Real Estate Law

Long Odds: Commercial Mortgagors Fighting to Keep Their Property During Foreclosure Have Few Options

By Tracy Steindel Ickes
March
2014
Article
, Page 144
Illinois law presumes lenders are entitled to possession of commercial property during foreclosure, and defendant-mortgagors aren't likely to overcome that presumption.

Stump v. Swanson Development Company

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Liens
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (3d) 110784
Decision Date: 
Monday, February 10, 2014
District: 
3d Dist.
Division/County: 
Will Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed and remanded.
Justice: 
McDADE
Concept of inquiry notice does not apply to equitable vendor's liens. The only time, if at all, that a purchaser of a property interest who is a stranger to original transaction can be burdened with original vendee's equitable obligation for unpaid purchase price is when subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for value has actual knowledge about prior purchase to render his own purchase or mortgage tantamount to fraud.(LYTTON and SCHMIDT, concurring.)

House Billl 4428

Topic: 
Attorney statute of repose
(Sandack, R-Lombard) amends the Code of Civil Procedure statute of repose for attorneys by tolling the six-year statute of repose if the client is still represented by the attorney or the attorney knowingly conceals the act or omission. The period of limitations will not begin to run until the person is no longer represented by the attorney or until the client should have known of the injury. Introduced and referred to House Rules Committee.

Macon County, Ill. v. MERSCORP, Inc.

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Property Law
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 13-3251
Decision Date: 
January 29, 2014
Federal District: 
C.D. Ill.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in granting defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiffs-Counties’ action seeking declaration that Illinois statute (765 ILCS section 128) required that every assignment of mortgage be recorded. Under Union County, 735 F3d 730, said statute does not require that any mortgage be recorded, and thus recording of any mortgage assignments made by defendant was optional. Ct. rejected plaintiff’s claim that defendants’ refusal to pay recording fees, where promissory notes associated with recorded mortgages were transferred to third-parties, constituted unjust enrichment to defendants.

CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Sharlow

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Mortgage Foreclosure
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (3d) 130107
Decision Date: 
Thursday, January 30, 2014
District: 
3d Dist.
Division/County: 
Will Co.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
CARTER
Defendant filed Section 2-1401 petition to modify order confirming judicial sale after foreclosure, alleging that she was entitled to surplus existing from sale. Due diligence is not required under the law when the Section 2-1401 petition is in the nature of a bill of review. As foreclosure judgment contained Rule 304(a) language, it was thus a final and appealable judgment. Reimbursement of Plaintiff's postjudgment costs and advances was appropriate, as order confirming sale may also approve mortgagee's postjudgment fees and costs to extent provided for in note and mortgage.(HOLDRIDGE, concurring; O'BRIEN, dissenting.)

CitiMortgage, Inc. v. Bermudez

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Mortgage Foreclosure
Citation
Case Number: 
2014 IL App (1st) 122824
Decision Date: 
Friday, January 24, 2014
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 6th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed.
Justice: 
REYES
Judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered, and property was sold at judicial sale. Court properly denied Defendants' motion to set aside judicial sale and confirmation, and denied them leave to obtain limited discovery as to HAMP requirements for Freddie Mac mortgages. Defendants failed to prove, by preponderance of evidence, that they applied for assistance under HAMP under MHAP. Court within its discretion in denying discovery, as Plaintiff had attached applicable version of Guide and Bulletins to its motion. (HALL and LAMPKIN, concurring.)

House Bill 3775

Topic: 
Title insurance and trust agreements
House Bill 3775 (Tyron, R-Crystal Lake) amends the Residential Mortgage License Act of 1987 to do two things. (1) Prohibits a mortgage lender acting on behalf of a borrower from requiring the seller of real property to disclose the terms of a private trust agreement regarding the real property if the seller has obtained title insurance for the transaction. (2) Prohibits a mortgage lender acting on behalf of a borrower from withholding approval or threatening to do so of the borrower’s residential mortgage loan because the seller has not disclosed the terms of a private trust agreement regarding the real property. Introduced and referred to House Rules Committee.

GK Development, Inc. v. Iowa Malls Financing Corporation

Illinois Appellate Court
Civil Court
Contracts
Citation
Case Number: 
2013 IL App (1st) 112802
Decision Date: 
Thursday, December 19, 2013
District: 
1st Dist.
Division/County: 
Cook Co., 4th Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part with instructions.
Justice: 
HOWSE
Contract provision for sale of four shopping centers, which required that $4.3 million of purchase price be held in escrow from seller’s proceeds then be paid to seller only if certain conditions are timely met, is unenforceable as a penalty. Provision fails to distinguish between a minor delay in permit approval and a complete failure of construction project, and thus it sought to award entire value of contract for a temporary delay, which is an unenforceable penalty to coerce performance, and a windfall to the buyer, rather than a valid liquidated damages provision. (FITZGERALD SMITH and LAVIN, concurring.)

Aeroground, Inc. v. CenterPoint Properties Trust

Federal 7th Circuit Court
Civil Court
Leases
Citation
Case Number: 
No. 13-1956
Decision Date: 
December 23, 2013
Federal District: 
N.D. Ill., E. Div.
Holding: 
Affirmed
Dist. Ct. did not err in finding, after bench trial, that instant warehouse lease between parties required that plaintiff-tenant make repairs to concrete slab floor of warehouse. While lease contained ambiguous terms as to whether plaintiff or defendant-landlord was required to make such repairs, where lease specifically required plaintiff to repair “floors” and generally directed defendant to repair warehouse’s “foundation,” Dist. Ct. could properly find that instant damage, which was caused by plaintiff’s heavy fork-lifts, affected slab’s function as “floor.” Thus, plaintiff was required to make said repairs under the more specific clause in lease requiring plaintiff to repair floors of warehouse.