People v. Bailey

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

In a unanimous decision, the Court reviewed the revestment doctrine. Since its first application in a criminal case in 1983 (in People v. Kaeding, 98 Ill. 2d 237), the revestment doctrine has always provided that a circuit court may be revested with jurisdiction over an untimely post-judgment motion where there is (1) active participation by the parties, (2) without objection, (3) in proceedings inconsistent with the merits of the earlier judgment. At issue was the meaning of the last element, "proceedings inconsistent with the merits of the earlier judgment." The Court clarified that the last element is met only in those circumstances where both parties assert positions that support setting aside at least part of the judgment. A failure to object on the basis of timeliness is not sufficient to revest the court with jurisdiction, rejecting the position asserted by the defendant.

The Court also clarified that the appropriate result in the case of improper revestment is not for the appellate court to dismiss the appeal. Rather, the appellate court should vacate the trial court's order addressing the merits of an untimely motion and should order that the untimely motion be dismissed.

This opinion confirms that the revestment doctrine is very narrow and will only apply in situations where both parties agree that there should be some modification to the final judgment. Thus, no party should rely on its ability to invoke the revestment doctrine and revest court with jurisdiction over an untimely pleading.

Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the civil cases Hooker v. The Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago, American Access Casualty Co. v. Reyes, and The Venture-Newberg-Perini, Stone & Webster v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Commission and the criminal cases In re Danielle J. and People v. Brown.

CIVIL

Hooker v. Retirement Board of the Firemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago

By Michael T. Reagan, Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan, Ottawa

This case resolved the issue of whether annuities paid to the widows of two Chicago firemen who suffered duty-related injuries and later died should have included “duty availability pay,” which had never been received by these decedents, in the calculation of the amounts. The calculation of an annuity is to be based on “the current annual salary attached to the classified position to which the fireman was certified at the time of his death.” The court noted that the amount of the annuity does not depend on the fireman’s actual salary during his career. “Duty availability pay” is paid on a quarterly basis to all firemen, except certain employees assigned to platoon duty.

Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Friday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the civil case In re Karavidas and the criminal case People v. Trzeciak.

CRIMINAL

People v. Trzeciak

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

Our panel of leading appellate attorneys review Thursday's Illinois Supreme Court opinions in the criminal cases People v. Johnson and In re Shelby R.

People v. Johnson

By Kerry J. Bryson, Office of the State Appellate Defender

At issue was whether Section 4-2002.1(a) of the Counties Code allows for imposition of a $50 State’s Attorney fee for hearing a 2-1401 petition. The statute refers only to imposition of the fee for habeas corpus proceedings.

The Court rejected the argument that “habeas corpus” was meant to refer, generically, to any collateral proceedings, noting that habeas corpus has a specific meaning. Considering the plain language of the statute as the best indication of legislative intent, the Court concluded that the reference to “habeas corpus” was meant to encompass the various types of habeas corpus proceedings (e.g., habeas corpus ad prosequendum, habeas corpus ad respondendum, habeas corpus ad testificandum), and nothing more. Inclusion of any other collateral proceedings would have to come from the
legislature.

While this decision is not particularly broad-reaching, it does demonstrate the Court’s adherence to long-standing principles of statutory construction, beginning with looking first to the plain language of the statute.  Where the plain language is clear, the Court will go no further in interpreting a statute’s meaning.