Real Estate Law

Court properly denied amended Section 2-1401 petition for relief from judgment of foreclosure as to her real property, filed by trustee of revocable living trust. Section 2-1401(e) of Code of Civil Procedure precludes a Section 2-1401 petition from affecting disposition of property transferred to a third party after entry of the challenged judgment. Section 15-1509(c) of Foreclosure Law limits the claims that may be asserted after judicial sale of foreclosed property. A Section 2-1401 petition which asserts numerous fact-dependent challenges must set forth allegations supporting existence of meritorious defense, due diligence in presenting defense, and due diligence in filing the Section 2-1401 petition.(DELORT and HARRIS, concurring.)

Court properly dismissed verified complaint with prejudice pursuant to Section 2-615 of Code of Civil Procedure. Section 20-20(a)(34) of Real Estate License Act, which prohibits an attorney from acting as both attorney and broker in same real estate transaction, does not violate special legislation, equal protection, or separation of powers clauses of Illinois Constitution. Reasonable justification for prohibition is to protect general public from representation that carries potential for conflict of interest. Court properly refused to allow Plaintiff to amend his complaint, as he previously stated to court that he only intended to raise facial challenge. (SIMON, concurring; PIERCE, concurring.)

Plaintiff filed declaratory judgment action seeking declaration that he had a 50% beneficial interest in two Illinois land trusts in which bank was trustee and Defendant possessed remaining beneficial interest. Plaintiff's claim is time-barred by statute of limitations period in Section 13-205 of Code of Civil Procedure. Evidence at trial showed that Plaintiff knew or should have known of the existence of his injuries outside of 5-year limitation period. Appropriate statute of limitations is determined by nature of liability, which is that Defendant's actions are not consistent with parties' alleged 1994 agreement to each receive a 50% beneficial interest in land trusts, which would give Plaintiff a 50% interest in powers and ownership rights accorded to beneficiary of an Illinois land trust.(DELORT and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

Court entered judgment of foreclosure and sale in the amount of $891,285 in favor of bank and against both Defendants "on the note". Court erred in denying bank's request for entry of a personal deficiency judgment against Defendants, as request was sufficiently supported by allegations of complaint, its exhibits, and the evidence. Bank included in prayers for relief a specific request for a personal deficiency judgment and a general request for any appropriate relief.(HOFFMAN and HALL, concurring.)

Court properly entered default judgment in mortgage foreclosure action. Defendants knew about case, participated in it, and made several attempts to evade service. Original lender erred in legal description of property on mortgage documents as not including house and detached garage, although Defendants described house and garage on their bankruptcy schedules. Thus, erroneous legal description in first mortgage was result of mutual mistake of parties, and court properly allowed reformation. Plaintiff, transferee of mortgage loan, was properly substituted as plaintiff, after default judgment, and thus has standing.(STEWART and SCHWARM, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 7/22/15.) School District filed constitutional challenge to amendment to Property Tax Code which provided real property tax exemption on leasehold interests and improvements on land leased from county airport authority to FBOs (fixed based operators) providing aeronautical services. Classification of tax breaks is arbitrary, as there is no justification for singling out these for-profit businesses over other businesses in Illinois or other FBOs in Illinois. The one existing FBO at county airport, and future FBOs leasing there, are not uniquely situated based on their location near Iowa border. Amendment, as written, is unconstitutional special legislation that arbitrarily discriminates in favor of a select group. (HOLDRIDGE and WRIGHT, concurring.)

Court confirmed foreclosure sale in residential mortgage foreclosure action, and denied Defendants' two separate motions to reconsider. Trial court should have been informed of Defendants' application for assistance under HAMP, and of disposition of Defendants' HAMP application, before it confirmed foreclosure sale; court could then have determined whether Plaintiff satisfied requirements of HAMP. On remand, court shoudl consider and resolve disposition of HAMP application and determine whether Plaintiff's action and inaction were material violation of HAMP.(CATES and CHAPMAN, concurring.)