Real Estate Law

House Bill 2744

Topic: 
Boundary-line agreements
(Andersson, R-Geneva; McConnaughy, R-St. Charles) amends the Municipal Code to provide that it shall not be considered a “conflict” under the boundary-line provisions of this Section when a municipality that is a party to a jurisdictional boundary-line agreement cedes property within its own jurisdiction to another municipality not a party to the same jurisdictional boundary-line agreement. Passed both chambers.
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House Bill 2644

Topic: 
Condominium Property Act
(Cassidy, D-Chicago; Steans, D-Chicago) makes it void as a matter of public policy if a provision in a condominium instrument purports to limit or restrict the representative rights of the board if it requires prior consent of the unit owners or requires arbitration or mediation of a dispute between the developer or one or more declarants under the condominium instruments. Deletes language providing that a provision in a declaration which would otherwise be void and ineffective may be enforced if it is approved by a vote of not less than 75% of the unit owners at any time after the election of the first unit-owner board of managers. Passed both chambers.
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House Bill 2635

Topic: 
Mechanics Lien Act
(Sandack, R-Downers Grove; Harmon, D-Oak Park) allows a lien claimant to proceed directly against a bond substituted for the lien on the owner’s real estate or funds. The court may dismiss parties other than the principal, surety of the bond, and the lien claimant. Defenses against the lien claimant are limited to those that could be asserted by the principal or contracting owner. The “prevailing party” in an action brought under this new subsection shall be awarded its attorney fees. The “prevailing party” is defined as a lien claimant that recovers at least 75% of the amount of its lien claim, or the principal of the bond if the lien claimant recovers less than 25% of the amount of its lien claim. The attorney’s fees for a lien claimant that is a prevailing party is limited to the amount remaining on the bond after the payment of the claim and interest, and the attorney’s fees awarded to a bond principal shall be limited to 50% of the amount of the lien claim. Passed both chambers.
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Marks v. Vanderventer

Marks v. Vanderventer
Illinois Supreme Court
Civil Court
Due Process
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL 116226
Decision Date: 
Thursday, May 21, 2015
District: 
2d Dist.
Division/County: 
Lake Co.
Holding: 
Circuit court reversed.
Justice: 
BURKE
A rational relationship exists between persons subjected to Rental Housing Support Program surcharge and the object of the section of the Counties Code which imposes a $10 surcharge for recordation of any real estate-related document in a county. Goals of statute are to provide affordable rental housing and to maintain and improve property values, and are legitimate government interests. (GARMAN, FREEMAN, THOMAS, KILBRIDE, KARMEIER, and THEIS, concurring.)

People ex rel. McGuire v. Cornelius

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
People ex rel. McGuire v. Cornelius
Civil Court
Tax Deeds
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
May 27, 2015
Docket Number: 
No. 118975
District: 
3rd Dist.
This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted respondent’s motion seeking relief under section 22-45 of Property Tax Code and under section 2-1401 of Code of Civil Procedure to set aside tax deed issued to petitioner, where trial court concluded that petitioner had failed to notify respondent concerning County Clerk’s contact information as required by Tax Code. Although Appellate Court initially found that trial court improperly found that tax deed was void because it lacked personal jurisdiction over respondent, it nevertheless held that trial court did not err in voiding instant tax deed, since: (1) petitioner had failed to strictly comply with notice provisions set forth in section 22-5 and 22-10 of Tax Code; and (2) respondent could use collateral relief provisions of section 2-1401 to obtain vacatur of order awarding instant tax deed. (Dissent filed.)

Christopher B. Burke Engineering Ltd. v. Harkins

Illinois Supreme Court PLAs
Christopher B. Burke Engineering Ltd. v. Harkins
Civil Court
Mechanic's Liens
Citation
PLA issue Date: 
May 27, 2015
Docket Number: 
No. 118955
District: 
3rd Dist.

This case presents question as to whether trial court properly granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment in action by plaintiff-engineering firm to enforce its mechanic’s lien for certain engineering work performed for defendants on real estate. Appellate Court, in affirming trial court, noted that subject property remained untouched following completion of plaintiff’s services and found that plaintiff could not enforce its lien under Mechanic’s Lien Act since it had failed to show that its work had improved subject property, where plaintiff’s work merely allowed plaintiffs to record final plat of subject property. (Dissent filed.)

Republic Bank of Chicago v. Village of Manhattan

Republic Bank of Chicago v. Village of Manhattan
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Foreclosure
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (3d) 130379
Decision Date: 
Friday, May 15, 2015
District: 
3d Dist.
Division/County: 
Will Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
LYTTON
(Court opinion corrected 5/26/15.) Bank filed two separate foreclosure actions against multiple Defendants, to foreclose on roads and outlots contained in two failed subdivisions located in village. Court properly granted Village's motion to dismiss, as roads and common areas had been dedicated to Village. When a mortgagee executes and records mortgage releases on lots shown on plat of subdivision, mortgagee impliedly consents to entire plat, including streets shown thereon, and can no longer revoke its assent to dedication of streets and alleys set forth in plat. Village satisfied two requirements for valid statutory dedication of property. Village had expressly accepted offers to dedicate roads and outlots after Bank filed foreclosure complaints and before judgment for foreclosure was entered, and thus acceptance was timely and effective. As property was unimproved, Village was not required to improve streets and commons areas to prove acceptance. (O'BRIEN, concurring; CARTER, dissenting.)

Baker v. The Forest of Preserve District of Cook County

Baker v. The Forest of Preserve District of Cook County
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Foreclosure
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 141457
Decision Date: 
Monday, May 18, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 1st Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
CONNORS
Forest Preserve District of Cook County has statutory authority, under Cook County Forest Preserve District Act, to acquire property in foreclosure by purchasing mortgage note and subsequently bidding on property at foreclosure sale. Ultimate purpose of Forest Preserve District's purchase of mortgage note was creation of a forest preserve, not acquired for profit but for a public purpose.(DELORT and CUNNINGHAM, concurring.)

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Sanders
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Motions to Vacate
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 141272
Decision Date: 
Friday, May 22, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 5th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
REYES
Court properly dismissed Defendant's Section 2-1401 petition to vacate judgment of foreclosure. Defendant waived jurisdiction when he participated in hearing and failed to contest court's jurisdiction within 60 days required by Section 15-1505.6 of Foreclosure Law. Defendant failed to establish by preponderance of evidence a meritorious defense and that he was duly diligent. (McBRIDE, concurring; GORDON, dissenting.)

In Re Application of the County Treasurer

In Re Application of the County Treasurer
Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Tax Deeds
Citation
Case Number: 
2015 IL App (1st) 133693
Decision Date: 
Wednesday, May 13, 2015
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 3d Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
HYMAN
Court properly granted tax deed to residential property occupied by homeowners. Attempts to notify homeowners of tax sale were sufficient because they were reasonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprised them of pendency of action and afford them opportunity to present their objections. Sheriff tried to serve them multiple times, and tried to send notice by certified mail, at two addresses, but they failed to claim their mail. No basis to conclude that appellees engaged in fraud in acquiring tax deed or violated homeowners' due process rights.(PUCINSKI and LAVIN, concurring.)