Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in State Building Venture v. O'Donnell, In re the commitment of Hernandez, People v. Zimmerman, People v. Amigon, People v. Alexander, People v. Jocko and People v. Carrera.

CIVIL

Vancura v. Katris

By Jean M. Prendergast, Schuyler, Roche & Crisham, P.C Today, in Vancura v. Katris, the Illinois Supreme Court unanimously reversed a trial court’s ruling that Kinko’s, Inc. (“Kinko’s”) bore liability for an employee’s decision to notarize plaintiff’s signature, which caused the loss of plaintiff’s interest in a mortgage note. It was undisputed that plaintiff never signed the document at issue. Plaintiff posited three theories: (1) violation of Section 7-102 of the Illinois Notary Public Act (“Act”) (5 ILCS 312/7-102 (West 1996)); (2) negligent training; and (3) negligent supervision. Interestingly, the Court disagreed with the appellate court’s determination that Kinko’s forfeited review of the common law claims by failing to provide adequate legal support. Instead, while the Court found certain of Kinko’s cited cases unpersuasive, it nevertheless found the citations and argument sufficient to satisfy Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7). In contrast, the Court ruled that plaintiff violated Rule 341(h)(7), and thus, forfeited his right to review of the appellate court’s judgment against him on his claim for violation of the Act. The Court next examined the common law claims and held that Section 7-102 of the Act was intended to modify the common law. Thus, the common law duty of employers of notaries extends only as far as the Act; the employer has a duty not to consent to the official misconduct of its employees. Plaintiff never argued that Kinko’s had any knowledge of its employee’s misconduct.

CIVIL

Krywin v. The Chicago Transit Authority

By Jean M. Prendergast, Schuyler, Roche & Crisham, P.C Today, in a 5-2 decision, the Illinois Supreme Court in Krywin v. The Chicago Transit Authority, held that a common carrier’s duty to provide passengers with a safe place to alight must yield to the natural accumulation rule. Under that rule, a landowner has no duty to remove natural accumulations of ice, snow or water. The plaintiff-passenger had fallen as she exited a train onto a slippery CTA platform. The court affirmed the appellate court and reversed the passenger’s nearly $400,000 verdict. The court also held that the CTA had no duty to identify a safer place to exit the train.  The court reasoned that the passenger failed to meet her burden to prove the feasibility of requiring the CTA to discharge all passengers safely during inclement conditions. The court took judicial notice of the magnitude of the CTA’s operations and observed that “it would be impractical to place a burden on the CTA to evaluate its train platforms” every time a train enters a station. Justice Freeman, joined by Justice Kilbride, dissented, pointing out that the majority’s holding disregarded the Local Government and Governmental Employees’ Tort Immunity Act (“Act”), which codified the natural accumulation rule, but also specifically excluded the CTA from the Act’s protection.  In addition, the dissent maintained that the majority decision is inconsistent with the court’s prior adoption of the principles stated in Section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which recognized that landowners are in a superior position to protect their invitees.

CIVIL

ABN Amro Mortgage Group v. McGahan

By Tim Eaton, Shefsky & Froelich Ltd. With the increasing number of foreclosure actions on residential homes, the high court addressed a question that has been to date answered by the lower courts inconsistently  --  that is whether a lender must name a personal representative for a deceased borrower in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding. The trial court found that a foreclosure proceeding was a quasi-in-rem proceeding requiring the mortgagee (borrower) to be a party, or if the borrower is deceased, a personal representative must be named in the action. The lender argued the proceeding was against the property only (in-rem), so no borrower was necessary. The appellate court agreed with the lender. The Supreme Court acknowledged that Illinois courts have ruled inconsistently in how these proceedings have been classified. But it resolved the issue in favor of the borrower since it found the object of the foreclosure is to enforce an obligation created by a contract between the lender and borrower, and therefore the borrower, or personal representative, becomes a necessary party. According to the parties’ briefs below, the resolution of this question will govern “literally thousands of current and future cases.” What is noteworthy about this appeal, is that there was no party bringing the appeal to the Supreme Court. The PLA was filed by an amicus, CVLS, a legal services group that represents indigent borrowers in foreclosure proceedings. Nevertheless, the high court allowed the petition and made no mention of the standing of the amicus in the opinion even though the issue had been raised earlier in prior motion practice.