vacant land at corner of Grand Avenue and North Jefferson Street in Chicago. City proposed creating a planned manufacturing district (PMD) there, and chocolate factory was proposed to be included in PMD. City filed complaint to condemn Defendant's property through eminent domain. After first jury trial, verdict for Defendant for $2.5 million. After 2nd jury trial for limited purpose of just compensation, verdict for Defendant for $7.1 million. Appellate court had previously found that this taking was constitutional, in Defendant's initial appeal, and thus the law-of-the-case doctrine binds appellate court to that decision. Trial court properly refused to reconsider its 2006 denial of the traverse. Defendant failed to meet elements required to grant motion for reconsideration based on newly discovered evidence. Defendant knew of the evidence of changed circumstances before the 2nd trial and partly presented to the jury.(GRIFFIN and PIERCE, concurring.)