Real Estate Law

Plaintiff developers purchased two-story, four-unit building to convert it into condo units, and alleged they purchased in reliance on oral promise that construction company would perform renovations needed for a certain price. Construction company then told Plaintiffs, after closing, that it would not be able to do renovation work. Court properly granted summary judgment for Defendants on fraud counts; there was no meeting of the minds as to work to be done, with no definite agreement in place as to scope of work, and thus there could be no false statement of material fact. Reliance on Defendants' statement that a repair and replace permit would suffice was not reasonable. (LAMPKIN and HALL, concurring.)

Homeowner, a senior citizen with limited education, was solicited by company to avoid foreclosure and signed numerous documents deeding property to company with promise that she could have her house back within a year. Homeowner made prima facie showing of essential elements of equitable mortgage, with many factors suggesting existence of a debt relationship. Attorney's conduct in comparing signatures on documents with signature on driver's license, without seeing signer in person, was not a valid notarization.However, Plaintiff was judicially bound by her admission that she signed warranty deed, and she could not assert forgery of signatures. Plaintiff presented prima facie case for legal malpractice against attorney, who met with her only once and who gave only cursory statements about complex real estate transaction. (HOFFMAN and DELORT, concurring.)

Bank filed foreclosure action against homeowners; court granted summary judgment for bank and sheriff's sale occurred but homeowners objected to confirmation of sale. Bank improperly failed to suspend sheriff's sale upon its receipt, at least 14 days prior, of homeowners' timely HAMP hardship application based on change in circumstances. A borrower's discharge from chapter 7 bankruptcy is a change in circumstance that can trigger continued eligibility for successive HAMP application under HAMP guideline 1.2. Court erred in confirming sale, based on bank's material violation under Section 15-1508(d-5) of Code of Civil Procedure by failing to suspend sale. (HUTCHINSON and BIRKETT, concurring.)

Department of Financial and Professional Regulation entered final order permanently revoking Plaintiffs' registrations under Title Insurance Act. Evidence showed that person who engineered "mortgage rescue" transactions, and for which Defendant Title Company acted as title agent, engaged in dishonest dealings as to disbursement of loan proceeds, was a manager and key decision maker of and had effective ownership interest in that title company through his mortgage company. Department's conclusion that titled company violated Title Insurance Act by employing him and allowing him ostensible ownership while engaged in dishonest dealings was not clearly erroneous. (HARRIS and QUINN, concurring.)

Mortgage foreclosure action filed, and court denied intervenor's motion to vacate confirmation of judicial sale. Plaintiff invoked mandatory obligations under 15-1508(b) of Foreclosure Law when it properly motioned for confirmation of Sale. Intervenor failed to carry its burden of proving that sufficient grounds existed to vacate confirmation of sale, as intervenor failed to show that "justice was otherwise not done" in sale, per Section 15-1508(b) of Foreclosure Law. Intervenor relied solely on County recorder of deeds website rather than reviewing the lis pendens itself, which lists mortgage at issue as mortgage to be foreclosed, and lists second mortgage under title "other parties of interest". (CONNORS and SIMON, concurring.)

LLC owner and developer of luxury condominium sued lender, claiming breach of forbearance agreement by filing deed in lieu of foreclosure in absence of material default. Court properly entered summary judgment for lender, as borrower committed a material default in failing to meet aggregate sales goal. Court properly followed intent of parties when they entered into forbearance agreement, per schedule set out in agreement, and thus borrowers should be credited net amount for parking space exchange transaction. Express terms of forbearance agreement permitted lender to file deed in lieu of foreclosure upon any event of default. (NEVILLE and STERBA, concurring.)

(Court opinion corrected 6/25/13.) Sellers of lakefront home stated, on their mandatory Disclosure Report, that they were not aware of any material defects with walls or floors. After purchase, buyers discovered numerous material defects in leaking windows, patio doors, and garage door. Obligation to disclose material defects in "walls" of home does not also require a seller to disclose material defects in windows or doors. Residential Real Property Disclosure Act is not intended to mandate disclosure of all potential material defects, but only those 23 items listed as conditions or material defects, and Act must be strictly construed. (WRIGHT, concurring; LYTTON, specially concurring.)

Plaintiffs filed complaint to quiet title to parcel of land; Defendants counterclaimed for decree quieting title in their favor. Court erred in quieting title in favor of Plaintiffs following bench trial. Clear-and-convincing is proper standard of proof under Section 13-110 of Limitations Act. Although Plaintiffs never took possession of parcel, it was because possession was not practicable as land was not "vacant and unoccupied" As Plaintiffs received no interest in parcel from chain of title, they have no title and thus they cannot quiet title. Thus, as Defendants demonstrated superior title, court should have quieted title in their favor. (BURKE and McLAREN, concurring.)

In mortgage foreclosure action, after Defendant filed untimely answer, court entered order of default and judgment of foreclosure. Court entered order approving sale and distribution of property. Defendant failed to comply with Section 2-301(a) of Code of Civil Procedure when he filed his answer, and thereby waived all objections to court's jurisdiction.Subsidiary of bank is exempt from requirements of Collection Agency Act. (HOWSE and PALMER, concurring.)